Accession and After

Approaching the mid-1950s Pakistan opted for a foreign policy accepting American military bases on its territory in return for military aid, the main motive for this radical change of course being the Kashmir issue. Becoming an alliance partner with the United States in the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 8 September 1954), Pakistan’s agreements with Turkey, a NATO member, provided the first steps for the evolution of the Baghdad Pact (24 February 1955), later (19 August 1959) called CENTO. Pakistan joined (17 September 1955) both the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, India standing clearly aloof from both. Pakistan and Turkey, on the other hand, became links between these three Western-sponsored alliances, embracing the whole gamut of nations from Canada to the Philippines that contained the Eastern bloc. Following the coup d’ etat(1958) in Iraq, Pakistan accommodated itself (5 March 1959), along with Iran and Turkey, with a bilateral defence agreement with the United States. Apparently, Pakistan endeavoured to secure from the United States as much military aid as possible to bring its armed potential on par with India. In contrast, Nehru, believing in non-alignment, emerged as champion of the causes of the Afro-Asian countries, initially in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia (1955).[1] Nehru’s visit to the Soviet Union was followed by the Bulganin-Khrushchev tour of India including Srinagar. The Soviet Union, not only guarded India’s interests during the Security Council meetings, but also extended military aid to India.[2]

Pakistan officially trained and encouraged Mujahidden to infiltrate into Indian-controlled territories.[11] To stop infiltration, the Indian Army thought it to be duty bound to occupy (25 August) certain passes in the Kargil sector, turning then to Uri and Poonch. The Azad Kashmir troops, supported by Pakistan’s regular units, attacked the Champ district at the end of the cease-fire line, coming very close to the City of jammu. When Indian columns moved towards Lahore and Sialkot, a full-fledged Indo-Pakistani War had begun. [12] The raiders from outside banked on getting wide local support, but the bulk of the kashmiri people gave the lie to the lurid expectations of ‘popular uprising’ put out by the Pakistani means of mass communication. Having reached a stalemate or a course more against Pakistan, Ayub Khan sent an appeal to President Lyndon B. Johnson to intervene personally while U Thant, the U.N. Secretary-General, continued his efforts for a cease-fire. Both sides agreed to stop fighting (26 September 1965), especially when the Security Council demanded it. Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, offered his good offices and the Uzbek capital of Tashkent for a negotiated settlement, which Ayub Khan and Shastri accepted. According to the Tashkent Declaration (10 January 1966), the armies withdrew, diplomatic relations were re-established, and they agreed to continue bilateral discussions.

While Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, upon becoming Prime Minister after Shastri’s unexpected death, endeavoured to rouse active Soviet support, Bhutto, finding faults with Pakistan’s military command, lleft the administration and established (1967) his own organization, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Contrary to the expectations of the hawkish politicians in Islamabad, the Mujahidden movement, openly sponsored by Pakistan, had failed to transform itself into a nation-wide rebellion. Moreover, violence, now described as “terrorism”, was being recognized as an international hazard. While New Delhi partitioned Eastern Punjab and honoured  the Sikhs for their loyalty to India by giving them the portion overshelingly inhabited by their people, the J&K Government arrested some Islamic leaders. Including Mirwaiz Muhammed Farooq and Maulana Muhammad Sayeed Masoodi. Some Sikhs took this award as an acknowledgement of a political structure meant for themselves. Meanwhile, the government in Srinagar was becoming more servile to New Delhi. Sheikh Abdullah being in detention, the party in power had changed its name to ‘Pradesh (State) Congress’ and won the majority of seats, through an election boycotted by the Plebiscite Front. The latter was formed  by Mirza Afzal Beg to represent the views of the Abdullah group. One of the first undertakings of Sheikh Abdullah after his release from jail was to go to Rawalpindi and tell Ayub Khan that the solution should be such that neither country ought to have the feeling of being outmatched nor should it weaken the foundations of Indian secularism.[13]

Ayub Khan’s place was taken (25 March 1968) by General Yahya Khan as Martial Law Administrator and later as the head of a military junta. In the next (1970) elections, Bhutto’s PPP won 81 seats out of 183 in west Pakistan, but Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League got 160 out of 162 seats in East Pakistan. [14]      Swooping down (25 March 1971) on the people of East Pakistan with aerial bombing, artillery and tanks instead of conceding the office of the Prime Minister to Mujipur Rahman signaled a fatal armed encounter between the forces of Pakistan’s two wings.

It also led to the Third Indo-Pakistani War and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. On account of the hijacking of an Indian plane,[15]  New Delhi banned Pakistani over flights across the long Indian territory. While some ten million refugees streaming into West Bengal gave India, which signed (9 August 1971) a Treaty of peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, a reason for getting involved in the crisis, Pakistan, which arranged a secret visit of Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s National Security Adviser to China[16] found itself in a “Fourteen Days’ War” (December 1971) that it could not win. Pakistan could not even secure a few advantages that it could use in the Kashmir issue.[17] It lost its eastern wing, the described military rule, which had brought so much suffering to both wings of the country, had to wind itself up, and Bhutto, the well-off landlord of Sindh and the former hawk in foreign relations, met Indira Gandhi in Simla to salvage some of what seemed wrecked.[18] The Simla Agreement (3 July 1972) stated that the two neighbors were resolved to settle their differences by peaceful bilateral negotiations or by other peaceful means, that neither side should unilaterally alter the situation, that they should always respect each other’s national unity and territorial integrity, that they would refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and that the Line of  Control (LOC) in J&K resulting from the cease-fire (17 December 1971) should be respected by both sides. Designated military commanders of both sides delineated the LOC, indicating the position of the two armies on the day of the cease-fire. Commanders signed the maps showing the LOC to endorse the agreement on it. Both governments accorded approval to the joint recommendations submitted by the commanders. The cease-fire line, later referred to as the LOC or the LOAC (Line of Actual Control), became the De facto border between the Indian and the Pakistani controlled areas. A joint statement by India and Pakistan paved the way for withdrawal of troops to their sides of the international border.

The Kashmir Accord

The Muslims of the Valley were inclined to stand their ground on Article 370, no matter how diminished it was by now, but the Hindus and Sikhs of Jammu as well as the Buddhists of Ladakh would have liked to see it  abolished. Indira Gandhi would also have preferred a contracted modus operandi not to shatter a precarious balance by encouraging some other Indian states to seek the same exemptions. The pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e Islami had won five seats in the 1972 elections against the majority of the Pradesh Congress Party, led by Syed Mir Qasim, who now filled the deceased Sandiq’s place. Under the changing circumstances, the Central Government, hoping to achieve a more stable government under Sheikh Abdullah, who had remained in the political wilderness for more than two decades, announces (24 February 1975) a “Kashmir Accord”, which stated that J&K, still governed by Article 370, was a “constituent unit” of the Indian Union Parliament w0ould continue to have the power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities towards disrupting the “territorial integrity of India or secession of a part of the territory from the Union”.

While the State Congress Party unanimously elected Sheikh Abdullah as its leader, Pakistan, which protested to the United nations, and Mirwaiz Muhammad Farooq’s circle denounced him for having “sold out” Kashmir’s interests. While the  Islamic forces in the Valley, supported by sections of the unemployed educated young generation, were attaining far greater strength than ever before, Sheikh Abdullah reconstituted the National Conference and persuaded the State Governor (L. K. Jha) to order fresh elections. Indira Gandhi and her party were defeated in the 1977 general elections,[19]  and Morarji Deai’s Janata Government[20] in New Delhi approved the J&K elections (30 June-3 July 1977) which gave Abdullah’s National Conference forty-seven out of seventy-six seats. Backed by the Muslim vote but unable to restrain the disgruntled, Sheikh Abdullah’s Administration, in the opinion of some commentators, more and more unfolded towards personal iron sway. Immediately after regime”.[21]  While explaining some of his actions, such as governmental authority of detention up to two years as a compelling measure against Pakistani infiltrators, some of his closest friends, like Mirza Afzal Beg, had to give up and leave him in the lurch. After Indira Gandhi’s return to power (1980) and almost on the heels of her meeting (22 July) with Abdullah, the aged Sheer-e Kashmir handed the reins of power to his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah.

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