Pakistani’s leadership led its people to believe that their country was incomplete without Kashmir being a part of it, simply because the Muslims constituted the majority there. Consequently, Pakistan launched its fourth war, now known as the Kargil War, for this land in mind-1999. It was significant because it happened to be first one fought with regular forced between India and Pakistan, both of whom had become overtly nuclear. India, which had demonstrated its ability to explode a nuclear device in mid-1974, carried out nuclear tests on 11 May 1998, and declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons. The five tests in 1998 emphasized the continuity of this capacity over the years. Pakistan, which tested a nuclear device in 1983, reached successful nuclear weaponization by 1987, and fired a nuclear intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) a year later, immediately carried out six in response to India’s five tests.[1]

When the American atomic bombs devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Gandhi had characterized the bomb as the most “diabolical use of science”.[2] Why did India require them more than four decades later?[3] For decades, its leaders pursued an independent and non-aligned foreign and defence policy. Simultaneously, India was critical of selective non-proliferation without disarmament. Permanent extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty without commitment to disarmament exposed the recalcitrance of the nuclear weapon states to realize a global abolition of those weapons. The unwillingness of the great powers in the post-Cold War international order to institute reforms in the United Nations system forced countries, especially those outside the alliance system, to develop national capabilities more seriously than before. Iraq and North Korea pursued clandestine nuclear programmes. China, a nuclear power with a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, had territorial disputes with India. France, which had given assurances that it would exercise utmost restraint in nuclear testing, regressed from its earlier moratorium.

With the overt nuclearization of both India and Pakistan in 1998, a full-scale war between the two neighbors was unrealistic, but there was still some scope for limited war. This is what occurred in kargil, which stood at the worst stand off between the two countries since 1971. Tow important conclusions of the armed conflict were that a number of countries exhibited sympathy for the India position, and that Pakistan soon needed a face-saving device adding to the tensions in the domestic power structure that finally brought another military coup.

The Indian and Pakistani bombs breached the monopoly of the five powers that monopolized the permanent seats in the U.N. Security Council. They also triggered a wave of sanctions in the United States, where not all influential people thought that these two Asian countries had no right to go nuclear. The Kargil War fought against this background, caused shifts in the approaches of some leading states, principally the United States and China. American pressure on Pakistan, signifying a shift in approach, to pull back its forces to the Line of Control, the neutrality of China, to which Pakistan owed some of the significant transfers of nuclear weapons technologies, and even the reluctance of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to endorse Pakistan’s presence in Kargil boosted New Delhi’s stand. Responses principally from Washington and Beijing hastened Pakistan’s retreat perhaps earlier than expected.

Blunder in Kargil

In May 1999, Pakistani Army regulars and mercenaries belonging to at least four militant or terrorist organizations[4] crossed the LOC into the Drass-Kargil-Batalik sector of Ladakh.[5] The Indian press reported it as a “new dimension” of Pakistan’s decade-old “proxy war” against India.[6] The LOC was established by mutual consent under the Simla Agreement. Since Pakistan, beginning with its creation, had made cross-border infiltration a pillar of its policy, what may now be termed as “Pakistan’s fourth war for Kashmir”[7] was a military operation, the Mujahideen  and other fighters playing a supportive role. It was, then only in a limited sense that the Kargil episode was another manifestation of “medieval malevolence spilling over from Afghanistan”.[8] It was foremost a military aggression, mainly led by Pakistan’s army regulars across a wide stretch of line, previously agreed upon to be the border. The intrusion into Indian air space of a Pakistani Navy maritime reconnaissance (Atlantique) aircraft and its shooting down added yet another dimension to the tension. Those who occupied Kargil heights were not Mujahideen, but were from Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry.[9] While the attacking side continued to fan the flames of “Islamic” militancy, India countered the surprise through the lethality of its response, and was generally praised for its restraint. Although the nature of the terrain may motivate a determined enemy to do the same all over again and, a few post-Kargil incidents such as the intrusion of a Pakistani aircraft to not help in returning to the table, there is no working alternative other than a meaningful dialogue if both parties are willing and ready to utilize the Simla Agreement as the basis.

Some Pakistanis expressed a doubt that LOC in Kashmir, as indicated in the Simla Agreement, was vague. It was discussed, on the other hand, with meticulous care, maps giving detailed references and descriptions of landmarks. They were checked and re-checked before the representatives of the two countries signed the documents. The members of the delegations were made up highly respected individuals, who met no less than nine times at Suchengarh (India) and at Wagah (Pakistan) leaving nothing as uncertain.[10] The wording of the paragraph (4/ii) dealing with the sanctity of the LOC of the Simla Agreement is as follows: “…Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations Both sides undertake to refrains from threat or use of force in violation of this Line”. The invasion was also a violation of the United Nations Charter.

Genral Pervez Musharraf. Then the Army Chief, admitted that his troops had captured 500 sq. km. Of Indian territory across the LOC in the Kargil sector.[11] India’s conventional military superiority hanging over Pakistan like a permanent Sword of Damocles, the Z.A. Bhutto government is Islamabad pursued a nuclear programme right after the 1971 defeat. India’s conventional superiority was, thus going to be neutralized. Pakistan manufactured a nuclear deveice and tested it in 1983. The year 1987 may be singled out as the date for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, followed by a new wave of extreme violence in Kashmir (1988). The years 1998 and 1999 witnessed more nuclear and IRBM tests. Both India and Pakistan declared themselves nuclear weapon states in May 1999. Pakistan assumed that the nuclear umbrella would allow action without risks. The chances of India’s retaliation would be much lower on account of the hazard of escalation to a nuclear weapon exchange. Not only feelings of revenge for earlier defeats would be compensated and tensions in the domestic power structure lessened, but armed hostilities would be stopped by the international community anyway. While new waves of the Mujahideen might infiltrate into Kashmir, Pakistan would establish military bridgeheads across the LOC, dominating the Drass-Kargil road, which is the only link between Srinagar and Leh. Just as the Sino-Soviet border armed conflict on the River Ussuri (1969) did not bring nuclear weapons into the equation, the strategy of limited war[12]became a Pakistani scenario.

A previous (1987) Pakistani plan to occupy the strategic hilltops in and around Kargil had to be abandoned when former Lieut. General, and then, Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan explained, in the presence of General Zia, the reasons why he found the idea militarily inappropriate.[13] About a decade later, Pakistan’s Army Chief General Jahangir karamat was forced to resign when he made public talks, unusual under the circumstances, on the need for better decision-making in national security matters. General Musharraf, who had standing links with several Islamic fundamentalist organizations, had trained Mujahideen groups, and had experience in mountain welfare, was appointed (1998), superseding three officers senior to hi, In Karamat’s place. There is some evidence that Pakistan has been planning an invasion to acquire a bridgehead across the LOC.

Considering the necessarily large gaps in the deployment of guards and troops in particular sectors of the LOC, it is comparatively easy to set up initial positions on the Indian side of the line. India decided to launch Operation Vijay, and its prime minister described the situation as “war-like” one.[14] Pakistan’s action soon turned out to be a military disaster. [15] Prime Minister Sharif’s meeting (4 July 1999) with President Clinton and the former’s promise that he would appeal to the “Kashmiri freedom fighters” to pull out was blueprint for a total defeat. Moreover, the Indian forces conducted themselves with predictable élan. For the first time, the world opinion seemed to endorse India’s policy stance on the Kargil conflict.

Pakistan needs to repair the damage that it has done to trust through confidence building deeds. Although Kargil does not compare with the previous wars in terms of forces or casualties involved, new Kargils have to be prevented.[16]One may remember that centuries ago Muhammad Ghauri attacked prithviraj seventeen times before he achieved success. The geographical fact of Pakistan cannot be ignored. India recognizes the sovereign state of Pakistan, and this is final, But hand in hand with the use of the latest technology to enhance security goes a dialogue which can be productive only if the LOC is respected.

The U.S. Modifies Behaviour

The Kargil episode caused an unequivocal tilt in U.S. policy in favour of India, which virtually an international consensus designated as the victim. The initial American reaction of urging mutual restraint in this episode fast gave way to a conviction that fighting would end only of the intruders departed either voluntarily or by force. The Americans more and more concerned over the export of rigid Islamic orthodox into Kashmir, persuaded the G-8 countries to demand full respect for the LOC. Supporting the Indian position on bilateralism, Washington now lays greater emphasis on Indo-Pakistani Army’s actions in Kargil threatened to derail. The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had affirmed the finality of partition by visiting the Minar-e Pakistan in Lahore.[17]

The United States had come a long way since the days of John Foster Dulles, later Secretary of State, who said that the Nehru-led interim government in India had allowed a strong Soviet influence.[18] Within the framework of global confrontation with the Soviet Union, Washington categorized Pakistan as a geostrategic ally in the “Northern Tier” of nations geographically under the nose of the Communist bloc. Dulles had considered India’s non-alignment as “immoral”[19] American global interest vis-à-vis its competition with Communism influenced its stance on Kashmir rather than the merits of the issue itself. American partiality generated then official Indian reactions demanding the exclusion of Americans from the U.N. Commission on Kashmir. Only Chinese-Indian conflict in 1962 broke the ice slightly, Washington nevertheless pressuring Nehru to settle it on terms more favourable to Pakistan, loomed behind the American suggestions for bilateral talks between the two countries in 1962063. U.S. diplomacy supported Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis, which was partly responsible for the subsequent Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971). After the Cold War, a new era appeared to have dawned, however, in Indo-American relations, which was reflected in the enhanced level of interactions among the high level officials, establishment of a “commercial alliance” and signing of a “defence cooperation” agreement. After the U.S. Commerce Department designated India as one of the new “Big Emerging Markets”, the amount of American foreign investment in India during the first year of the Clinton Administration, although still a small amount in relative terms, exceeded the cumulative U.S. investment in India from 1947 to mid-1991.[20]

Although the United States at times exerted some influence to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, the pattern of interactions with India were fluctuating while misperceptions remained consisting of various elements.[21] For instance, U.S. acceptance of the workability of the Simla Agreement became evident as American intelligence gathered sufficient proof on Pakistan’s inseparable involvement initially in training and arming of Kashmiri militants, and then in backing the Taliban. Cultivating some contacts with Pakistani-sponsored separatist groups in the United States, some American officials on occasion projected themselves as potential mediators within a trilateral frame of reference. Some American study groups or politicians, nevertheless, suggested the Simla option and the partition of J&K along the present LOC, perhaps with some minor adjustments.

The paradigmatic shift in U.S. policy towards India is more discernible after the Kargil experience. Apart from the merits of the incident as well as the broader Kashmir conflict, a writer portrayed the shift as “Kargil Spring” emerging from the “Nuclear Winter” of 1998.[22] Besides being a democracy, India is a major player in Asia, destined to become a great power in a near future. Apparently, the United States, first of all, acknowledged the fact that the genesis of the Kargil crisis lay in Pakistan’s adventurism, and refused to support a call for the internationalization of the issue in the wake of that crisis. It also rejected the Pakistani questioning of the legitimacy of the LOC. The change in the rules of military engagement on account of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Sub-continent, made the United States deeply concerned on account of the danger of tensions escalating into a nuclear conflict. The Indian-American community, a wealthy minority in the U.S. did not even adopt merely a neutral position like China, whose departure from its former pro-Pakistan support is of value to India. The position of Washington, which played a crucial role in moderating the old OIC policies, has been unambiguous.

When I.K. Gujral, a former Indian Prime Minister, was talking to President Clinton in 1997, he was reminded of the Biblical saying that goes: “…delays are not denials”.[23] Utilizing the opportunities that lie beyond Kargil, the two countries may agree, not only on a bilateral solution on the basis of partition along the LOC, but they may join forces against international terrorism, narcotics and small arms proliferation, and even seek to iron out differences on a range of other issues. In spite of a bitter conflict over Korea in the early 1950s. China and the U.S found ways of confronting the Soviet Union together within a span of less than two decades. Similarly, India and the U.S. may be at the threshold of a more flexible approach towards each other. They now have an opportunity to build on the trust generated by the Kargil crisis.

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