The North-East

The North-East has seen since then a number of insurgent groups whose tactics included intimidation, coercion, extortion, imposition of taxes, threats, kidnapping hit and run raids, attacks on isolated posts, ambushes, explosions, assassinations, terrorizing the population, and paralyzing the government. Perhaps the best known insurgency is the Naga revolt. Various groups, among them the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) having the best-trained cadre, either espouse secessionist rhetoric or demand a better deal. Insurgency is basically a reaction to years of economic neglect, political abuse, and prevalent corruption. All indicators of development such as capital formation, per capita income, communication network or irrigation facilities sow that the North-East remained far behind the rest of India. The clichés on neglect of man militants project common aspirations for better living and generally hold the Central Government responsible for deprivations. The people witness that come political parties, with a minority support among the electorate, manage to grab power through a display of money and parliamentary horse-trading. Further, the continuing influx of neighboring people changed the original essentials of demography in some states. In Tripura for instance, the indigenous people were reduced to a minority in their own land. In Assam, where the majority is engaged in subsistence agriculture, labour needs are met by considerably cheaper wages of the immigrants. But education outstrips, in the meantime, economic development. Only Arunachal Pradesh remained comparatively peaceful despite sharing a long international border with Bhutan, China, and Myanmar.

In addition to the impression of seclusion and uncertainty, caused mainly by the disruption of the old communications system following British India’s partition, incursions from neighboring China in the early 1960s further inflamed these feelings. All kinds passing after 1947 through East Pakistan almost the whole of the NE was land-locked. The original inhabitants were dependent on the outside for supplies and found the additional transport costs too much for their meager budgets. The arrival of Hindus from East Pakistan, independent Bangladesh in 1971, increased the insecurity of the North-Eastern peoples who feared the competition of the newcomers for jobs and food. The threat that the aliens might grow to dominate the lands of the indigenous people whipped up secessionist movements. The sloppy jungle setting was conducive to insurgency activities. In addition to the dire necessity of guarding the borders in that locality, a large force and the allocation of huge budget were essential for internal security.

Thus, India has been trying to counter and restrain two major insurgencies, one in J&K and the other in the NE. Neighboring Pakistan encourages terror in both regions where dissident sections among local inhabitants have genuine dissatisfaction but also yearn for tranquility and peace. The tribal tendency to administer themselves first surfaced (1953) with the Nagas and later (1966) with the Mizos. Ultimately, very few of the north-Eastern peoples avoided resort to arms. Even the peoples of Arunachal Pradesh, the Garos and the Khasis may be included among them. When ethnic unrest turned into armed militancy, terrorist attacks on civilians were frequently accompanied by full-fledged guerilla war. Poor farmers in destitute conditions and the unemployed youth with diplomas supported the militants. Parts of funds to solve the growing enigma were absorbed by corrupt administrators. The area soon became a beehive of scores of mostly armed militant organizations, nearly seventy or more highly active cliques in revolt, some inspired or sustained by India’s grudging neighbors, which attracted and engaged close to 200,000 Indian troops. Insurgent groups, often receiving incentives from Pakistan’s ISI, hit banks, smuggled drugs, abducted people and killed off adversaries.

It should never be forgotten that insurgent movements received external support for about two decades. The almost secluded and land-locked region of the North-East shares most (98%) of its frontiers with four independent Asian countries, and less than 2% is with the rest of India. The partition of the country and the artificial creation of international borders negatively affected the economic links of this region.[5]The whole territory looks like a distant corner with a shriveled neck linking it with the rest of the Indian Union. This isolation and the post-1947 disjunction encouraged neighboring China and Pakistan, in the 1960s, to keep the Mizo and Naga insurgencies on foot. Pakistan’s toehold had to melt away, however, with its frustration in the 1971 War. The support of the Kachin Independent Army, which had provided weapons and training to some Assamese, as well as Manipur and Naga groups, likewise underwent an eclipse in the late 1980s.

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) tried to establish some support among the Lanchpo and Note tribes in eastern Arunachal Pradesh and the Moriani sector of Assam. A number of insurgent groups, ostensibly to oppose the ‘Indialization’ campaign of the Central Government by allowing an inflow of Indians, joined hands to form a joint organization, styling themselves as the “Self-Defence United Front of the South-East Himalayan Region”.

The insurgents especially favoured the routes including two junctions, one connection Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, and other tying Mizoram with the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and the Chin Hills of Myanmar some of which are sparsely populated and offer the needed vegetation. Although the Indian army has been able to seal these routes, at least partially, by surprise attacks, as well as some synchronizing with the Myanmar authorities which have launched operations against the Chins, Kachins, Karens and Shans, the lasting solution is in the further recognition of their identities and more economic opportunities. There have been some accords with local groups; the key to peace, however, lies not in merely signing them, but in rapid economic development, and in understanding tribal psychology.

Some communities in India’s NE often enough express the belief that the rulers in the Centre have not been sufficiently caring or even fair to them. There have been times when some entertained the idea of leaving India. The feelings of inequity on the part of various ethnic groups and the rising expectations fanned the flames of autonomy. While the Naga insurgency remained for the greater part the most volatile one in the whole region, the neighboring Khasis and the Garos carved the state of Meghalaya out of Assam. The Bodos too wished a separate state on part of Assamese land. The Mizos in the south as well rose against the Indian state. The Dimasa Halong Dogou and the Karbi National Volunteers, in links with counterparts in Nagaland, expect separate homes for the Dimasa and the Karbi peoples. In spite of such agitation and convulsions, secession is not the unbroken and dominant trend.

Isolation being a geographical fact, several states such Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura carry on nearly all of their border trade with Bangladesh. Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland have barter trading relations with Myanmar. Mizoram among them exchange some products with Bangladesh as well. All had stopped trade with China following the frontier clash in 1962. India proceeded to sign a Border Trade Agreement with Bangladesh (1972) and with Myanmar (1994). As part of a drive to put a minimum infrastructure in place, the first trade route between Indian and Myanmar. Taking a second step, the Union Ministry of Commerce proposed to establish a Regional Trade Promotion Council to plan trade guidance and branches of the Agricultural Production Export Development Association. The airport at Guwahati, where a Trade Fair Exhibition was set up, underwent upgrading. All these new departures, however, may be no more than thin ends of the wedge. The products offered to world markets have to be of high quality at competitive prices.

Home Page