The “Golden Crescent”

Although Afghanistan had officially banned opium poppy cultivation as early as 1957, the ban proved to be ineffective on account of the inaccessibility of the remote production areas and their domination by traditionally uncontrolled tribal forces as much as the irresolution and impotence of the central government in Kabul. The armed conflict after the Soviet intervention (1979) speeded up production. Its sale contributed to the funding of the anti-Soviet war effort, intermixed with the support of Pakistan and Iran to the Mujahideen. The Soviet adventure in Afghanistan exposed, in addition, large number of soldiers to drugs, in a way not dissimilar to the American experience in Vietnam.[19]

As a consequence of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, groups on both sid3es of the border, armed with modern automatic weapons, indulged in heavy clashes with guards when smugglers were intercepted. The unraveling of the Soviet Union also led to the break-up of the previously centralized anti-narcotics effort. The achievement of independence on the part of a number of non-Russian republics now prevent  cross-borden cooperation of police and customes officials but proves to be no obstacle to criminal trafficking. Nacro-mafia possesses large amounts of money to subvert those who should be combatiting them. The establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has in no way provided a key to the growing problem. The phenomenon is so exceptional that anti-drug activity has been written into the new Russian military doctrine. However, in addition to the lack of knowledge of modern investigative techniques and a chronic shortage of all kinds of equipment, the large sums of money, resulting from the drugs trade, is fuelling the corruption. Further, the opening of the borders since the collapse of the Communist bloc (1989) created new opportunities to ease the smuggling of drugs from far away places in the East.

While Iran became a major transshipment point for illegal opiates from Pakistan and Afghanistan, opium and heroine (not hashis) export from the latter increased even after the control of the country by the Taliban fundamentalist leadership, which imposed a ban on hashish, consumed by the Afghans, but not on poppies from which opium and heroine are made and exported. Islamic guerillas from Afghanistan have been endeavouring to extend their influence in Tajikistan and even beyond.

Owing to Pakistan’s vulnerable borders with Afghanistan in the north and its long coastal belt in the south, that country’s geographical location is perfect for drug trafficking.[20] For some years now, heroin has become the lifeblood of Pakistan’s economy and political system. Those who hold purse strings in production and transport purchase protection, gain access to political circles, and acquire large shares in industries and banking. It is also a major source for groups of local people, including the terrorists absorbed in violence at home and across the border. The profit to drug dealers is over $8 billion or almost double Pakistan’s annual budget. The country provides transit routes for drugs reaching the West via Pakistan International Airways (PIA) or the Karachi port, the main narcotics entrepot in the region. Hyderabad in Sindhi is also a leading way station for heroin on its way down to Karachi. Heroin in sold and bought throughout much of Punjab. The underworld of the legendary city of Lahore, whose oriental charm has allured the invader and tourist alike since times immemorial, is now run by various heroin gangs. The PIA routine was so repeatedly used that the Saudi Arabian authorities warned that direct flights between Peshawar and Jeddah could be stopped. [21] The Karachi course passes through Yemen to Southern Europe or the African route via Somalia and Ethiopia to Kenya and onwards. The Balkan journey starts in Afghanistan and advances via Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.[22]

The ban by the Iranian Revolution on all forms of narcotics production and consumption pressurized dealers to go underground or abroad, principally to Pakistan. Settling in Karachi and Quetta, the latter the capital-city of Pakistani Baluchistan, they helped reconstruct and enlarge covert drug activities. The ban by the Zia-ul Haq regime, especially the Prohibition Order of 1979, further coerced the dealers to go underground and bolstered the hands of the long-standing networks in the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab. In spite of General Zia’s Islamization policy, some senior officials around him were reportedly engrossed in drug-related pursuits. The war in Afghanistan disrupted some of the old routes, bringing Pakistan more to the foreground in the illicit drug trade. Such blossoming narco-link, aided by all these circumstances, enabled Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as much as the drug smugglers to bring arms to several parts of India including Kashmir.

No policy of containing and uprooting terrorism can be regarding if it does not fully reflect on and challenge the narco-link. The whole procedure, starting with its cultivation up to weapons purchases for insurgency, seems to be the greatest single breeder of violence and crime all over the world, including the conflict-ridden land of Kashmir. Some other clashes such as the Naga-Kuki violence also had their roots in the lucrative drug transactions. Much of the illicit drug profits are used to finance and arm insurgents and terrorists. The trade is further promoted by intimidating and corrupting some of the law-enforcers. A number of government officials are frequently blamed, although not necessarily indicted, for direct links with drug smuggling. Some key officials even in the security service are thus undermined and neutralized.[23] Not only the insurgents, but also some foreign powers may sponsor terrorism and drug trafficking if the latter seem to serve their short-term interests. Pakistan’s role in the case of Kashmir and that of violence in other parts of the Indian Union are no exceptions.

Drug money plays a significant role in Pakistan’s domestic politics. Those who dominate the parallel economy based on drugs enterprises may databilize any administration that threatens their business. They compose an additional centre of power, along with the constitutional establishments and justifiable pressure groups. One may even assert that laundered narcotics money in a way activates the political system. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), believed to have been charged with laundering drug money, financed the movement for the fall from power (1977) of the PPP government. Some drug barons, who supported party organizations and elections campaigns, were themselves voted as MPs on the basis of the sheer power of the contraband money. Various lists of drug traffickers, occasionally seen in print, [24] include a number of active politicians, elected or not.

The Afridis, Khattaks and the Yusufzais are the major drug networks functioning in the NWFP, Pakistan’s drug barons established a close trade nexus with other drug barons, including the Indian ones. Drug traffickers throughout the world resorted to destabilizing especially the border regions. The drug-mafia was so powerful during the eleven years of General Zia-ul Haq’s rule that it was running a parallel under ground economy. Major Farooq Hameed, a pilot of General Zia and arrested for heroin smuggling, was the leader of a gang which operated through an elaborate network linking Dubai, Britain and Norway. Malik Saleem, another Pakistani drug prince, was extradited to the United States after a long legal battle. It is asserted that Malik Muhammad Ayb Khan Afridi (also known as Haji Ayub), one of the biggest barons in Pakistan, supported Nawaz Sharif’s Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). Sohail Zia Butt, a Kashmiri and cousin-in-law of Nawaz Sharif,[25] was known to be the controlling mastermind of one of the larger heroine gangs in Lahore. The election campaign (1988) of Malik Meraj Khalid, who served as a Speaker in the National Assembly, was reportedly financed by Haji Mirza Iqbal Beg, a Lahore landlord active in election campaigns. Although the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)[26] and the European Narcotics Police tried to put him behind bars to grow weaker, he initially hid in the tribal belt on the Afghan border and then surrendered to Pakistani police (1989). Another one, Haji Ali Muhammad Notezai, was twice elected to the Baluchistan Cabinet was a well-known smuggler. While Moeen Qureshi’s caretaker government barred drug barons from contesting the 1993 elections, two renowned traffickers became members, nevertheless, in the provincial assemblies in Baluchistan and the NWFP.

While the drug money, laundered through a chain of investments before it returns to Pakistan, created a new billionaire class which became a major threat to Pakistan’s ailing democracy as well as to the social fabric and economic development, some individuals who expressed their dismay over involvement in narcotics smuggling became prey to the drug barons’ wrath. Dr. Sayed Majrooh, Director of the Afghan Information Center in Peshwar, was assassinated for objecting to clandestine drug operations, and Altaf Ali Khan, the regional chief the day after he supervised an anti-drug operation.

Some individuals in Pakistan’s armed forces were either arrested for heroin smuggling or were reported for extensive links with the drug mafias. For instance, Swedish authorities discovered (1976) large amounts of hashish in two Pakistan Air Force (PAF) aircraft, which were in Sweden to collect spare parts. In the early 1980s, some officers, mostly majors, were accused of drug-related offences. Lieutenant General Fazle Haq, an ex-Chief Minister and Governor of NWEP, was believed to be a protector of the drug business. Some army vehicles that transported weapons and ammunition to the Mujahideen were also drug carriers. Profits from drug trafficking were partially used to finance the war in Afghanistan. The Turkish authorities seized (1993) ten tons of heroin dispatched from Peshawar via Karachi in army trucks. Groups in Pakistan’s ISI are believed to have been involved in drug smuggling from the rebel-controlled poppy-producing areas of Afghanistan to Pakistan. Reportedly, Army Chief of Staff and the head of the ISI suggested[27] to the newly-elected Prime Minister Sharif that drug deals could be used to finance foreign covert operations. The army chiefs denied these claims.

There is also a link between illicit drug trafficking and Pakistan’s funding of insurgents in Kashmir and in other parts of India.[28] The Kashmir insurgency as well as Sikh militancy were partly funded by heroin. Initially, the old city gangs formed the base of the “Kashmiri Heroin Syndicate”. Sohail Zia Butt was the key figure linking the old city gangs with the men who regulated the flow of drugs and money. In a socio-cultural atmosphere wherein marriages are also alliances of wealth and influence, Butt’s career prospered along with those of the Sharif brothers. Haji Iqbal Butt was a close advisor to the Sharifs, and Aslam Butt was the syndicate’s “ambassador” to other drug mafias. He had good relations with Chaudhry Shaukat Bhatti, in charge of&nbsnbsp; the Arain community network around Lahore. The Hizb-e Islami of Gulbudding Hekmatyar, one of the strongest of the pro-Pakistani groups, and in the foreground of the Afghan Mujahideen, was not left out. Another pro-Pakistani group, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen was supported by the ISI. Similarl, the Sikh rebels, assisted by Haji Mirza Iqbal Beg, from the Arain community and Pakistan’s principal drug baron carried heroin across the border for money and arms. Iqbal Beg, who had brought a specialist to see General Zia’s retarded daughter, secured access to circles of power and privilege. Much of the profit from the drug trade is channeled into the purchase of arms, which end up in the hands of the local insurgents and imported mercenaries, who are among “the most determined zealots”.[29] Easily accessible weapons fuelled violence on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border. Pakistan’s ISI and India’s Research and Analysis Wing have waged a war against each other in Nepal, where Afghani-Pakistani networks of Wahabite Sunni persuasion have been working since the early 1980s. Sri Lanka is also increasingly used as a transit territory for narcotics, in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) may be involved.

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