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Kashmir and Neighbors |
Punjab,
Bengal and the Tamils Punjab-Plenty and Panic| The Naxalites | The Srilankan Tamils Punjab,
Bengal and the Tamils Terrorism in Punjab[1] is linked with the politics of some members of the Sikh religious minority, which forms the majority in that state. About 80% of the 15 million Sikhs live in India. There are over a million of them seeking their livelihood outside the mother country. The Sikhs, who object to the headlines that link them with terrorist acts, are not terrorists. One may reserve the term “Khalistani” to describe the groups that favour a separate Khalistan, or an unborn “land of the pure” for Sikhs. Khalsa means the “pure” or the militants of the faithful. The “Naxalites”, who had resorted to terrorist methods but who did not have separatist aims, however, focused their efforts ostensibly on their “class enemies” and tried to keep up a bloody vendetta against them. The hoped-for nation wide uprising failed to occur, but the Naxalite strategy of agrarian mass revolution, coupled with urban terror, profoundly shook the Indian political system between 1967 and 1972. Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanks, lying in the southern tip of India, spilled over in TamilNadu, an Indian state. Punjab-Plenty
and Panic Punjab, the bountiful heart of Khalistan (or Sikhistan), is India’s frontier state. Although the present-day Indian Punjab is about the size of a Central American republic, the maps of Khalistan envisage a “Sikh empire” engulfing all the lands between the Himalayas to the Arabian Sea. All Khalistanis are Sikhs, but not all Sikhs are Khalistanis. The causes of the problem in Punjab, posed by the Khalistanis, are complex, comprising history, misperceptions, changing trends, political and economic dynamics, and “foreign hand”.[2]Between the years 1947-66, a minority became a majority in Punjab.[3] The majority of the Sikhs entertain the notion, however, that all of India is their home, and that Khalistan is a medieval farce. They marry with the Hindus, who also worship at the Sikh gurwara (temple). |
Dissatisfied
with Hinduism and Islam, Guru Nanak (1469-1539)[4]
had founded the Sikh religion in his quest for a doctrine egalitarian
according to his conception.[5] He wrote: “Make Love thy
mosque, Sincerity thy prayer-carpet, Justice thy Koran, Modesty thy
circumcision, Courtesy thy kaaba, Truth thy guru, Charity thy creed and
prayer…”[6]
By the time of the sixth Guru, who started the habit of wearing two
swords (piri and miri) representing the spiritual and worldly
authority, militancy was institutionalized in it.[7]
Sikh males are generally recognized by their colourful turbans and
beards. Their other distinguishing marks are a comb in the hair, a
dagger, a steel bracelet and short outer pants. Collectively, they are
known as the “five Ks”, for the first letter of the Punjabi word for
each of them. They have “Singh” (lion) as a middle or a family name,
but Singh is also a common Hindu name. The females take the word “Kaur”,
which means “princess”. The
Sikhs have experienced two massacres, in 1746 and in 1962, during which
the attackers tried to sack their leading city Amritsar and attempted to
tarnish and dishonour their Golden Temple. The period of RanjitSingh,
who ruled as the Maharajah of Punjab for four decades (1799-1839) is a
source of inspiration for Sikh militancy.[8]
The militants now overlook the fact that the Sikh Maharajah’s rule
necessarily encompassed Punjab’s total social diversity including
Hindus and Muslims. The
British came to control the whole of Punjab after two Anglo-Sikh Wars
(1845-46, 1848-49),[9]
following which the Sikhs gained a favoured position in the British
army, and some of them emigrated to other colonies in East Africa and
elsewhere. [10]
At times, they revolted. There was a powerful peasant movement against a
new colonization bill (1905-07), a Ghaddar movement (1913-18), and the
Jajjaianwala Bagh tragedy (1919) involving bloodshed. Expecting
independence for India, the Sikhs proposed changes in Punjab’s
boundaries to guarantee more representation in future parliaments. When
partition seemed to be inescapable, and some Muslims attained Pakistan,[11]
some Sikhs urged for an independent Khalistan.[12]
Ever since partition,[13]
many Sikhs felt that its consequences have been unfair to their
community. Pakistan, a Muslim state, had taken the larger portion
causing the flight of some 2.5 million or 40% of the Sikhs to the Indian
part, the majority of whom resettled in east Punjab. They had lost in
the western section the rich and productive land which had belonged to
their forefathers for some centuries. The British exit had also taken
away their privileges such as reserved legislative seats and their
selective place in the armed forces. Accounting for a high share of the
country’s export trade, what had remained of the former united Punjab
was still the granary of independent India situated, nevertheless,
alongside the nation’s leading competitor in the west, thus occupying
a key position in defence as well.[14] Alarmed
that their identity might be lost in the mergers and blending, the
Sikhs, on the other hand, underlined that they should possess separate
institutions and distinct legal guarantees.[15]
If they have later resorted to violence in pursuit of these aims, there
was a basis for this movement going back to the Sikh Gurdwara Act (1925)
and the guiding role of the Akali Dal which controlled the committees
set up under it. Although they story of terrorism in Punjab started much
later (1978),[16]
there were agitations to bring about changes in its boundaries to give
the Sikhs a majority. The Nehru-Tara Singh agreement (1955) could not
prevent Sant (Saint) Fateh Singh’s long fast in the Golden Temple
(1960) or Master Tara Singh’s[17]
fast, which started on Independence Day (1961), just as the division
(1971) of Punjab[18]
into Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and a reduced Punjab did not satisfy the
Akali Dal[19]
whose hopes were centred on coming to power. Even
after the creation of the new Sikh-majority state of Punjab, a
considerable Sikh minority had to stay in Haryana while the Hindus made
up the majority in the urban areas of Punjab. The Sikhs were also not
satisfied when the capital city of Chandigarh doubled as the capital of
Haryana as well. Further, the Sikhs deemed the way the waters of the
Punjab rivers[20]
were divided to be unjust. While some Sikh leaders like Darshan Singh
Pheruman went on fast unto death and became martyrs, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi, to pacify the Sikhs, presented Chandigarh to Punjab in
exchange for two Hindi-speaking areas (Abhor and Fazilka) to Haryana.
The Sikhs now constituted the majority in Punjab, but this
transformation did not prevent the Akali Dal from becoming more
militant. Especially after the latter’s historic resolution(1973)
which underscored Sikh separateness, politics in Punjab deteriorated
into terrorism, based on demands for greater autonomy and a further
alteration of frontiers now to incorporate the Punjabi-speaking portions
of Haryana and Rajasthan in the south. The frustration of the ambitious
Akali leadership, which could not come to power, enabled the unemployed
but educated Sikh youngsters to come to the forefront of state politics
with an eye on terrorism. Terrorism
first appeared (1978) with a collision between the fundamentalist Jatha demonstrators, the fundamentalist leaders swore vengeance against their
adversaries including the government. The Akali leaders, on the other
hand, in competition with the other extremists, pressed for the
announcement of Amritsar as a holy city and the renaming of the express
train to that city as the Golden Temple Express. What was originally a
clash between the Jatha and the Nirankaris evolved actually the result
of socio-economic factors rather than purely religious ones, and that
the shrinking base of the Punjabi economy, coupled with unemployed
educated youth, contributed to militancy.[21] |
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Agriculture was no longer ale to absorb the growing populace, and people were forced to search for employment elsewhere. The central authority in New Delhi, which misused Article 356 of the Constitution to topple the democratically elected local governments, further disenchanted the Punjabi people. The Akalis, who were entrusted with the mandate to administer after no less than four elections (1967, 1969, 1977, 1985) resorted to agitation only in 1980 when their government was toppled for the third time. The opposition parties became active only after thousands of people were jailed. Sant (Saint) Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala(e),[22]who was also arrested and then released and thus became a martyr and also a charismatic leader in the eyes of the Sikh youth, publicly advocated violence.[23] When those whose names appeared in the hit lists printed in newspapers were actually assassinated, some Hinds of Punjab started migrating to other states. Not only were several Nirankaris murdered, but the proprietor of the Samachar group of newspapers was also killed, and an Indian Airlines Boeing was hijacked (1981).[24] The diffusion of violence in the fertile and the strategically important state of Punjab gave Pakistan a chance to influence events. Many Indians believed, at that time, that some Pakistanis harboured a “K-2” (Kashmir-khalistan) plan. Pakistan’s support of the Punjabi terrorists in providing sanctuaries, operational bases weapons and training facilities would promote Hindu-Sikh alienation, keep the Sword of Damocles hanging over India's head, discredit that country’s secular credentials, and keep its security forces tied down within its borders. When that neighboring state, now a local ally of the United States in support of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, was ready to pass on weapons into Punjab, as well as J&K, the Sikh terrorists had already cultivated links with the smugglers at the common border. Much of the coordination of links with J&K militants and the NE insurgents was being done by Pakistan, which was facilitating terrorism if not directly aiding and abetting it. Another web of external involvement ran through the Sikh communities abroad. Sant Bhindranwala,[25]who had ordered is flock to disrupt the 1982 Asian Games in Delhi,[26] chose to move his headequarters to the golden Temple, where he immediately started to arms, ammunition and explosives. Assault rifles, procured partially with Pakistan’s help, replaced the smaller weapons. A large number of followers from the rural areas congregated in the same complex. Their leaders made a call for Dharma Yudh, or mass agitation. On a number of occasions, solution acceptable to both sides was in the offing. At a crucial stage during of those negotiations, an aircraft was ready to fly Akali’s Sant Longowal to the capital but the flight did not take off since the Congress Party seemed to take advantage of the situation in the 1985 elections. The militants targeted, not only a number of Hindu temples, but also the Punjab police officers twenty of whom were killed in 1983. The President’s rule replaced the elected Darbara Singh government in Punjab when a terrorist group hijacked a bus in Amritsar and murdered six Hindu passengers. With the popularly elected government gone, the number of terrorist acts dramatically rose. The political arena authority would be met only by rushing large paramilitary forces to Punjab. Such forces lacked, however, pertinent information related to the locality. The militants felt free to display the sophisticated weapons acquired, thanks in part to Palistan’s interest in the conflict. The Golden Temple turned into a fortified castle in public view. The government should have shown a determined but toned down reaction when the developing crisis could have been contained without shedding blood or as little as possible. Indira Gandhi was not disposed to risk a military adventure. Some army advisors assured her that it would be a brief operation. One should not ignore the fact that the extremists showed no regard for the sanctity of the temple. Although it was true that terrorists were taking advantage of famed religious shrine no less than the golden Temple for their own purposes, it was a sacred place where a full-fledged armed clash should not take place. It was too late for the people to support the government in such a conflict, especially when it involved severe damage to the shrine. Apart form the Akal Takht (Throne)[27] of historical fame and the Harmindir Sahib in the middle of the holy tank, the Golden Temple is a huge complex with a number of building, Guru Nanak Niwas, Worships, several entrances and pathways. All of its buildings, even the gates with majestic domes, were heavily fortified and had holes to fire on the army. Every opening was a firing position. Fortifications were visible everywhere. With bunkers and fire trenches, the whole complex seemed to be an impregnable bastion. Not only the passages underneath, but also the buildings around the complex were in the control of the extremists. Starving them and forcing them out was impossible because there was a huge amount of food grain stock. According to some Indian writers, the army was simply given the task of ending the defilement of the Golden Temple, a symbol of Indian secularism as much as the holiest shrine of the Sikhs, by a “bunch of terrorists and criminals”.[28] Operation Blue Star,[29] which gave the army, not well informed about the complexities of the problem the assignment to empty the Golden Temple of the terrorists, proved to be a mistake with fatal consequences, The operation, launched on the night of 5 June 1984, used tanks to silence fortifications. Lieut.-Gen. K.S. Brar, a top-ranking officer responsible for the military action on the Golden Temple, and whose observations endorse the findings of the Indian Government, justified the intervention in the following words: “[T]he ultimate decision to use the army was taken most reluctantly when every other avenue for a peaceful settlement had been exhausted and the integrity of the country stood seriously threatened and endangered”.[30] The rolling tanks and thundering artillery shattered walls, crushed stairs and knocked down monumental relics such as the Akal Takht. Troop movement from any direction came under heavy fire from the Akal Takht, which had a machine-gun bunker. Any plan to clear the extremists out of it without causing damage to it seemed impossible. Attempts by the army to throw non-lethal gas into the Akal Takht building failed. The sound of the rocket launchers, mortars, machine-guns, and hand-grenades still echo in the minds and the hearts of those who witnessed the traumatic scenes. In addition to the 4,712 killed, about 10,000 were arrested. The army suffered 84 dead and 262 wounded.[31] Almost the entire Sikh community, not only in Punjab or in the whole of India, but also in the diaspora, judged the massive army intervention as an attack on their religion as well. The misuse of a holy shrine should have been an incredible shock for an average Sikh. It is asserted that “thousands of youth crossed over the borders to Pakistan for training in arms”.[32] While the Sikhs swore vengeance, the foreign based militants urged for an independent “Republic of Khalistan”. One solid effect of Operation Blue Star was the rise of terrorism in Punjab for years to come. Pakistan took advantage of the situation for its own purposes, channeling more arms and financial aid to some militants.[33]One dramatic consequence was the assassination (31 October 1985) of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards, resulting in another tragic response, the anti-Sikh riots during which at least 2,150 Sikhs were killed in New Delhi and more than 600 in other parts of the India.[34]The key stumbling block in Hindu-Sikh relations was not so much the transfer of Chandigarh, or the equitable sharing of waters, or even local autonomy, and finally Operation Blue Star, but the massacre of Sikhs in Delhi and elsewhere. The large-scale anti-Sikh riots, the gruesome murder of thousands of Sikhs and horrendous scenes in the presences of kith and kin threatened to tear apart the secular edifice of the country besides delivering still one more cruel blow to the Sikh psyche. Another consequence of Operation Blue Star was the growth of rivalry between the leaders of Sikh factions. After the death of Bhindranwala, the new Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for Punjab, and realized the Ragiv-Longowal (Punjab) Accord (1985).[35] The people of the country, particularly the Punjabis, heaved a sigh of relief when ultimately an accord was signed after paying a heavy price. Sant Longowal was killed by Sikh extremists who considered it a sell-out. This murder did not stop the Longowal Akali Dal faction winning a large majority, for the first time in the state’s history, in the 1985 State Assembly elections. Neither did this triumph prevent the Punjabi terrorists from sabotaging an Air India jumbo jet, which exploded (1985) over the Atlantic. A bomb went off in the baggage hold of the aircraft, bound for New Delhi and Bombay from Toronto and Montreal. A certain “M. Singh”, who later did not board the flight, had persuaded the officials in Vancouver to put his bag on board, for transfer to the Air India flight leaving Toronto. The death toll of 329 stands as the worst at-sea air crash of all time. As a terrorist act, it is the bloodiest in the modern era. The case against a Vancouver-based Sikh extremist cell was very strong, and the call for justice of the bereaved families was bitter ad loud. The lives lost wee unpayable except in shared remorse.[36] Once more, groups of Sikhs housed themselves in the Golden Temple complex. But this time, the public sentiment and the terrorists were mismatched. There was hardly any tension in the city. The militants, who realized that they were in a hopeless situation, surrendered without the army firing a single sot. The so-called Operation Black Thunder was one of the most successful anti-terrorist operations anywhere in the world. There were no casualties, and no damage. Sikh sensitivities were not hurt. Even the Sikh masses supported the operation. An extraordinary success story like Operation Black Thunder fell short of signifying an end for terrorism in Punjab. Some youngsters introduced remote control timed devices and land mines in addition to the AK.47s and other sophisticated weapons imported from Pakistan. There are documents, such as letters about arms supplies or suggestions for organizational changes, establishing Pakistan’s active involvement.[37] Punjab is not only a border state with a long (550 km) frontier with Pakistan, but it also adjoins J&K, whose lifeline it always was. Barbed wire fencing with observation posts were erected along the whole Indo-Pakistan border. Every situation in Punjab had its impact on J&K. By the same token, the state of affairs in Punjab affected the country as a whole, including its economic life. Punjab is still the granary of India, and its food production traditionally contributed to reducing dependence on imports. It is one of the sources of raw materials like cotton, sugarcane and other crops. When terrorism hit high spots, Punjab’s economy was in bad shape. As there were cases of railway track sabotage and random firing at crowds, trade virtually reached a standstill, and there was an outflow of capital. Most educational institutions were communalized and became centers of extremist activities. About half of the new generation terrorists came from the urban middle class and the rich peasant families. Some were engaged in illicit drug trade. Their avowed aim was to control Khalistan through violent action. The Khalistan Commando Force (KCF),[38] on record for smuggling arms from Pakistan, and the Khalisatan Liberation Organization (KLO) set off a number of explosions in the past. Some Babbar Khalsa activists, who received training in Pakistan, made more use of explosives than the other groups. The situation went precipitously downhill between 1986 and 1989 with murders becoming more and more common. The killings started to consume those very people on whose behalf the activities were supposed to have been carried out. In two years (1989-90), the militants issued 31 codes of conduct for academics, bureaucrats, farmers, journalists, policemen, school children, shopkeepers, and others. The people found these codes more oppressive than anything the government had done. [39] It was those depredations against some Sikhs that eventually led to the collapse of support for the militancy. While the veneer of religion grew thinner and thinner, the terrorists killed more Sikhs than Hindus, attacked women and extorted money. Finally, the Sikh-dominated Punjab Police defeated the Khalistani terrorists. The Babbar Khalsa and the KCF leaders escaped to Pakistan, and some fled to North America. The remaining ones still have the capacity, however, to commit terrorist acts.[40] In any case, time may heal the wounds inflicted by the extremists. Punjab terrorism, which grew out of a number of Sikh grievances, real and imaginary, and which briefly spilled over to a limited Western corner of the neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh, eventually declined because of a general abhorrence of violence and lack of public support. The success of Operation Black Thunder buried, at least partly, the disastrous memory of Operation Blue Star. Most Indian sources seem convinced that terrorism will not revive in Punjab. But developments partly caused by the failures of the political-administrative system that has allowed problems to fester, in the past, creating a base of grievance upon which terrorist movements, later encouraged by Pakistan’s ISI, were built. However, the speech (27 March 1985) of Khushwant Singh in the Upper House (Rajya Sabha) of the Indian Parliament may still be remembered: “We are now concerned with one issue. It is the dignity and the self-respect of a community of about 15 million people whose susceptibilities have been deeply hurt. You have to learn how to assuage those feelings and win this community back into the community that comprises India”.[41] Two important root causes lie in the economic situation and the shape of the political map of the state. For instance, it is very difficult to fight extremism if the Punjabi peasants are deprived of water. Every government has to tackle the problems of poverty and unemployment. Further, the political parties should abandon the use of communal divisions with the hope of winning the next elections. The Akali party, in power and out of power, played different roles. When removed from power, it pursued the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973), which contained the seeds of separatism, but when in power (1973-81) the same Resolution was put in cold storage. The people of Punjab, who want peace, are against the separatist slogans and extremism. The implementation of the essence of the Punjab Accord will restore harmony and isolate the militants. [1] An effort to analyse the
long-term forces which have produced the Punjab crisis: Pramod Kunar
t al., Punjab Crisis: Context and Trends, Chandigarh, Centre
for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1984. This study
defines three kinds of communalism the conformist, the secessionist
and the incremental-concessionist. While taking note that
communalism may express discontent, the authors point out that it
fails to provide viable remedies to socio-economic conditions that
generate it, and becomes an instrument of vested interests
to maintain their dominant position. A short general
reference: H.R. Khanna et al., Terrorism in Punjab: Cause and
Cure, Chandigarh, Panchnad Research Institute, 1987. [2] Pakistan is meant by
“foreign hand”. For a criticism of the image of “design to
destabilize India”, see the chapter entitle target="_self" “The ‘Foreign
Hand' "in: Ghani Jafar, The Sikh Volcano, Lahore, Vanguard
Books, 1987. [3] Devinder Pal Sandhu, Sikhs in Indian Politics: Study of a Minority, New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1992. [4] On the attitude of the first guru towards the Muslims: N.D. Ahuja. The Great Guru Nanak and the Muslims, Chandigarh, Kirti Publishing House, 1971. Also: S.S. Bal, Guru Nanak in the Eyes of the Non-Sikhs, Chanidgarh, Punjab University, 1975. [5] The first five volumes on the ten Gurus: Max Arthur Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion, Vols. I-VI, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909. The Sikhs on the basis of original records, partially Sikh University Press, 1979. A comprehensive view of the growth of Sikh thought and action based on original English and Indian sources: Hari Ram Gupta, History of the Sikhs, Vols. I-VIII, New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1973. [6] H.G Rawlinson, A Concise History of the Indian People, Delhi, Low Price Publications, 1994, [7] On how a monotheistic faith became political in aims and military in methods: Indu Bhushan Banerjee, Evolution of the Khalsa, Vols. I-II, Calcutta, A. Mukherjee and Co., 1979. For the Sikh struggle for survival as a separate community against Muslim Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vols. I-II, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966. Just before Govind Singh died told his followers that he was the last of the true Gurus and that they should afterwards look upon the holy book for constant guidance. Singh, |
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[8] The following source describes the evolution of the Sikh community from its relationship with the parent Hindu society towards a Khalsa identity: Rajiv A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: the politics of Faith, London, Allen and Unwin, 1986. [9] Patrick Turnbull, “Ferozeshehr and the Sikh War, December 1845”, History Today, London, XXVII/1 (January 1977); Huge C.B. Cook, The Sikh Wars, Delhi, Tomson Press, 1975. [10] One of the very first works as a comprehensive history of Sikhs from this origin to their war with the British in 1845-46: J.D. Cunningham, A history of the Sikhs: from the Origin of the Nation to the Battkes if the Sutlej, Delhi, S. Chand, 1966. Author Fox argues that the British superimposed a separate identity on the Sikhs as a requirement of their “divide and rule” policy: Richard G. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985. [11] The following author argues that although Sikh history is centred in Punjab, the Sikhs did not appear to have claimed a separate homeland until the creation of Pakistan: Harjot S. Oberoi, “From Punjab to ‘Khalistan’: Territoriality and Met commentary”, Pacific Affairs, Vancouver, 60/1 (1987), [12] Satinder Singh, Khalistan:
an Academic Analysis, New Delhi, Amar Prakashan, 1982. The
beginnings of the Khalsa movement: Arjan Dass Malik, An Indian
Guerilla War: the Sikh People’s War, 1699-1769), New Delhi,
Wiley Eastern Limited, 1975. Descriptions of early expressions for
an independent Sikh homeland: Sahdu Swarup Singh, The Sikhs
Demand Their Homeland, Lahore Bookshop, 1946; G.S. Dillon,
“Evolution of the Demand for a Sikh Homeland”, Indian journal
of Political Science, Guntar, A.P., 35/4 (1974), [13] For a compilation of official documents: Mian Muhammad Sadullah, ed., The Partition of the Punjab, Vols. I-IV, Lahore, National Documentation Centre, 1983. On the aftereffects of partition on Punjab: Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab, New Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1965. [14] A prominent Punjabi
writer’s polemic addressed to the former Indian prime Minister
requesting him to do justice to Punjab’s legitimate demands:
Jaswant Singh Kanwal, The Other Zafarnamah: an Open Letter to
Rajiv Gandhi, Sir hind, India, Lokgeet Parkashan, 1987.
Emphasizing Punjab’s contribution to the country’s defence and
economy, the author asserts the Central Government discriminated
against the Punjabis, which have no heavy industry and whose food
grain was drained away at low prices. [15] Rajiv A. Kapur deals with
the contemporary Sixth communal consciousness: Sikh Separatism:
the Politics of Faith, London, Allen and Unwin, 1986. More on
the politics of the congress Party and its relations with the Sikhs:
K. L Tuteja, Sikh Politics: 1920-40, Kurukshetra, Vishal
Publishers, 1984. [16] On the rise of religious and political consciousness among the Sikhs: Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: the Story of the Struggle, Delhi, U.C. Kapoor, 1970. [17] Durlab Singh, The Valiant Fighter: a Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh, Lahore, Hero Publications, 1972. [18] The Sikhs as a minority in the pre-1966 Punjab: Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966. [19] For the birth and development of the Akali Party: Kailash Chander Gulati, The Akalis: Past and Present, New Delhi, Ashajanak Publications, 1974. For a reevaluation of the Akali movement and its contribution to India’s independence: Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, Delhi, Macmillan, 1976. [20] An official view on the waters of Rvi and Beas: Punjab Government, Ravi-Beas Agreement: White Paper, Chandigarh, Information and Public Relations Department, 1982. By the Council of Sikh Affairs: The Punjab River-Water Dispute: Amended Copy, the Truth, Chandigarh, 1982. A third work chronicling the dispute between Haryana and Punjab: Paul Singh Dhillon, A Tale of Two rivers, Chandigarh, Dhillon Publishers, 1983. [21] Hamish Telford, “The Political Economy of Punjab: Creating Space for Sikh Militancy”, Asian Survey, Berkeley, 32/11 (November 1982), [22] B.M. Sinha, “Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale: the Man Who Set Punjab Aflame”, Illustrated Weekly of India, Bombay, 103/38 (24 October 1882), [23] An interesting interpretation of the “humane” nature of young Sikh terrorists, whose amateurishness reveals the influence of the low-brow commercial films: Ashish Nandy, “The Discreet Charms of Indian Terrorism”, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Essex, U.K., 28/1 (1990), [24] Excerpts from statements: “…[A]rm yourselves and prepare for a war… Every Sikh boy should keep 200 grenades with them… A Sikh without arms is naked…” Balraj Madhok, Punjab Problem: the Muslim Connection, New Delhi, Vision Books, 1985, [25] A sensationalist depiction of Sant Bhindranwala and his followers: Chand Joshi, Bhindranwale: Myth and Reality, New delhi, Vikas, 1984. In contrast: Surjeet Jalandhry, Sant Bhindranwale, Jalandhar, Punjab pocket Books, 1984. [26] Arjun Shourie, “Growth of Sikh Separatism”, Secular Democracy, New Delhi, 5 (May 1982), [27] H.S.Dilgir, The Akal Takht, Jullundur, Punjabi Book Company, 1980. [28] V.D. Chopra, R.K. Mishra and Nirmal Singh, Agony of Punjab, New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1984. [29] For the narration of the event: Harminder Kaur, Blue Star Over Amritsar, New Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1990. the official report on the chronology of meetings between the Central Government and Akali leaders and including a diary of the violence in Punjab: Government of India, White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, New Delhi, Department of Information and Broadcasting, 1984. [30] K.S. Brar, Operation Blue Star: The True Story, New Delhi, UBS Publications, 1993, Three more eye-witness accounts: Kuldip Nayar and Khuswant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Blue Star and After, New Delhi, Vision Books, 1981, Subhask Kirpekar, “Operation Bluestar: an Eyewitness Account”, Amarit Kaul The Punjab Story, New Delhi, Roli Books International, 1984. [31] A guide to the casualties: Mark Tully and S. Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle, London, Jonathan Cape, 1985, [32] A veteran Communist leader: Harkishan Singh Surjeet, Deepening Punjab Crisis: a Democratic Solution, New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1992. [33] A former Jan Sangh leader claims that Pakistan is intimately connected with the Pujab issue: Madhok, Punjab Problem: the Muslim Connection, An appendix reproduces the interview of the Akali leader Sand Longowal with the Indian Magazine Sunday, 32 March 1985. Two other sources which assert Pakistani interference: AttarChand, Pakistan Terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1991. [34] Description of the riots: People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Who Are the Guilty? Report of a joint Inquiry into the Causes and Impact of the Riots in Delhi from 31 October to 10 November, Delhi, 1984. The narratives of victims who survived and/or their relatives: Uma Chakravarti Nandita Kaksar, The Delhi Riots: Three Days in the Life of a Nation, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1987. The report of the Mishra Commission, mandated to look into the anti-Sikh riots was not officially published. Some of its excerpts in Harish jain, ed., Mishra Commission Report, Sirhind Manid, India, Takshila Publications, [35] The Sikh question and the
signing of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, 1985: Ghani Jafer, The Sikh
Volcano, New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers, 1988. [36] There were the years when India did not want its communal violence to gain international spotlight, and Canada did not welcome scrutiny of its communal difficulties. Clair Blaise and Bharati Mikherjee, The Sorrow and the Terror: the Haunting Legacy of the Air India Tragedy, Markham, Canada, Viking, 1987. [37] V.N. Narayanan, Tryst with Terror: Punjab’s Turbulent Decade, Ajanta, 1996, Prime Minister Ragiv Gandhi repeatedly warned Pakistan against helping the terrorists in Punjab. For front-page statements: The Times of India, New Delhi, 16 August 1988, 17 July 1989, etc. [38] The history and working of the Khalistan Commando Force for an independent Sikh state: Joyce Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerilla Violence, London, Zed Books, 1995. [39] Narayanan, [40] For the new shocks that made several people to ask whether Punjab was back in the days of terror: Frontline, Madras, X/20 (25 September-8 October 1993) [41] Kushwant Singh, My Bleeding Punjab, New Delhi, UBS Publishers, 1992,
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