Kashmir and Neighbors @ whatisindia.com

Engaging India is one war after another, Pakistan took plausible risks while coming close to Srinagar in 1947 and making a breakthrough near Amritsar in 1965, but splitting itself into two in 1971. The “covert war” since the 1980s, which began with the battles for Siachen, still continues. The Kargil War in 1999 was the first one fought with regular forces after both Pakistan and India had become overtly nuclear. Except the one in 1971, all the others were specifically linked with Kashmir. Although Palistan’s expectations of success turned out to be miscalculated ventures, the present power equation between the two countries, based on nuclear capabilities, leaves only one alternative for them: the pursuit of peace.

In spite of the initial success of Pakistan to win the sympathy and support of many Muslim countries and communities over Kashmir, the “Muslim bloc” is no longer the cohesive cartel on this issue that it used to be. Pakistan, which had hosted gatherings of the OIC, grabbed the chance of serving as the frontline state during much of Afghanistan's civil war. The jehad, supported by General Zia and CIA, finally led to Muslims killing Muslims. Pakistan has burnt its fingers in Afghanistan, as the armed Taliban are now beyond the control of Islamabad. The United States, an ally of Pakistan since the Baghdad Pact days and its long-time supporter on the Kashmir issue, seems to have accepted, apart from occasional suggestions of Washington’s mediation, India’s primary responsibility in Kashmir’s future and basically advocates a solution through direct negotiations with the people concerned and with Pakistan, even after the defeat of Soviet influence in Afghanistan, the collapse of Communism in Central Asia, and the change of regime in Russia itself. Similarly, China, another friend of Pakistan, recommended, since 1980, negotiations only between India and Pakistan. Some of Pakistan’s links with the Muslim world, the United States, and China dried up.

It is in the best interest of India and Pakistan to co-exist peacefully.[1] Even undeclared low-intensity hostilities may erupt into a full-scale war in which the most lethal weapons are employed. Hot pursuit of terrorists may be a casus belli inviting counter-measures. Pakistan aimed to overcome its inferiority in conventional weapons by going nuclear. The acquisition of nuclear weapons has not increased Pakistan’s military capabilities against India, however, because the latter is also a nuclear power. If continued fighting over Kashmir leads to an atomic war between the two neighbors, who possess nuclear explosives with developed delivery systems, the consequence can only be mutual annihilation. Thus, the choice is either friendship or destruction. [2] Nuclear weapons actually prevent war because of their deterrent effect. Each country can gain more from cooperative than from antagonistic relations. Both can agree to extend to the nuclear field what the Simla Agreement put on paper regarding conventional weapons. Trust has its own risks, but more so perpetual mistrust. The chances of friendship are better now than in the past. The peoples of India and Pakistan, who have the capacity to elect rulers dedicated to peace through negotiations, may ask themselves whether the whole Sub-continent should perish for a comparatively small piece of land, even if it happens to be the divinely beautiful Kashmir.

Options for Kashmir

The key to resolving tension between India and Pakistan lies in a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Both New Delhi and Islamabad recognize the need for a way out of the deadlock. Options may be summarized as joining India or Pakistan, becoming independent or turning the Lind of Control into an international border. The two countries can accept only solutions that will not cause severe domestic repercussions. Therefore, the possibility of the whole undivided state joining India or Pakistan is almost nil. Some Kashmiris may welcome independence but this alternative cannot be accepted by India and Pakistan. A plebiscite is unacceptable not only to India, but also to Pakistan. To approve the creation of an independent state out of India would pose a danger to the country’s territorial integrity. Nehru’s Interim Government back in 1947 had conveyed to Lord Mountbatten and to the Maharaja that J&K could accede to India or Pakistan but that it must not attempt to stay independent. It had been an independent state between 15 August and 26 October 1947. Even then, India had not approved of a Standstill Agreement which would maintain that status quo. The independence option would have balkanized India, even it had been adopted by a handful of states. For Pakistan, it would also be another failure for the two-nations theory. Moreover, it may further partition J&K into three units, Hind and Buddhist, as well as Muslim.

The last option is to formalize the status quo leaving with India the portion it now administers and allowing Pakistan to hold to whatever it has. This alternative is closer to India’s solution of the issue. It may be said that this line of reasoning was pursued from the time of Nehru, who had agreed to a ceasefire in 1948. Between the years 1949-72, the Indo-Pakistan border in Kashmir had been defined by this ceasefire line. Even a victorious India pushed for that kind of a partition during the Simla talks. The latter agreement accepted the same as a LOC, designed to lay the basis for conversion into an international border. As the initial phase of an eventual solution, an end to Pakistan’s military aid to the Kashmiri militants goes hand in hand with India’s support of elections that would choose Kashmir’s representatives.[3] Those Kashmiris who had fled may return home and vote in free and fair elections to be monitored by a team of experts. Both regions, administered separately by the two neighbors, may enjoy maximum autonomy with soft borders. A harmonious balance may be struck between the need to integrate J&K within the national mainstream and the installation of autonomous self-governance. What is meant by the last concept is good governance or accountable political machinery, stable economic infrastructure and even-handed as ell as effective judiciary. To paraphrase Tennyson a bit, one may conclude: “Let us not lose ourselves in light!”

[1] Pran Chopra, “Prospects for Peace with Pakistan”, Securing India’s Future in the New Millennium, ed., Brahma Chellaney, New Delhi, The Centre for Policy Research, 1999,

[2] Birbal Nash, Kashmir: the Nuclear Flashpoint, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 1998,

[3] David Cortright, ed., The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, New York, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, The authors suggest debt relief and additional credits for Pakistan and the possibility of a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council for India.

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