A Constituent Assembly of Kashmir was to determine the future constitutional organization of the state. An agreement seemed to have been reached by the National Conference leaders and the Central Government regarding the governments in states would not apply to J&K, that Kashmir’s Constitution would be framed by the state’s Constituent Assembly, and that the control of the Kashmiri Army would remain vested with India. While the Interim Government nominated four members to represent J&K in the Constituent Assembly of India (eventually in the Lok Sabha), Sheikh Abdullah, in the press statement to an influential English paper,[1] had pleaded for the independence of Kashmir, and the National Conference leaders evolved fresh proposals, one being that the administrative control over the Kashmiri forces would be restored to the state. The earlier agreement was already enshrined, however, in the Constitution of India as draft Article 306-A. The Kashmiri leaders told Gopalswami Ayangar, the Minister of States in the Central Government, that Kashmir had acceded to India in regard to only three subjects: foreign affairs, defence and communications, and retained its independence in all other matters. A revised draft was also rejected, and a final one, renumbered as Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, giving a special status to Jammu and Kashmir, came into force.[2] The powers to amend its provisions were vested with the Indian Parliament.[3]

In late 1951, a Constituent Assembly, which the Kashmiri leadership deemed to be a constitutional sequel to the freedom struggle, was convened with seventy-five members, all from the National Conference or other sympathetic supporters, and twenty-five more seats reserved for those to represent the Pakistani-controlled territories. The Muzaffarabad regime, dominated in the early years by some of Abdullah’s opponents in the Muslim Conference and unable to survive without Pakistan’s blessing and patronage, wavered politically in accordance with the change of power in Karachi or Islamabad. While it may be deemed not unnatural for a number of Indian Muslim organizations to be overtly critical of Pakistan’s rule in parts of Kashmiri land,[4] some Pakistani sources also disapproved of the lack of a simple election, over so many years, to let those kashmiris choose a representative government of their own.[5] The J&K election, however, was boycotted by the Praja Parishad, which represented the Hindu middle class and was therefore against any land reform. But, in a way, the people had spoken although only less than 5% of the electorate had gone to the polls. In mid-1952, a Kashmiri delegation went to the Indian capital to sign the Delhi Agreement (24 July), which recognized the uncongenial prerogatives of the State Legislature.[6] Abdullah’s perception was that a unitary system, coupled with communalism, would submerge the identity of the Kashmiri people. There was no difference of opinions as far as Kashmir’s accession. The citizens of Kashmir, which was to have its own flag and be vested with all the “residuary powers”, would enjoy land ownership rights denied to Indians form other states. While the other Indian States would have premiers too, their designation being “Chief Minister”, Kashmir’s head of government was going to be the only one in India with that title outside of the Prime Minister of the Indian Republic. Sheikh Abdullah announced the end of the Dogra-Hindu dynasty, founded in the past by Gulab Singh. A constitutional Head of State, the Sadar-e Riyasat, was to be elected by the Legislative Assembly. The choice was Y.K. Singh for a period of five years. To respect the sentiments of the local people, the medium of instruction in the public schools and the official language throughout the state was to be Urdu, and Hindi, recognized as lingua franca by the Indian Constitution, was not to enjoy that prominence in J&K. Although the recruitment of the Kashmiris in the army had been stopped by successive foreign rulers for so many centuries, the new leadership established a National Militia to vindicate the pride of the people. Education became free in the new schools opened in big towns. The children of the poor now had the opportunity, for the first time, to reach high levels. The big landed estates were abolished, old debts of the poor liquidated, cottage industries subsidized, factories set up, all towns and many villages electrified, inexpensive transport systems established, and entrepreneurs financially helped. It seemed that after a long period of poverty, the Kashmiris were going to witness the dawn of a new era.

Beginning with the first Security Council resolution, India insisted that a plebiscite could be held only following the restoration of order in Kashmir, meaning the withdrawal of the tribal invaders and the Pakistani forces. As Hewitt observes, it was never considered necessary, however, to hold a plebiscite in the princely states. The plebiscite in Junagadh (1948) was not a consistent policy.[7] Although conscious of his leadership of a predominantly Muslim community, Sheikh Abdullah seemed to have been deeply attached to secular philosophy. He strove against complete absorption by anyone of his powerful neighbors, but he was more inclined towards India than Pakistan. Apart from the sad memories of the tribal invasion, the people would vote for India, if need be, as long as the popular Sheer-e Kashmir (The Lion of Kashmir) was at the helm of the administration. Pakistan realized that a plebiscite at this stage would probably mean the total loss of Azad Kashmir and the rest, especially when some Indian troops would still be there. With the feeling in the Valley on account of arson, looting and rape by the invaders, an early plebiscite would probably go against Pakistan.

The UNCIP, nevertheless, proposed a Plebiscite Administrator, the U.S. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (22 March 1949), to take over some sovereign powers over the disputed territory for the duration of the plebiscite. India declined the offer. The Security Council then appointed one mediator after another, who proposed plans for consideration. General A.G.L. McNaughton (Canada) suggested the withdrawal of all Pakistani regulars but only the reduction of the Azad Kashmir forces. Sir Owen Dixon (Australia) recommended “regional plebiscites”, that is, the awarding of each area according to the outcome of the vote therein. Liaquat Ali Khan insisted on a single plebiscite if the hand of Pakistan, branded as “aggressor”, was excluded. Pakistan would accept it if the influence of India and Sheikh Abdullah was greatly diminished. Dr. Frank P.Graham(U.S.A) could not accomplish any headway either.[8] Consequently, the Kashmir issue did not appear in the Security Council agenda until the beginning of 1957. In the meantime, however, the J&K Constituent Assembly declared (17 November 1956) the state to be an integral part of the Union of India. When Gunnar Jarring’s (Sweden) attempt to mediate was equally unsuccessful, the Security Council lost all initiative until the mid-1960s.[9] Pakistan raised the issue when (1963) some Indian politicians called for the “liberation” of Azad Kashmir and when a hair of Islam’s Prophet Mohammed disappeared (1964) from the Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar. Under the circumstances then, Nehru, a believer in secularism, abhorred the idea of a partition of J&K either by plebiscite or negotiations, basically resting on communal criteria. By the same principle, he also opposed the independence or secession of any part of India.

Sheikh Abdullah, who strove for a semi-independent status for his own state to realize extensive land reforms and benefit from the plentiful tourist possibilities of the land, sometimes gave indications, alarming for India, that he may be sterling towards a further change in Kashmir’s association with that country. But his leadership gravitated towards secularism, which was also the goal of the Indian Constitution. Although there were some tendencies even in India standing for a degree of religious intolerance at some future date, the presence of Kashmir in the Union of India, in Sheikh Abdullah’s view, would be a major factor in stabilizing relations between the Muslims and the Hindus of that country. Further, in association with the landlord-ridden Pakistan, with so many feudal privileges intact, he could not possibly realize any of his economic reforms. Kashmir’s traditional markets were also centered in India. It was India, not Pakistan, that could give Kashmir technical services and material for industrialization. Although an all-weather road-link for trade then existed only with Pakistan, a stable system of communication with India was also feasible. Pakistan was a Muslim state, but a feudal one. The appeal to religion constituted a wrong approach, however sentimental. Pakistan did not represent the organic unity of all the Muslims in the Sub-continent either. As one Muslim was as good as another, the Kashmiri Muslims, in Abdullah’s opinion, should choose the Muslims living in India. Religious affinity alone, on the other hand, did not determine the political alliance of a state. There was no Buddhist, Christian or even a Muslim bloc. What would be the fate of the non-Muslims of Kashmir? The third course of keeping aloof from both India and Pakistan, but having friendly relations with both of them, seemed attractive but it was not easy to protect the independence of small country with insufficient strength to defend itself. A neighbor had invaded Kashmir is spite of a valid Standstill Agreement. Sheikh Abdullah had no differences of opinion on the fact of a Kashmir’s accession with India; he had differences on the limits of that accession.

The probing of the Working Committee of the Constituent Assembly into the future of the state, including a variety of risks and probabilities, non yet considered to be conclusive, scared circles who would rather have closer union with India. For instance, the majority of the Ladakhs felt threatened by Abdullah’s land reforms which limited the wealth of the traditionally dominant Buddhist monasteries. The total cultivated area in the state was about 2,200,000 acres, [10] most of which was owned by the Maharaja, his Jagirdars and the landlord class of Chakdars. In their eyes, Sheikh Abdullah seemed bent towards additional powers-some admittedly authoritarian, but probably to withstand such vested interests. A disinformation campaign, aided by communal forces, created suspicion against him. For instance, the influential Ladakhis declared that in the event of the state drifting away from India, they would rather severe their relations with Kashmir and merge directly with the Indian Union.[11]

In Jammu the opposition was spearheaded by the Praja Parishad, which was against a separate Constitution for J&K. Prem Nath Dogra, its leader, associated with the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in India and who advocated the abolition of Article 370, was detained on Abdullah’s orders. Dr. Syana Prasad Mookerjee. Jana Sangh’s President arrested at the state border, was pronounced dead of heart attack while under detention. Closely watched by the Intelligence Bureau,[12] more accountable to the Central Government, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed on the night of 8-9 August 1953, and replaced by his lieutenant, Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad.[13] Abdullah, arrested almost instantly and charged with conspiracy, remained in prison until 8 April 1964, was discharged by a special court, rearrested about a year later, and remained under detention until 1968. For most of the detention period, the Sheikh turned from a ‘quisling’ to a ‘patriot’ in Pakistan.

The customs barrier was removed (13 April 1954), and the state became economically an integral part of India. When elections were held in early 1957 under the new Constitution (26 January 1957), patterned on the Indian Constitution, the bulk of the seats again went to the National Conference, only seven being won by the Hindu parties. The performance of the National Conference was even better in the 1962 elections. The government in New Delhi identified such confirmations as late but popular endorsements of the 1947 accession. There had been, however, some measure of manipulation almost in all the phases of the electioneering process, easy to judge from the way Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad’s rotten reign (1953-63) came to an end. Succeeded by Khwaja Shamsuddin, the title of Sadar-e Riyasat was changed to Governor, and the Prime Minister would henceforth be referred to as Chief Minister. While Sheikh Abdullah, now (temporarily) out of jail, was visiting Muzaffarabad, Nehru passed away (27 May 1964). When the new Indian Government allowed Abdullah to attend the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers, his private discussions with China’s Chou En-lai caused the cancellation of his passport and subsequent arrest. Although some civil disturbances occurred in Kashmir in reaction to the renewal of arrest, Sheikh Abdullah’s formal successors relied increasingly more on India.

[1] Interview to Michael Davidson in the The Scotsman, Edinburgh, 14 April 1949.

[2] Mohan Krishan Teng, Kashmir: Article 370

[3] While Article 1 of the Indian Constitution conceived J&K to be an integral part of the Indian Union, Article 370 was so different from the “Mysore model” which accepted a Constitution, proclaimed on 25 November 1949, framed by India. Menon, op. cit., Also: Mahendra P. Singh,. V.N.Shukla’s Constitution of India, 9^th ed., Lucknow, Eastern Book Company, 1996. The continued application of Article 370 was questioned in Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K(1969).

[4] Government of India, Kashmir: Indian Muslims’ Challenge, New Delhi, Information Service of India, 1965.

[5] The Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore (5 June 1955) and Khyber Mail (27 August 1964) quoted in: Government of India, Occupied Kashmir: a Pakistan Colony, New Delhi, External Publicity Division, 1965.

[6] On the unconventional prerogatives: M.K. Teng and Santosh Kaul, Kashmir’s Special Status, New Delhi, Oriental Publishers, 1975; Ram Krishen Kaul Bhatt, Political and Constitutional Development of the Jammu and Kashmir State, New Delhi, Seema, 1984; Krishan Mohar Teng, State Government and Politics: Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi, Sterling, 1985. These three studies provide analysis of the political institutions and operatives that the Constitution of J&K envisaged. That state was accorded a special position in the Indian constitutional system. A prominent Kashmiri recorded about three decades later, however, that developments, unforeseen by the Constitution-makers, occurred, and worse, idleness overshadowed beauty when state politicians, especially the Muslim leaders, used Article 370 to exploit the gullible masses. Prem nNath Bazaz, Democracy Through Initiation and Terror: the Untold Story of Kashmir Politics, New Delhi, Heritage, 1978,

[7] Hewitt,

[8] The reports of McNaughton, Dixon, Graham and Jarring in: Government of Pakistan Reports on Kashmir by United nations Representatives, Karachi, 1958; 1962.

[9] Sisr Gupta, Kashmir: a Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1966; Rahmatullah Khan, Kashmir in the United Nations, Delhi, Vikas, 1966. Surendra Chopra, U.N. Mediation in Kashmir: a Study in Power Politics, Kurukshetra, Vishal Publications, 1971.

[10] Bamzai,

[11] lbid.,

[12] The account of the Bureau’s Director: B.N. Mullik, My Years with Nehru: 1948-1964, Bombay, etc., Allied Publishers, 1972.

[13] Both men had similar (humble) origins, but diverse talents. While both seemed physically strong, Abdullah was a self-confident speechmaker with inflammatory gestures, “Bakshi Sahib” was a realist with a widespread reputation that he would attend to all wrongs. Sheean,

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