Manipur, a former princely state[1] with a hilly terrain, is sandwiched between Myanmar on the east and Assam on the west with Mizoram and Nagaland on the south and north. Manipur seems to be remote, inaccessible and therefore largely isolated. The Manipur River Valley extends from the north to the south, and the hill ranges include the Naga hills in the north, and the Chin and Mizo hills in the south. Manipur has a long (350km) border with Myanmar.[2] Although granted statehood in 1972,[3] the lands are surrounded by the Mizo and Naga separatists, in the southern and northern districts respectively. While some Manipur groups went to East Pakistan, others sought the assistance of China, in both cases to fight against the Indian Government. Insurgency in Manipur has been no less intense than in Nagaland. Besides the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), operation from Manipur, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kngleipak (PREPAK) are based in the Manipur Valley, and have at times played havoc with the people.

The Kukis[4] and the Nagas are the two main tribes[5] who live in the Manipur Hills, and the Métiers dwell in the valley. The Kukis, who are the ethnic cousins of the Mizos, congregate in the southern hills, where they are active in drug smuggling, a profitable business they do not want to share with the Tangkhul Nagas. The latter generally support a faction (Muivah-Isac group) of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. Thuengalin Muviah, who is a Tangkhul, is responsible for a series of terrorist acts in Manipur. The Meiteis, who have repudiated Hinduism which they had embraced about three-hundred years ago, now stress their pre-Hindu past.

Some years such as 1979-81 may be summed up as the peak of terrorist activities, but Manipur still goes through political instability. While the NSCN(M) is active in the hill districts, and the ethnic war with the Kukis take heavy toll of innocent lives politicians of practically all schools cultivate underground groups, eroding democratic institutions in the process. Some politicians use communal terror to serve their purposes, and most of the funds New Delhi provides find their way into the private accounts of corrupt bureaucrats.

Formerly the Mizo Hill district of Assam, Mizoram,[6] originally inhabited by small Tibeto-Burman stock,[7] became a state of India in 1972.[8] While the Mizo Union, a political party founded in the late 1940s, did not resist becoming a part of Assam, a secessionist group demanded that the people living in the hills or Mizoram should join the tribes of upper Burma where their kin congregated.[9] When the Mizo[10] Union (Which emerged to fight for the vested interests of the chiefs) carried all the seats, except the two won by the United Mizo Freedom Organization (UMFO), the latter sought support for the formation of a separate hill state bringing together some parts of Assam, Manipur, Tripura and NEFA, the present Arunachal Pradesh. One of the worst famines (1959) in the history of the country led to the Mizo National Front (MNF), which formed an armed wing called the Mizo National Army (MNA) and which demanded independence for Mizoram.

Insurgency[11] started in 1966 when armed MNF militants attacked some government installations, followed by an announcement declaring independence from the Indian Union. The MNF, with Pakistani and Chinese help, set up training camps in the Chittangong Hills, and later a provisional government in East Pakistan. The regrouping of some villages for economic development reasons or because the security forces find it difficult to penetrate alienated the local peoples. In the year 1971, when East Pakistan could no longer welcome the insurgents, the Indian Government gave “Union Territory Status” to the Mizo district, and a North-Eastern Council was organized to plan the integrated development of the whole region. The assassination of high-ranking police officers, nevertheless, continued until Lal Denga, the leader of the terrorists, who was staying in Pakistan, wrote to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressing a preference for peaceful settlement and accepting Mizoram as an integral part of India.

Prime Minister Morarji Desai, who succeeded Mrs. Gandhi after the latter’s defeat in the 1977 elections, expected Lal Denga first to surrender his arms before negotiations could proceed. There were frequent elections, new governments, recurring President’s rule, surrender of terrorist leaders, and the emergence of new factions. Some politicians, sweeping the polls, fell only to come back with the comfortable majority. Prime Minister Morarji Desia, who was given a very warm welcome by the people when he set foot on Mizoram soil for a two-day visit in late 1978, displayed extreme insensitivity to the sentiments of the local inhabitants and went back without the cheers of the crowd. Desai’s remarks having neutralized whatever constructive work had been done for some months, President Sanjiva Reddy, who visited the territory later, was also received in total silence.

A new wave of insurgency was perhaps inevitable, although unpopular on the part of the Mizoram people, who were fed up with violence. Terrorist acts continued even after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980. Following a series of events involving ambushes, attacks, killings, and setting of fires, the MNF leader Lal Denga met the newly elected prime minister and issued a statement repudiating terrorism. Although Lal Denga acknowledged that Mizoram was an integral part of India, he urged, in a 26-point memorandum submitted to the prime minister, for “Greater Mizoram”to comprise all the Mizo-inhabited parts of the neighboring states. One may note here that a small group, the Hmar People’s Convention (HPC), raised a demand for a state separate from Mizoram. In spite of the eruption of violence once again, the negotiations, between New Delhi and the MNF leader were proceeding satisfactorily when Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated in late 1984.

The new Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met Lal Denga, who signed the Mizoram Accord (1986) with the Union Home Secretary. Mizoram was granted statehood, and Lal Denga was sworn in as the new Chief Minister. The relative peace in Mizoram may be explained by the later moderate attitudes of the Mizo leaders as well as the Central government in New Delhi.

Tripura is a formerly princely state situate in the southwest of Assam, and surrounded by Bangladesh on three sides. It is linked with the Indian Union trough the Cachar district of Assam. The cause of terrorism in Tripura[12] is the response of some tribal organizations[13] to the massive migration first from East Pakistan and then from independent Bangladesh. Consequently, the indigenous peoples have been reduced to a smaller percentage in their own native land. Tripura insurgents, particularly the Sengkrak in the 1960s and the Tripura National Volunteers 9TNV, formerly Tripura Sean) in the 1970s, also resorted to secessionist rhetoric but mainly to secure a bett3r deal, and insurgents emerged as a reaction to the tribals’ growing marginalization. The successive waves of migration from the Chittagong, Comilla and Sylhet districts of Bangaldesh polarized the Tripura polity.[14] Those groups, like the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS), formed in 1967, or the Amra Bangali (AB) that most feared that they would lose their identity as well as their land, formed militant organizations ostensibly to protect their rights. While the Tripura tribals were alienated from the political and the economic process, the extremist movements thrived basically on poverty. Many joined the TUJS since it had a platform to protect the tribal interests in the state. Radicalism, preached by Bijoy Harangkhwal, led to the split of the TUJS, and the radicals, who styled themselves as the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV), formed (1977) their own organization and benefited from a training camp in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Maintaining close links with the Mizo underground, they committed a series of terrorist acts causing the death of more than a thousand non-tribals. Another one thousand lost their lives in the notorious Mandai massacre (1980). After the arrest of its leader (Harangkhwal), the TNV was succeeded (1980) by the All-Tripura People’s Liberation Organization (ATPLO), which also surrendered after a year.

But the violence during the 1988 Assembly elections left no alternative except to extend the Disturbed Area to Tripura. In spite of the accord between New Delhi and Harangkhwal in the same year, the attempt to manipulate the fact of terrorism and its consequences on the part of politicians for their narrow interests prevented the application of a long-term strategy and eventual peace. The militants who lost the support of the members of the tribes in the process now indulge in other criminal activities for personal gain. There is no separatist movement but violence for its own sake.

Insurgency in the NE thrived because the local peoples felt a separate ethnic identity combined with a suspicion of neglect. As elsewhere, outside support from across the borders added fuel to fire. The insurgents in the NE received some support from Bangladesh, China and Pakistan. Agitators set up operational bases or received training in safer localities in East Pakistan, later in Bangladesh. For Instance, both Phizo and Lal Denga, Naga and Mizo leaders, crossed over to Eat Pakistan where they were welcomed with open arms. The former’s three-year stay in Dacca was a prolonged one, and the latter’s uprising started (1966) after consignments of arms were dispatched from Chittagong. A few thousand insurgents were trained in camps close to the Indian border. For instance, the group led by Kaito Sema went (1962) to East Pakistan through the North Cachar Hills, and returned to Nagaland to blow up the railway track near Rangapahar (1963).[15]Several other groups under Duosi Chakhesang Zuheto Sema treckked to Pakistan and infiltrated back to Nagaland. The liaison officer of Lal Denga, the Mizo chief, was reportedly General Ershad, then a captain. After the temporary loss of rebel sanctuaries during the 1971 War, even the Tripura Volunteer Force found some patronage in Bangaladesh. ULFA of Assam also established contact with Pakistan’s ISI circles and the Afghan Mujahiddeen. It is believed, however, that the Government of Bangladesh freezed all help to the NE insurgents after the victory of the Awami League in the 1995 elections.

Active Chinese support to the Naga, Mizo, Meitei and Kuki rebels started in 1966, mainly in the form of instruction at the guerilla training centers in East Pakistan. China terminated material support in 1978. [16] ULFA had camps in the jungles of southern Bhutan. The rebels could use Myanmar territory for their own purposes on account of the inability of the government to effectively administer the hilly areas along India’s border.[17]

Although the time of troubles has not completely ended in the North-East, there have been constitutional and political adjustments some of which may be seen in Article 371 and onwards as well as through other dispensations such as the creation of sub-states, autonomous districts, and the North-Eastern Council, all giving some expression to new demands. Recent settlements caused many armed cadres to surrender their arms. The expansion of the economy, however, is a vital part of their rehabilitation. “Relative deprivation”[18] needs to be eliminated by attacking the roots of insurgency.[19] This can happen only if necessary conditions are created, coupled with education, entrepreneurship and market links. Waterways, hydro-power, varied plantation and tourist appeal may transform the lives of the North-Eastern people, who want and need peace. The whole region had been a part of larger Brahmaputra Yangtze-Mekong economic unit. A dynamic vision may be realized only if the interested governments take steps to re-establish the transit routes and markets disrupted by partition. Given Indo-Bangladesh settlement and improving relations with Myanmar, insurgency, gun-running, narcotics, and sanctuary will be replaced by market opportunities stimulating infrastructure development, trade, investments, joint ventures, and employment.

[1] Arun Kumar Sharma, Manipur: the Glorious Past, New Delhi, Aryan Books International, 1994.

[2] Leishangthem Chandramani Singh, The Boudaries of Manipur, Imphal, Pan Manipuri Youth League, 1970.

[3] M. Ibohal Singh, Constitutional and Legal History of Manipur, Samurou, Samurou Lakpa Mayai Lambi Law College, 1986.

[4] Thangkhomang S. Gangte, The Kkis of Manipur: a Historical Analysis, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 1993.

[5] Sipra Sen, Tribes and Castes of Manipur, New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 1992.

[6] Animesh Chandra Ray, Mizoram, New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1972.

[7] Lalrimawia, Mizoram: History and Cultural Identity, 1890-1947, Guwahati, Spectrum Publications, 1995.

[8] C.G. Verghese, A History of the Mizos, 2 vols, New Delhi, Vikas, 1997.

[9] Sipra Sen, Tribes of Mizoram, New Delhi, Gian Publishing House, 1992.

[10] The new name Mizo (mi meaning man, zo meaning hill) used in preference to Lushai.

[11] R.N. Prassad, ed., Autonomy Movements in Mizoram, New Delhi, vikas, 1994.

[12] Sambhuti Ranjan Bhattacharjee, Tribal Insurgency in Tripura: a Study in Exploration of Causes, New Delhi, Inter-India Publications, 1989.

[13] Description of tribes: Sipra Sen. Tribes of Tripura, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House 1993.

[14] Gayatri Bhattacharyya, Refugee Rehabilitation and Its Impact on Tripura’s Economy, New Delhi, Omsons Publications, 1988.

[15] S.P. Sinha, “Insurgency in North-East India: the External Factor”, U.S.I Journal, New Delhi, CXXVII/533 (July-September 1998), Also: Singh, Nagaland,

[16] For the China connection: Nibedon,

[17] Some Indian writers occasionally criticize the Indian Minister of Defecne (George Fernandes), whose sympathy for the pro-democracy movement in Mayanmar is no secret, for not taking action against illegal gun-running operations while the government frequently blames the unrest on “foreign hands”. For instance, Nitin A. Gokhale, “Route to Suicide”, Outlook, New Delhi, 1 February 1999,

[18] W.C Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1986.l

[19] P.S Datta, “Roots of Insurgency”, Seminar, New Delhi, 366 (February 1990)

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