The critical Clinton-Sharif deal (4 July 1999) expedited an honorable retreat for the Pakistani armed forces. But it was China’s posture of neutrality that convinced the Pakistani leadership of the futility of insistence on armed intervention. China’s new response was in contrast with its former policy of blessing and encouragement of Pakistan’s actions. Known for taking a pro-Pakistan stand in all the earlier conflicts, China, this time, changed its strategic behaviour on the entire J&K question. Having supplied military hardware and sensitive technology to Pakistan for so many decades, China now advised its long-standing strategic partner to abide by the LOC and withdraw the intruders. This radical departure brings to mind the possibility that Kargil may also be the beginning of a new trend in Sino-Pakistan relations. If it indicates a changed context of Sino-U.S. stand off as well, new initiatives in Sino-U.S. and Sino-Indian ties will serve a mutually supplementing atmosphere of peace. Beijing’s neutrality may bolster a new China-India-Pakistan security relationship.[1]

The Chinese Communities were still fighting in the Civil War when both India and Pakistan became independent. Official Peking (now Beijing) line after 1949 described Indian political life as bourgeois liberal democracy and Nehru as a stooge of Western interests. Following the Indo-Pakistan War of 1948 and the Indo-Chinese War of 1962, China and Pakistan built friendship against their common enemy. Pakistan even conceded some territory to China, which became its major supplier of military equipment and technologies. China provided the same kind of support during the 1971 War. As well put by an Indian writer,[2] one does not need to scratch too deep to discover the links between China’s nuclear capability as well as its policy of assisting Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme and India’s decision to keep the nuclear option open. India stationed five of its seven mountain divisions on its northern borders.[3] Pakistan facilitated Henry Kissinger’s historic trip to Beijing, which made all three countries more suspicious in Indian eyes. In the 1970s, Pakistan emerged as the “number one recipient of Chinese supplies”.[4] Although Pakistan made use of various contributions from other sources as well, Chinese help in transforming that country into a nuclear power was significant. Although China, from time to time, disappointed Pakistan, its frequent patronage, over the years, became the most central concern of India’s security thinking. China was, thus, a critical factor in India’s foreign policy, almost as problematic as Pakistan, but qualitatively different from that western neighbour[5] On the other hand, since the signing of the Sino-Indian agreement (1993) on the maintenance of peace on the LOC, both China and India have been actively adjusting their policies towards each other, and their relationship has been improving at a faster pace than expected.[6]

China’s recent posture of neutrality, however, may be singled out as the “most important factor” that greased the wheels of the Clinton-Sharifdeal.[7] China remained neutral even after the visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif to Beijing. In the post-Cold War circumstances, Pakistan lost some standing in China’s foreign policy calculations. Beijing has to adapt itself to the new realities. Pakistan is no longer the frontline state battling Soviet influence in Central and South Asia. A meeting of minds between the Chinese and the new Russian leadership replaced the former military threat along the western and southern borders. While a possible Western intervention in this region would bring new dangers closer to home, Pakistan’s repeated nuclear and missile tests easily put China on the spot under the critical eyes of the United States, which also accused that country for “stealing” technologies from U.S. facilities. Neither did Pakistan restrict the domination and network of the Islamic militants, whose activities extended into the Muslim-Turkic (Uygur) province of Xinjiang (or Chinese Turkestan). Although China’s leaders claim that Islamic extremism does not pose a threat to security, their country possessing a civilization with a long experience in dealing with multi-ethic problems, Beijing is beginning to see, however, the emergence of fissiparous tendencies involving weapons and drugs.[8] Moreover, NATO’s selective support of human rights of some minority ethnic groups would increase the probability of future interference in Tibet as well as in Xinjiang. For China, Pakistan’s terrorist-mercenary linkage might prove to be a high risk in the long run. New China, critical of encouraging unilateralism in international relations, is bound to act like a great power of the 21^st century with global interests rather than a mere regional balancer pursuing limited gains such as getting an ally off the hook.[9]

[1] Swaran Singh, “The Kargil Conflict: Why and How of China’s Neutrality”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, XXIII/7 (October 1999)

[2] Swaran Singh, “China Factor in India’s Nuclear Policy”, Journal of Peace Studies, New Delhi, 5/3 (May-June 1998),

[3] Sahdev Vohra, “The North-Eastern Frontier of India and China’s Claim”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, XII (December 1989),

[4] Jai Bhagwan, “Chinese Arms Transfers to the Third World: Emerging Paterns of Commercialization”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, XI/6 (September 1988), Aabha Dixit, “Enduring Sino-Pak Relations; the military Dimension”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, XII (December 1989),

[5] Sujit Dutta, “Sino-Indian Relations: Some Issues”, Startegic Analysis, New Delhi, XI/11 (February 1988),

[6] Mao Siwei, “China and the Kashmir Issue”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, XVII/12 (March 1995),

[7] Swaran Singh, “China’s Posture of Neutrality”, World Focus, New Delhi, 234-235 (June-July 1999),

[8] Surya Gangadharan, “The China-Taliban Equation”, Aakrosh, New Delhi, 3/6 (January 2000),

[9] Zhou Gang, “Sino-Indian Relations”, U.S.I Journal, New Delhi, CXXXI/536 (April-June 1999),

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