Assam is a part of the NE that controls the eastern end of the neck that links this region with India.[1] A former governor of Assam says that the loss of this state would mean the dispossession of the entire land mass in the North-East with its rich natural resources.[2] It is the core state of that region. Although once undivided Assam was later balkanized into various political units, its preeminence prevails. Its population is more than twice the total number of citizens of the remaining six states, and the ration in terms of economic resources is also in its favour.

Like the other neighboring states, Assam’s feelings of neglect were partially ignored as ad hoc politics little by little by little were offered to deal with violence. Assam’s borders kept changing during the colonial era.[3] Following Britain’s conquest (1826)of Assam, the Cachar and the Jaintia Hills were added to it but with Lord Curzon’s partition of Bengal (1905), Assam was altogether joined to the new entity of East Bengal. The Assamese were thus reduced to a minority in that new province until their land was elevated to the status of a governor’s province in less than two decades. Bengali clerks and professionals coma with the British, who owned the tea gardens. While the labourers in them were mostly from the neighboring areas, the middlemen were all Marwaris from Rajasthan. The settlement of Bengali Muslims on large tracts of state land with the intention of “growing more food” during the Second World War, was motivated by Political reasons, and actually grew more Muslims in Assam.

During the partition of India, the predominantly Muslim Sylhet joined with East Pakistan, and later (1951) Dewangiri was ceded to Bhutan. Four tribal districts of Assam, namely, the Garo Hills, the Lushai Hills, the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, and the Naga Hills were elevated to the status of autonomous states of Nagaland (1963), of Assam, that state experienced considerable shrinkage of its area.[4] Assam became a state with a very high percentage of Muslim migrants continue. The Assamese will soon be a minority in their own state. They have produced, nevertheless, several persons who have made their mark at the national level.[5] Assam always had a fertile land and sparse population. Although rich in natural resources and having a favourable population-land ratio, Assam is behind the Indian Union average in respect to power supply, health facilities, education and communications. The state of the whole infrastructure is poor. Stagnation in both the industrial and agricultural sectors has resulted in about 12% unemployed or underemployed. Close to half of the population lives on or below the poverty line. Illiteracy is growing; hospitals are ill-equipped; much of the land is inaccessible. The village economy is still at a subsistence level. Floods adversely affect one-third of the agricultural land. The consumer goods are brought from outside, so whatever wealth there is, produced mainly from the oil sector, flows outside. Otherwise, Assam possesses many ingredients such as oil, coal, hydro-power potential, fertile land (tea) and cheap labour. With a population increasing and economic expectations shrinking, the Assamese identity is also threatened by outsiders who take control over trade and

Assamese nationality is plagued by massive and unceasing immigration. Newcomers from Bengal, Bhutan, Bihar, Nepal and Tripura swarmed into Assam. Bengali Hindus were forcibly evicted, and Bengali Muslims came for economic reasons. Since settlers from the neighboring countries and parts of India make up a sizable portions of Assamese society, the middle class especially feels threatened culturally as well as economically and politically, and the Assamese consequently ask for job reservations and seats in electoral politics. In addition, tribal ethnic groups such as the Bodos and even the Karbis underline their separateness from the mainstream community.[7] The deportation of illegal Hindu immigrants who rushed out of the Sylhet area of East Pakistan as well as the alleged neglect of the Bodo language coupled with the demand for a separate state of “Bodoland” within the Indian Union were the main issues behind terrorism in Assam. The Hindus had abandoned their original places of residence in East Bengal for economic reasons as much as in response to the Islamization drive of the Government of Pakistan. Large-scale immigration persisted after the secession of the eastern wing of that Islamic state. Assam now has a total of 269 km.of border with Bangladesh. Although ethnic divisions surfaced more and more in the 1990s, Assam has experienced turmoil since 1979.[8] It was in late 1978 that the All-Assam Students’ Union (AASU) started agitation against the infiltration of outsiders. This group of Assamese students especially resented the inclusion of the foreigners in the voters’ list. “It needed only a spark for a popular agitation to being in 1979.”[9] The objective of the “Asom” movement, initiated (1979) by the All-Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), was to deport all foreigners. The year 1980 witnessed the launching of a serious drive to deport illegal immigrants. The government’s refusal to drop the name of those immigrants from the electoral rolls, in contradiction to the demands of the AASU which insisted their agitation when their demands could not be met in full. Initially the backing and later the championship of the energetic student leaders of this movement finally bred the Lalonga tribal attacks (1983) on Muslim villages at Nellie involving the hell of plunder and butchery over 1,700 persons. Mrs. Gandhi decided to forge ahead with state elections, which was boycotted by the AASU leadership and which attracted a very small percentage of the electorate. Although the new Chief Minister (Hiteshwar Saikia) convinced the student leaders to give up the expulsion of the immigrants who had come to Assam before 1971, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), organized in 1979 with some backing from Pakistan’s ISI and links with the Kachin and Naga insurgents, indulged in a series killings and attacks on communications to create terror. It also helped the poor, acquiring at times a Robin Hood image. With no cutback in terrorist acts and no progress in secret talks with the AASU leaders, elections were renewed, and the dynamic student group came to power. After the AASU leads resigned from the student organizations, and AAGSP was voluntarily dissolved, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), formed by the leadership of these movements, came to power on a towering tide of Assamese sub-nationalism. The man on the street shared the view that everything would be well since youth power took control of the land. Although the new government immediately generated optimism, confidence in it was short-lived as the young politicians soon succumbed to corrupt practices and quickly wasted their initial support. Representing frustrations in the Assamese society, the youth leaders raised hopes for a better future but lacked the know-how and the direct support of the Centre necessary to clear up the complex puzzles of this isolated state. Cold water was poured on the electorate when practically nothing was done to remove the difficulties. V.P. Singh’s government in New Delhi had to dismiss the administration, and the President’s rule was established (1990) in Assam. The new administration, which degenerated into army supremacy, thus harboured another explosive predicament.
Response of the government to agitation between the years 1979-85 further motivated the militant organizations to enforce a blockade on the export of crude oil, jute and some other products. Some student groups may have made an issue out of the establishment of an oil refinery, but it was the sober reality of ever increasing foreign nationals which seemed to threaten the identity of the Assamese and kept the Assam movement alive. A movement against the Barauni Refinery, connected with the pumping of crude oil out of Assam and the construction of pipeline to take the commodity to the refinery in the neighboring state of Bihar, further alienated groups to each other. The oil pipelines have served as target symbols for terrorist groups. But it was actually the ceaseless influx of immigrants that fanned disorder in the society as much as disarranging the economic set up of the province. “The Assam Distributed Areas Act” went into operation during the same period. The report (1984) of the Central Government Commission recommended that Assam may be granted “special protection as in Kashmir” where no electorate can be bought by or sold to an outsider. Just about simultaneous with the fall of the local government, Operation Bajrang started assaults on the ULFA camps near the border or in the forest areas. Although the army operation was not a great success in some camps such as at Lakhipather, it nevertheless created the conviction that the government, and not ULFA camps near the border or in the forest areas. Although the army operation was not a great success in some camps such as at Lakhipather, it nevertheless created the conviction that the government, and not ULFA, controlled Assam. Some terrorists at Saraipung were taken by surprise, but many escaped at Tinsukhja. The myth of their impregnability vanished, however. After the Assam Accord (1985) between RajivGandhi’s government and the AASU, new elections were held, and the Asom Gana Parishad, the newly-created party, achieved a landslide victory. The Accord, officially known as the Memorandum of Settlement, could not be interpreted in full, however. The number of immigrants did not decrease after the Assam Accord. The local chapters of the political parties needed the votes of these additional residents, who were illegal settlers from, abroad, and therefore, non-citizens. India had passed a single ‘Foreigners Act, for the whole of the country except Assam, and the special Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act (1983) was put into operation for Assam only. Neither the poor application of the Act, nor the cosmetic changes (1988) to it met the requirements of the day. Although groups in revolt continued to enjoy the support of likeminded cliques in Bangladesh, and certainly of Pakistan’s ISI, India’s agreement with Bangladesh on challenging the terrorists discouraged some of them who previously benefited from logistics and training facilities in Chittagong and Sylhet. In 1992, a group of ULFA leaders issued statements in favour of giving up and ending violence and, at the same time, denouncing the Bangladesh-based leaders who had links with the ISI. Pradeep Gogoi, vice-chairman of ULFA, according to his admission, was on official guest in Pakistan in most of 1991.[10] Although the ULFA statements opted for a peaceful solution within legal means, some of their members continued terrorism in Assam and still others stayed in the Cox’s Bazaar and Mymensigh camps of Bangladesh. Various Assamese groups harbour a sense of neglect but do not seek a separate sovereign entity based on the principles of self-determination. They cherish feelings of affinity with the remainder of India, and expect the Centre to help them develop. Probably, ULFA remains the largest underground organization with a front-runner place in militancy. Militant camps, formerly in Assam, moved into the jungles of neighboring Bhutan. Although many ULFA militants surrendered with their weapons, operating from sanctuaries across the border, their potential for hit and run remains. During the Lok Sabha elections of 1998, Assam was one of the few states where polling was completely peaceful, and the voter turn-out was 62% as against the national average of 54%.[11]There are also fundamentalist groups such as the United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam and the Muslim Liberation Tigers, engrossed mainly in retaliations against militant Assamese groups. A demand for a separate state of Bodoland within the Indian Union is widespread in the northern part of the Brahmaputra, where the Bodos complain of neglect of their language and feel exploited but where they do not constitute the majority in any area. In fact, they are no more than 4% of the population of Assam. They claim, however, the entire north bank of the Brahmaputra. The Bodos, early immigrants of Mongoloid stock from China, constitute the eighth largest tribe in India. They are scattered on the pasture lands of north Bengal as well as in the Manas sanctuary bordering Bhutan. Alienated from the majority community (the Assamese), the Bodo tribes felt disturbed that their own culture might leave no trace in some future date. Enjoying very little constitutional guarantees among all the Scheduled Tribes of India, their initial demand was limited to the inclusion of the BODO language as the medium of instruction in schools and the adoption of the Latin script. The BODO Sahitya Sabha (BSS) was formed (1952) to unite the BODO people on the language issue. When the BSS suggested the use of the Latin script for the Bodo, the Central Government insisted on the Devanagari letters of Hindi, which soon proved to be incompatible for that tribal tongue. The Bodos finally adopted the Latin script. There was much more than that to the Bodo grievance and the Assamese response to it. The underlying conflict came to the surface when the life of the landless peasants worsened, and when the Assamese felt that the Bodo desire to administer their own community could further divide Assam, which had already lost Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. Other related issues seemed to be playing a role when the All-Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) joined hands with others to stop the flow of crude oil from north Assam to a refinery in Bihar. Dreading the power and oppression of the non-Bodo majority, the Bodos, previously trained in arms by the Special Security Bureau (SSB) as a rear-line of defence, have committed acts of terrorism since the 1980s. The demands for a separate homeland for the Bodos, first launched resolutely in 1984, were confined basically to a full fledged Bodoland on the north bank of the Brahmaputra and autonomous districts in the south of the same river. Until 1987, they were satisfied with the demand for an autonomous council, an enjoyed by the other Assamese hill tribes. The Memorandum of Settlement, or the Bodo Accord, signed (1993) between the leaders of the Bodo movement on the one hand, and the central and state governments on the other, granted considerable autonomy to these tribal people living in about 2,000 villages. Some of the Accord’s cardinal parts could not be implemented owing to government half-heartedness as much as infighting among the resurgent factions. Moreover, insisting on the inclusion of an additional 2,000 villages plus the forests near the Bhutan border, the Bodo leaders gave the impression that they were gradually but progressively enlarging the frontiers of a separate ‘Bodoland’. Apparently, conditions were not ripe for the success of an agreement. A number of Bodo leaders categorically rejected the Bodoland Autonomous Council, created by this agreement and comprising certain districts and villages. They suspected that some other villages were not included because the latter were situated near the international border.
Several militant groups such as the National Democratic Front for Bodoland (NDEB) and the Bodoland Liberation Tiger Front (BLTF) compete for leadership. There are other tribal organizations like the Bodoland Statehood Movement Council (BSMC),, the People’s Democratic Front (PDF), the All-Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), and the United Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front(UTNLF) that have laid claim to legitimate representation of the people. The Bodo Security Force, a militant organization operating on the side, persisted in terrorist activities. Efforts for a political settlement have borne nor fruit so far. While New Delhi recently set up a working group to assess the Bodoland issue once more, the Bodos continue to feel that their culture is being swallowed up by the Assamese dominance. It may be asserted that the struggle of the Bodos, since 1966, has been more for a separate political identity than a separate state on the north bank of the Brahmaputra, as well as local autonomy for the districts of Rabha and Tiwa in the south. Although Bodo terrorism has not underscored separatism, the ISI and the NSCN interference may feed secessionist tendencies, not entirely non-existent, for an “independent Udaychal state”. The Bodo militants proved to be more ready than the ULFA leaders to negotiate to end the bloodshed. Nevertheless, various terrorist organizations to not shrink from occasional killings among themselves in order to win the support of the entire Bodo nation. Further, keen to attain numerical majorities in areas where they are less than half of the population, the Bodos are also prone to evict especially the landowning immigrant Muslim Bengalis and the Santhals. It should be added that when hundreds died and many more became homeless, some Santhal groups founded several armed organizations such as the Adiulfa, the Bisra Commando Force and the Cobra to withstand the Bodo attacks. In view of such off-an-on carnage, New Delhi insisted on the inclusion of safety devices in the Bodo Autonomous Council areas. [1] Iscot Marbaniang, Assam in a Nutshell, Shillong, Chapala Book Stall, 1970. [2] S.K. Sinha, “Insurgency in Assam”, U.S.I. Journal, New Delhi, CXXVIII/533 (July-September 1998), [3] Nari Rustomji, Enhanted Frontiers: Sikkim, Bhutan and India’s North-Eastern Border-lands, Calcutta, Oxford University Press, 1971: ____, imperiled Frontiers, Bombay, Oxford university press, 1983. [4] Shekar Gupta, Assam: a Valley Divided, New Delhi, Vikas, 1984. [5] For instance, F.A. Ahamad (former President of India) and D.K. Barooah (former President of the Congress Party). T.S. Murty, Assam, the Difficult Years: a Study of Political Developments in 1979-83, New Delhi, Himalayan Books, 1983. [6] Amiya Kumar Das, Assam’s Agony: a Socio-Economic and Political Analysis, New Delhi, Lancers Publications, 1982. [7] P.S Datta, ed., Ethnic Movements in Poly-Cultural Assam, New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications in association with Vikas, 1990. [8]Mahesh Joshi, Assam: the Indian Conflict, New Delhi, Prachi Prakashan, 1981; Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, Assam from Agitation to Accord, New Delhi, Genuine Publications, 1988. [9] Shailesh K. Singh, “Background to the Insurgencies”, Peace Initiatives: Assam Today, Can the Fires be Put Out?, New Delhi, IV/1-2 (January-April 1998), [10] Karan R. Sawhny, “Insurgency and Counter-insurgency: Ending Two Decades of Deadly Conflict in a Fracturing Polity”, [11] Sinha, Home Page