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Kashmir and Neighbors |
Violence in KashmirViolence in Kashmir | Fanning the Flames | The Retreat of the Rebellion Violence in KashmirIt may be asserted that since 1947 there has always been some conflict and even hostilities in Jammu and Kashmir. Terrorism, now more than a decade old, on the other hand, is the product of recent years. Initially led by the youth of Srinagar, for what they called azadi, later largely usurped by Pakistan, and finally turned into a proxy war against India by the same neighbour, terrorism may be said to have moved through a number of phases. As described earlier, interference blended with violence has longer past. The tribal raiders and the invading Pakistani forces targeted, in late 1947, some minorities and indulged in devastation and looting in this piece of territory that belonged to neighbour. Portraying Lal Shastri, who succeeded Nehru, as an ineffective and shaky leader, Pakistani commandos infiltrated into the same terrain a decade and a half later, only to find that they could not count on extensive support. It was the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane by two Al-Fatah activists in early 1971 to help gain the release of two of their associates held in a Kashmir jail that signaled the start of terrorism there. The militant movement resulted in crystallizing the attitudes of groups of people towards a religious ideology, pushing the nationalistic component of the Kashmir identity into a phase of dormancy. The new ideology perceives of an Islamic state stretching from Kashmir and covering Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. The weakening of the National Conference, the demise of Sheikh Abdullah, and the rising of Hindu fundamentalism in Jammu and Ladakh as well as in some other parts of India provided a fillip to the dissemination of such as Islamic orientation. Although Islamic ferver has not swept the entire Kashmir society, a new Caliphate movement “has great potential to come into conflict with the other [ethno-cultural] perception” in Kashmir.[1] Pakistan escalated its covert war in 1988 after it acquired nuclear weapons about a year before.[2] For years, the case of Kashmir presented the analyst with “an ideal study of proxy arming as an extension of policy by other means”.[3] Although much reduced now, terrorism has not yet abandoned the region. What is called the “Islamic” component of the strife may not remain confined to Kashmir alone; it still has the potential to spill over to other countries. |
Violence
in J&K commenced with the entry of Pakistani units into the land on
the grounds that the place of this Muslim majority state ought not be in
India. Although each census showed an overwhelming Hindu majority in the
Indian provinces, the Muslim community within the same union constituted
the largest minority. Not only India, but a good portion of world public
opinion strongly suspects that Pakistani which continues to keep
two-fifths of the state’s territory, creates political instability in
the rest of the state. Sheikh
Abdullah, who formally took over the government in early 1948,
emphasized Hindu-Muslim unity from the very beginning of his political
career having been convinced that only Muslim-oriented slogans would
bring misery for all. Nevertheless, he was dismissed, released on
account of his occasional but strong anti India statements. Violence
erupted after the disappearance in late 1963 of a stand of hair of the
Muslim prophet Muhammad at the Hazratbal Shrine. The mobs, which
destroyed some Hindu property and condemned the Chief Minister Bakshi
Ghulam Muhammad. Shouted slogans for the release of Sheikh Abdullah. The
latter, after discharge in early 1964, was invited both by the Pakistani
President Ayub Khan and the Indian Prime Minister Nehru to find a
solution to the Kashmir issue. Abdullah’s role abruptly came to an end
when Nehru suddenly died while Kashmir’s veteran statesman, who did
not trust any other Indian leader to the same extent, was still in
Pakistan. His statements in support of Pakistan’s demand for
plebiscite and his readiness to meet Chinese leaders led to his arrest a
year after Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru. As
briefly referred to above, Pakistan’s President mistook the new Prime
Minister’s soft style to mean irresolution and embarked on Operation
Gibraltar (and Operation Grand Slam) enabling 7,000 commandos to
infiltrate into Kashmir. It was supposed to initiate a guerilla movement
against the Indian Government. When the Indian security forces hit back
by taking Haji Pir Pass to stop infiltration, Pakistan militant
rebellion dispatched armoured units further provoking Indian response to
cross the international border. A.UN sponsored ceasefire, accepted by
both sides, ended the stalemate of the 1965 conflict. There seemed to be
no reason for an insurgency by the Kashmir Muslims. Mrs. Indira Gandhi,
who came to power after Shastri’s death (1965), showed more
understanding towards Shekish Abdullah who had always harboured secular
views that brought him closer to Nehru before 1947. It was the act of
two militants (Muhammaad Ashraf and Muhammad Hashim Qureshi), who
hijacked an Indian plane on 30 January 1971, and expected the release of
their saboteur colleagues, thereby widely opening the chapter of
terrorism in J&K. India banned the flights of Pakistani planes over
its territory when the hijacked aircraft was burned in Lahore. During
the same year, Pakistan lost Muslim population of East Bengal on account
of the fauls and misdeeds of its own armed forces, and not the
intervention of the Indian army. The common denominator of religion was
inadequate to preserve the union. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, who like the previous leaders of the country, backed the
idea of Kashmir’s seccession and the equipping as well as the training
of Muslim militants, had no option but to sign the Simla Agreement
(1972), according to which the two neighbours contracted to resolve
their differences through peaceful means and honour the Line of Actual
Control (LOAC), previously known as the Line of Control(LOC). In
addition to Pakistan’s continued interest in armed belligerency in
parts of Kashmir, the ascent of hawkish activism in Punjab and the
alienation of the Sikh community in response to Operation Blue Star
inspired and buoyed up militancy in Kashmir. Muslim fundamentalists and
the pro-Pakistani elements became more and more aggressive, and
explosive devices started to go off more often and in more places. In
the meantime, Mrs. Gandhi received a grandiose traditional welcome
involving a procession of boats down the Jhelum River when Sheikh
Abdullah took over as Chief Minister following the 1975 accord that came
after three years of negotiations. Although India’s new Prime
Minister, who succeeded Mrs. Gandhi did not favour a Kashmiri government
that would sympathise with the Congress Party which seemed to have lost
the country-wide contest, the National Conferecne under Abdullah’s
leadership won the 1977 elections. Even after the death of the Lion of
Kashmir in 1982, the National Conferecne, this time under Sheikh
Abdullah’s son Farooq, won another sweeping victory in the 1983
elections, the party showing strength mainly in the Valley, and the
Congress getting most of the seats in Jammu. When Farooq Abdullah
suspected his brother-in-law Ghulam Muhammad (‘Gul’) Shah of
intriguing with the Congress to succeed him as Chief Minister, he was
expelled from the National Conference but struck back by spilitting it
and forming the Asli (Real) National Conference to be headed by his wife
Khalida. |
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While the Congress Party was searching for ways to remove Farooq Abdullah and to discipline him, some dissatisfied citizens waved Pakistani flags and shouted slogans against the Indian cricket team during a match (1983) with the West Indian team in Srinagar. At the time that Operation Blue Star furnished arguments for militancy in Punjab, the Kashmir separatists labeled Farooq Abdullah as “Indian agent”. The latter argued with New Delhi, however, that to toe the Congress line could make Kashmir another Punjab. Farooq was dismissed, nevertheless, and his rival Shah was sworn in as the new Chief Minster only to be ousted in favour of an imposed Governor’s rule. Farooq Abdullah would come back as the leader of the National Conferecne-Congress coalition government. This short experience should have illustrated that such interference from the federal capital promoted the cause of the militants, facilitated their publicity, and helped them to set up new formations. It is no surprise that the opposition groups favouring the Islamisation of the Valley and secession joined hands to forge ahead in support of the Muslim United Front, which painted both Farooq and his party as treacherous. The National Conference and Congress still won in the 1987 assembly elections, but there were charges of rigging at some polls. The Valley AflamePeace and order in the state had radically deteriorated by mid-1988. There were bomb blasts in Srinagar (1 August)[4] While green flags were hoisted in downtown Srinagar on 14 August marking the anniversary of Pakistan’s independence, the same people chose to jack up black flags the next day, the occasion of India’s National Day.[5] The demonstrators shouting anti-Indian slogans the day after clashed with the police causing the death of one person and injury to about one hundred more, and attempted to set the Rishi Pir Temple on fire. Four persons were killed during the riots on 18 August, and four more within a week. When a bomb exploded (31 August) in a bus killing one person, terrorism claimed this loss as the first casualty since the beginning of the new wave of violence in 1988. Eijaz Ahmad Dar, the first militant to lose his life in police action on 18 September, became a martyr. The day he died became another occasion for renewed protests. His loss meant more for the insurgents than the serious injuries suffered by eleven persons with the explosion in a van about a month later. By the beginning of 1989, the militants became brash and brazen enough to attack police stations in the state capital. Shuddering at the prospect that violence would grow worse, many official felt unfit to restrain the menace and welcomed the initially small contingent of the National Security Guard (NSG) commandos, stationed in Srinagar, to train J&K police officers in anti-terrorist tactics. This measure falling far short of meeting the growing peril, General K.V. Krishna Rao, the former Chief of the Army Staff and the Governor of Manipur and Nagaland, was appointed to replace Jagmohan as the new governor. Subsquent events amply revealed that what was needed to confront terrorism competently went beyond a change of governors. Such appointees, who exhibited little realistic vision to balance conflicting demands, were publicly criticized by high-ranking federal officials and quickly replaced by others. This inconclusive official response to complex circumstances consequentially encouraged the militants in Kashmir. Under their coaching and intimidation, more and more people placed hopes on the path of violence to achieve certain aims. Acts of terrorism were better planned, daringly executed and created stronger roots. Terrorists successfully ambushed (13 July 1989) a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) bus killing two and wounding fourteen. While the so-called Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) claimed responsibility for this bloodshed, a fundamentalist terrorist organization called the Hizbullah Islamia Jamhoria warned the “traitors” of further violence if found collaborating with the “enemy”, that is, the government and its security forces. The Islamic extremists set in motion a fundamentalist campaign especially targeting women. An explosion (20 July)[6] in a ladies toilet in a cinema was followed by acid-throwing (29 July) on the faces of two young girls who had not worn veils. Pakistan Independence Day was observed (1989) with even more spirit and zeal than the year before. While green flags fluttered freely on the occasion all over Srinagar, some passionate groups burned the Indian colours trying to attach to their action an imposed air of solemnly. The police unable to carry out its conventional functions of check and control, the assertive activists engineered a series of bomb blasts that injured about sixty persons in one day. Feeling estranged and vulnerable, some members among the decision-making authorities found refuge in the thought that this was, after all, a “tolerable level of violence”. Then, two Kashmiri secessionists hijacked a state transport bus and blew it up near Tangmarg (17 August).[7] About 50 persons were injured in a series of incidents (18-21 August).[8] One of the leaders of the ruling National Conferecne (Muhammad Yusuf Halwai) was assassinated in daylight in the centre of the town, and the residence of the State Congress President (Shafi Muhammad Qureshi) was damaged by explosions. Even the effigies of Sheikh Abdullah were burnt for his association with India and attachment to the idea of secularism. Terrorism threw the whole Valley into ferment. Starting with 14 September, Kashmiri Pandits became the next target. The Vice-President of the Baharatiya Janata Party (Tikka Lal Taploo) was killed for his belief that the accession of J&K to India was irrevocable. [9] Hand grenades injured eleven policemen and twenty other (18 September)[10] No Police officer, including the Deputy Commissioners of Srinagar and Ananatnag, could show enough courage to sign the detention warrant of Shabir Shah, the President of the People’s League, who was arrested (27 September). In Ahmed were killed. The judge (N.K Ganjoo) who had sentenced a JKLF leader (Muhammad Maqbool Bhatt) was shot dead (4 November). There were 51 explosions the same month. The terrorists having scared away the voters during the elections to the Lok Sabha (22 November),[11] the average votes cast were no more than five per cent. About a week later (1 December), not only the Station House Officer of Maisooma (Saifullah Lone) was murdered, but his body, which lay in the street for hours, was finally taken by the militants and thrown in front of the police station. Practically no one had the courage to attend his funeral procession. The appointment of a Muslim Kashmiri (Mufi Muhammad Sayeed) as the Union Home Minster by V.P. Singh, who replaced Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minster, soon proved to be a turn for the worse. In late (8 December) 1989, Pakistani-trained JKLF activists abducted the Home Minister’s daughter (Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed) and demanded the release of five militants (including Hamid Sheikh, one of the kingpins of the separatist movement) who were among the first to take to terrorism in J&K.[12] The Chief Minster being in London, not only the Council of Ministers accepted the demands of the kidnappers but each mediator promised more to outbid his “competitor”. When Farooq Abdullah returned from his lengthy trip abroad, he disclosed that he was not prepared to capitulate to the terrorists. Contrary to the earlier agreement, however, the five militants were released first, and the Minster’s daughter freed later. Kashmiri crowds, including some police officers in uniform were jubilant on the streets not for the release of Rubaiya Sayeed but for the release of the militants. The government proved incapble of controlling this state of affairs, and while the Chief Minster, who also held the Home portfolio, was in jammu, there were daily disturbances in Srinagar. The Union Bank was looted (20 December), two policemen were shot dead and seven other injured (24 December),[13] a bomb blast wounded seven persons (1 January 1990), two police officers were killed (9 January), [14] 13 more murdered, and over 100 injured (8 January). A police officer and an imam were killed and left hanging for display. The government, which for some time looked impatient to change the governor (General Rao), reappointed Jagmohan in his place, and Farooq Abdullah resigned. While the mobs took control of parts of the capital, the Kashmiri Pandits feared for their lives. The militants demanded the release of over a hundred suspects to the tune of broadcasts from the minarets that called for “death to Indian dogs!” The new governor, whose second term of administration had opened in the worst possible circumstances, had no option but to ask the army to intervene. The army fire, not only killed some individuals and galvanized emotions, but it also led to rumours, spread by militants, that the police as well had erroneously suffered casualties. Although no such incident had taken place, an armed clash between policemen and the army could be staved off only after a few days of mediation. Some officers were removed from service, however, for their role in inciting their colleagues. Increasing the level of their agitation, the terrorists adopted the “Punjab style” of assassinations while riding on motorcycles and shot at officers, other officials and Kashmiri Pandits. The armed activists were so much in control of the streets that even the governor could not attend the Republic Day Parade (26 January). When the director of the Srinagar TV and Radio Station (Lassa Kaul) was shot dead for refusing to adhere to the line of the terrorists, other functionaries declined to work until the station was moved to Jammu. |
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The hostility between Governor Jagmohan and Farooq Abdullah led to the dissolution 919 February) of the State Assembly, a move that could only block the political process even further. While selective murders continued, the police units, which proved to be inadequate in equipment and training to respond, were either passive bystanders or attackers of unarmed mobs, among whom even the National Conference supporters and Zakura caused the death of 17 Kashmiri civilians (1 March). Few acts other than police firing at unarmed citizens could kindle anti-government attitudes. The authority of the militants became so unquestionable that they could publicly hang one of their own (Mir Mustafa) for starting a dialogue with the government and get away with it.
[1] Riyaz Punjabi, “The Concept of an Islamic Caliphate”, Journal of Peace Studies, New Delhi, I/1 (November-December 1993), [2] A seminal contribution to the study of terrorism in India, including some insights into the functioning of the government at the highest level, by someone who held important assignments in different states during his career spanning thirty-six years: Ved Marvah, Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in India, New Delhi, HarperCollins, 1997. Another account of the militant rebellion in Kashmir, especially since 1988: Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties, New Delhi, and Penguin Books, 1999. [3] Tara Kartha, Tools of Terror: Light Weapons and India’s Security, New Delhi, knowledge World in association with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1999, [4] The Times of India, New Delhi, 2 August 1988, [5] lbid., 16-17 August 1988. The Mirwaiz’s fiery speech during the Friday prayers at Jama Masjid, which demanded the opening of the Srinagar-Rawalpindi road, apparently encouraged the support of the Awami Action Committee (AAC) to hoist Pakistan’s national flag near Islamiya College, and they managed to raise black flags on some shops. The police opened fire when groups attacked the Khyanyar police station. A Ding-dong battle continued the whole day in the area considered AAC’s stronghold. [6] Ibid.,21 July 1989, [7] Ibid., 18 August 1989. [8]Ibid., 19 August 1989. [9] Ibid., 15 September 1989. [10] Ibid., 19
September 1989. [11] Ibid., 23 November
1989. [12] Askari H. Zahidi, “Mufti’s Daughter Kidnapped”, ibid., 9 December 1989, [13] Ibid., 25 December 1989, [14] “Two IB Officials Shot”, ibid., 10 January 1990, Editorail (“Long Haul in Kashmir”): “… The latest bout of violence comes in the wake of the decision by militants to organize rallies outside the United Nations military group headquarters to lauch a “Quit Kashmir” movement. By choosing the day (January 5) marking the arrival of U.N. troops following Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir in 1948, Kashmir’s fundamentalist organizations cleverly to the U.N. to hold a plebiscite in the state…[O]ver a dozen people have died in the act of defying authority…”
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