The Indian Analyst
 

Kashmir and Neighbors

 

 

Historical Backdrop

The British | Historical Backdrop | Sheikh Abdullah  

Gulab Singh, one of the most trusted military aids of Ranjit Singh, subjugated Ladakh and Baltistan. With the conquest of the last two pieces of land, Gulab Singh’s possessions more-or-less encircled Kashmir from the south and the east. The First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-46)[1] ended with the Treaty of Lahore which brought to the British the hilly territories between the rivers Bias and India including Kashmir. The British, in their turn, sold the latter to Gulab Singh for the party sum of 75 lacks of rupees (or 750,000 sterling) through the Treaty of Amritsar (16 March 1846),[2] which also meant that the British hence forth recognized the independence of the  “Dogra regime” in Jammu and Kashmir, and honoured the ruler with the title of the Maharaja, who entered Srinagar the same year. Already the master of Jammu, Ladakh (up to the Drass River) and Baltistan, the Maharaja, who later occupied Gilgit as well, thus founded the modern State of Jammu and Kashmir, which assumed its undivided shape, including part of the Pamirs and of Tibet besides the Indian Kingdoms of Jammu and Kashmir. This whole area had never been effectively united under one administration before. The Kashmir Valley was now returned to a Hindu ruler, but the overwhelming majority of the Valley’s population had become Muslim since the time of Queen Kota Rani. Gulab Singh was to rule over a Muslim majority, just as the Muslim Nizam of Hyderabad and the Muslim ruler of Junagadh were ruling over predominantly Hindu populations. The British ‘gift’, the result of a well-planned policy, “was not for the sake of money, but for a major political reason, i.e., to weaken the Sikh power”.[3]

The Gulab Singh regime had to subdue the warlike Bomba and Khakha tribes of the Valley and resist the British to control its frontier policy, as well as searching for solutions to the economic chaos especially in the rural areas. The Maharaja eradicated some of the worst aspects of the beggar (forced labour) system. He ordered the rationing of rice for the city population and removed part of the tyrannical practice imposed on the shawl- weavers by requiring them to pay only for the actual work done by them on the loom and recognizing their right to change their employers and to minimum salaries. He was not a saint, and his methods might have been primeval, but he took some painsto govern justly. He punished corrupt officials in a rude manner, but the considered great expenditure on places a waste of resources. He remained an orthodox Hindu, but having started his careers petty official in the Court, he conquered kingdoms and eventually became one of the most remarkable Indians of the 19th century. With the revolt of the Indian army at Meerut in mid-1857, the old British.[4] After the death (1858) of Gulab Singh, Maharaja Ranbir Singh promoted trade by constructing a few roads and establishing a postal service. He introduced experimental tea gardens, allocated money for the silk industry and wine making, and abolished the tax for the ailing shawl business.

While the British seemed more occupied by the expansion of Russia, which stormed Chimkent (1864), Tashment (1865), Samarkand (1868) and Khiva(1873), [5] famine, raging in Kashmir, took away three-fifths of the total population of the Valley on account of the continuous rains that destroyed when the French market was lost after the Franco-German war(1871). A year later, the Sunni weavers looted the property of the Shi’a manufacturers and traders. On the other hand, in response to recurring revolts, Gilgit was permanently annexed to Jammu and Kashmir, and agreements were made with the rulers of Hunza and Nagar to guarantee trade safety.

Pratap Singh’s long reign (1885-1925) was marked by more British Interference mainly on account of tensions on the northern frontiers of India. Although popular complaints multiplied while the treasury remained empty, the tangible rationale behind the British curtailing of the new Maharaja’s power was not the grievances of the people, but the craving for control over that vital border region. As the Russian military appeared more frequently on the Pamirs, effective ruler ship passed from the hands of the Maharaja to those of a Council of Regency, subject to the supervision of the British Resident who was to become the final referee in all matters. He was the spokesman of the Central Government with the duty of keeping a close watch on the administration. Enjoying even some judicial powers not mentioned in official document, his office was veiled dictatorship, and his advice was a command. Encouraged by the Russian debut and the latter’s hunger for branching out, the HunzaNagar forces revolted but were suppressed by none other than Colonel A.G.Durand, the British Political Agent in Giilgit. The Kashmir State contributed men and money for all these expeditions. Having obtained the control of the frontier posts, the British saw no harm in appointing (1891) the Maharaja as the new President of the Council, even if only as a figurehead. As the Imperial Government further consolidated its positions in the northern frontier and as relations with Afghanistan improved, the State Council was abolished (1905), but the Maharaja’s orders had to be approved by the British Resident. The Maharaja placed the resources of his state at the disposal of the British Government during the First World War. Even then, he would act in accordance with the advice of the Resident regarding frontier problems and keynote administrative reorganizations. Full powers were restored to Maharaja Pratap Singh only in 1921. When he was succeeded by his nephew, Raja Hari Singh, groups of young Kashmiri men, mostly non-Muslims educated in the state and the missionary schools (first established in 1874 and 1881 respectively) or in the colleges in Srinagar (1905) and Jammu(1908), were imbued with notions of equality and freedom.

Indian Nationalism and the Muslims

These circumstances nourished ideas of Indian nationalism and the independence as well as providing for the seeds of problems connected with some nationalities and minorities.[6] The nationalist movement in the pre-partition Indian Sub-continent had its own peculiarities. The fact that nationalism there grew under British colonial rule had an impact on that transformation more ways than one. Britan set foot in India when its capitalist formation had reached the stage of expansion abroad. It was British assets, supported by financial means, that encountered and paralysed Indian feudalism, and thereby economically unified India through capitalist economic forms, including a network of communications so vital for colonial rule and also helpful to convert a medieval people into a modern nation. Just as this evolution was motivated by the interests of foreign capital, the blossoming of local nationalism under colonial rule had to be, in some ways, dissimilar to the evolution of British or French nationalism . While this transformation, stimulated by foreign interests, provided the objective basis for the rise of the Indian nation, not only its special features prevented the forging of the whole Indian peoples into a coherent nation, but British capitalism, which fought against feudalism at home, perpetrated some local feudal relics in that “most precious jewel in the crown”, again for its own sake. While British capitalism inevitably helped the consolidation of economic forms that contributed to the creation of nationalism in India, subjectively it sought to rely on forces that retarded the process of national consolidation.

Indian nationalism, on the other hand, grew unevenly in terms of time and momentum. Different communities and regions joined it at different times and in various tempi: The Muslims in the north or the Indu Bengalis in ports, the peasantry or the urban dwellers, the depressed classes or the traditionally wealthy reacted differently and at different times. Those who were galvanized early and those who joined the wagon late thought of themselves as separate groups. The differences were on account of a number of factors such as the proximity to the great cities, the level of economic development or the size of the educated sub-class. Under the circumstances, various groups, with personalities of their own, seemed to develop separately. But all initially believed in a single Indian state, none favouring partition. The future independent state has to be based on some kind of federalism, with the provinces enjoying autonomy.

When various nationalities in India wanted to unite the territories inhabited by their own culture, this longing was only a quest for self-expression, not in conflict with the general union of the whole country. There were several commercial or industrial groups in a number of awakened nationalities however, which incited hatred against their rivals in other national or religious groups by trying to incite the consciousness of the masses and presenting their economic interests under different garbs. Made up of conflicting groups with different interests, the Hindus and the Muslims had common religions as far as their respective communities were concerned. Otherwise, both the Hindus and the Muslims had a class structure with their own landlords, moneylenders, professionals, shopkeepers, peasants and workers. The adherents of these two leading religions were dispersed all over India.

But it was inevitable in this growth of nationalism that the Muslims, the depressed classes, and some other socio-religious groups also developed movements of some identity. None of them spoke the same language, however; nor did they inhabit a definite territory or have a common economic life. In many places, as in Bengal, one could not differentiate a Muslim from a Hindu except for one differential-religion. Hinduism or Islam was an important bond.

With no common territory, language or economic life, the Indian Muslims shared no monolithic interests encompassing all. There were Muslims in Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir and in East Bengal, all reflecting different identities, in addition to a common religion. Similarly, there were Hindu Bengalis, Hindu Biharis or Hindu Marathas. Using a different tongue and living at a particular place, all of them represented a different nationality. But in religious terms, the Indian Muslims of the time, constituting a 90 million group within the 400 million Indian population, was the biggest minority.

It is relevant to remember that the Muslim masses, everywhere in India including Kashmir, were economically weak. The British conquest of India brought down the Moghul Empire and its Muslim aristocracy. While the latter lost its political power and economic positions, a new landlord class was made up of Hindu merchants and money-lenders, who became the mainstay of foreign rule. The Hindus had started to interact with the British much earlier than the Muslims. The first contacts had necessarily been in the ports like Bengal, Bombay and Madras, which were predominantly Hindu, and not in northern India, where the dominant segment of the Muslims lived. It was first in the Hindu areas that the British, supported with roads, new cities and educational facilities, created the new economic system. When the British brought their educational system to India, it was the Hindus, rather some of them, who benefited from this new opportunity, while the Muslims stuck to traditional learning.

The ripening political concept of “Muslim nationalism” reflected the desire of the feudal upper crust of that religious community to regain its privileges, long denied by the colonizing British. Conditions of extremely weak capital formations in most northern India were conducive to channeling local frustrations into the mainstream of religious identity. Although the feudal elements seemed to spearhead this identity, large non-feudal economic classes or groups such as the peasants, small landowners, hatred of the Hindu occupancy in the middle and lower levels of the country’s trade, industry and civil service. The landlord upper crust found in Islam a ready instrumentality that could go to the heart of the masses with whose support they could, above all, protect their own interests. Much later did they rally to the call for the creation of an Indian Muslim state?

The foundations of a Muslim state in parts of India were laid some time before the formation of “Pakistan”. Being late comers in national awakening in India, the Muslim thinkers sought for ways to overcome their limits. One should bear in mind the names of Shah Waliullah (1703-62)[7] Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98) [8] and Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938),[9] among the outstanding Indian Muslim thinkers, as precursors of the reconstruction of Islam from which the content of Pakistan’s philosophical roots were developed. Waliullah, whome Iqbal defined as “perhaps the first Muslim” [10]who refuted the former interpretations of the Islamic dogma and searched for “purification”, or a reversion to early Islam. This negation of obsolete forms and the desire to return to essentials blended to cause contradictions in Waliullah’s philosophy allowing two opposite trends in later Muslim through to quote him for different purposes.

Syed Ahmad Khan was the first to suggest the principles and the application of a new orientation. Although he personally belonged to the upper stratum of the Indian Muslimfeudal society, his recommendations and achievements aimed to serve a much larger community. After the failure of the so-called “Indian Mutiny” (1857),[11] a popular uprising that further strengthened the anti-Muslim trend of British policy, he suggested a programme for political collaboration with the British and also educational measures to restore the former status of the Muslim community. While the latter sought, in general terms, for a new ways to change the attitude of the British authorities towards them, Syed Ahmad Khan started a movement of Western education amalgamated with Islam. The Muslims had to abandon their antiquated religious dogmas as well as their repugnance towards contemporary Western civilization. The result was the Mahmohan Anglo-Oriental College (1877), now the Aligarh Muslim University.[12] Religion was a means to preserve the community’s indigenous culture, but a new centre had to spread secular education through which the regeneration of the Indian Muslims could be accomplished. Even some verses in the Qur’an, whose form was allegorical, needed new interpretations to be based upon interpretation of religious dogma, earned him the title of (British) Knight, but the Ulama insisted that religious faith ought to be over and above man’s reasoning.

As expressed in Sir Syed Ahmad’s book,[13] the newly educated Muslims were expected to remain loyal to the British. While urging faithfulness to the latter, Sir Syed opposed the Indian National Congress, some of whose early leaders like the Ghose brothers, Pal, Rai and Tilak, stressed the “Hindu ideology” as a weapon against the foreigners. But it hardly appealed to the Muslims; neither did the Congress decision to boycott the British goods, which would promote the Indian industrialists, not the Muslims who did not yet own any mills. It raised the price of the local products manufactured and sold by Hindus.

Indian Muslims of later generations honour Muhammad Iqbal [14] as a great poet, philosopher and a religious reformer. There are journals, societies and an academy that bear his name. Although his impact was felt in the decades after the First World War, the Muslims of the Sub-continent regarded him as their spiritual father because he was, in contrast to Syed  Ahmad Khan, anti-colonial, echoed the disposition of the younger generation by bringing the Islamic teaching closer to the norms of Western thinking, and expressed his ideas in beautiful and impressive verse. While influenced by the Medieval Sufis, and especially (the Turkish) Maulana Jalal-ud Din Rumi (1207-73),[15] Islam needed, in Iqbals’s view, to have its principles expressed in the ideas of modern times. He found some ideas of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) similar to those of Rumi, and was attracted by Friedrich W. Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) ideal of a superman with a strong will.[16]

The divergence of Hindu-Muslim interests provided the colonial power with the opportunities to stimulate different religious groups to follow divergent currents. Devices like separate representation, the central theme of the so-called “reforms” known after the viceroys (Mino-Morley, 1909; Montague-Chelmsford, 1919),[17] were parts of the communal principle in the constitutional machinery of the remade called Indian state. The Indian nationalists criticized the system of separate electorates as a deliberate strategy of Britain to weaken the unity of the Indian peoples. Bengal, for instance, was divided into East and West on the basis of religion and ostensibly for convenience in administration.

Political consciousness thus gathering momentum among the Islamic circles, the Muslim League,[18] a political party, was formed (1906) signifying an important turning point in the history of the country. The British started taking strong measures against them, as the Muslims developed political maturity before, during and after the First World War. They banned Muslim publications and interned their leaders such as Muhammad and Shaukat Ali and Maulana Azad.[19] When the Muslims protested against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the Greek invasion of Anatolia, the Indian National Congress enthusiastically supported them. What was then called the “Khilafat Movement” united the Hindus and the Muslims to a degree unparalleled before.[20] Sindhi and Pathan Muslims organized a “Hijrat Movement” (migration) to Afghanistan as a reaction to the Treaty of Sevres (1920) that the victors of the First World War wanted to dictate to the Turks. However, the Republican Turks themselves soon abolished the Khilafat and secularized their state and when the Afghan Government refused admission to the Indian Muslims, the wind was taken out of the agitators’ sails, and Hindu-Muslim unity began to shatter. The nationalist leaders failed to offer a programme of principles and actions after the non-cooperation movement against the British. When some leaders, like Gandhi, injected Hindu religious ideas into the nationalist movement, this created the wrong impression in some minds that the Congress was actually a Hindu movement. Cooperation gave place to communal riots, behind which there were the vested interests of groups belonging to different faiths who gave a communal form to their struggle.

Both the Muslim communal tradition and the Hindutva (literally ‘Hinduness’) tradition propounded the “two-nations theory”. As early as 1927, M.A. Ansari saw communalist tendencies not only in some pronouncements of Jayakar, but also of Jinnah.[21] There was a “strange agreement’ in both attitudes.[22]

The Hindu Mahasabha (Great Hindu Association) had no quarrel with Jinnah’s two-nations theory. Gandhi was anathema to both Muslim and Hindu communalists. The British backed the Muslim League in preference to other Muslims who joined hands with the Congress.

The masses, on the other hand, whether Hindu or Muslim, had identical interests. They were not the ones who got the seats in the legislatures or in the bureaucracy. A programme of principles and action to emanate from either side could unite them. The Hindu money-lender oppressed the Muslim debtor, and the Hindu Bengali landlord exploited the back ward Muslim peasant. This relationship was presented as a communal conflict. The money-lender and the landlord suppressed the debtor and the tenant, whether a Hindu or Muslim.

When the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, proclaimed India’s entry into the Second World War without prior consultation with the main political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League were equally desirous to attain independence or at least an immediate transfer of as much power as possible. The British Government looked forward to the cooperation of the Indians in the prosecution of the war, at the end of which they could enter into consulatations with several interested parties to bring the benefits of parliamentary democracy to the peoples of India. The Hindus, who formed three-fourths of the population and were far ahead of the Muslims in terms of wealth, cohesion and education, perhaps inevitably identified their communal interests with Indian nationalism. They built the Indian national Congress, founded in 1885,[23] as a strong political instrument with which neither the moderate Liberal Federation nor the extremist Hindu Mahasabha could compete for authority or representation. Its “mahatmaic” leader, Gandhi, a sincere humanitarian, was nevertheless the very quintessence of Hinduism for the masses.

The Muslims, who were only one-fourth of the total population and a minority everywhere, except in the north-west and the north-east, wanted freedom from British rule as much as the Hindus but considered their lesser status in education, administration, trade and industry not befitting their traditions of greatness and also feared possible Hindu domination in the new social fabric after independence. Jinnah never posed as a man of religion but equaled Gandhi in single-mindness of purpose. The Muslim League leadership, which had already interpreted the formation of the Congress-led governments after the 1937 elections as hostile acts against their interests, stood in awe of a Hindu-dominated future Constituent Assembly. At the Lahore session of the Muslim League, a decision (23 March 1940),[24] moved by the Bengal Chief Minister A.K. Fazl-ul Haq and which came to be known as the “Pakistan Resolution”,[25] stated that no plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless designed on the principle that “geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent States”. [26] Jinnah’s complementary statement[27] on this occasion describing the Hindus and Muslims as belonging to “two different civilizations” based mainly on “conflicting ideas and conceptions” is generally acknowledged as the beginning of the well-known two-nations theory. However, while the Congress leadership rejected it with anger more than displeasure, some extremist circles such as the Hindu Mahasabha had previously referred to the two communities as “two nations”,[28] and some Muslim organizations were against the idea of a separate  sovereign state for the Muslims of India. For instance, the All-India Momin Conference, the Jama’ at-ul Ulama, the Azad Muslim Conference, and the Ahrar Party were all against the Muslim League, and the Khuda-e Khidmatgar of the North-West Frontier Province, the Watan Party of Baluchistan, and the All-India Shi’a Political Conference were pro-Congress. Apart from the Muslim League, only the Communist Party of India, among the significant political parties, recognized the Muslim right to secession. The Pakistan Resolution also implied the partition of Punjab and Bengal.


[1] Huge Cook, The Sikh War: December 1845”, History Today, London, XXVII/1 (January 1977), pp.31-40.

[2] K.M. Panikkar, “Treaty of Amritsar and the Foundation of the Kashmir State”, Grover, op.cit., Vol. I. pp. 92-113.

[3] M. L. Kapur, “Kashmir Sold”, ibid., p.60.

[4] Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, New Delhi, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1976, p.201. For the response of the British to the shock of the 1857 revolt; Thomas R. Matcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857-1870, New Delhi, Manohar, 1990.

[5] Hugh Seton-Waston, The Decline of Imperial Russia: 1855-1914,New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1952,pp.82-89.

[6] Huge Seton-Watson, Nations and States: an Enquiry into the Origin of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, London, Methen, 1977,pp. 290-297.

[7] On the religious rather than political views of this key figure in the South Asian Islamic tradition: J.M.S. Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi: 1703=1762, Leiden, The Netherlands, E.J. Brill, 1986.

[8] On Syed Ahmad’s reconciliation of human reason and divine omnipotence: Bashir AhmadDar, Religious thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Lahore, Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957; Christian W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: a Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology, New Delhi, Vikas, 1978; Hafeez Malik, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan, New York, Clumbia University Press, 1980.

[9] Some of Iqbal’s works: Asrar-e Khudi (The Secrets of the Self), Shikwa-Jawab-e Shikwa(Complaint and Answer), Zabur-e Ajam(Persian Psalms) and Javid-nama…The Iqbal Academy in Lahore brings out the Bazm-e Iqbal,a review devoted to a critical study of his thought and those branches of learning in which he was interested.

[10] Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. London, Oxford University Press, 1934. p. 97.

[11] For a review of recent histography of 1857 in a broad social and economic framework, some new trends and a few gaps in research: Kalyan Kumar Sengupta,  in a broad social and economic framework, some new trends and a few gaps in research: Kalyan Kumar Sengupta, Recent Writings on the Revolt of 1857: a Survey, New Delhi, Indian Council of Historical Research, 1975, especially pp. 56-61

[12] By Aligarh’s Vice-Chancellor when the school entered its second century: A.M. Khusro, Aligarh: a Century Ends and a Century Begins, Aligarh Muslim University, 1977.

[13] An account of the Loyal Mahomedans of India, Meerut, J.A. Gibbons, 1860. Also by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: The Causes of the Indian Revolt, Benares, Medical Hill Press, 1873; Essay on the Question Whether Islam Has been Beneficial or Injurious to Human Society in General. Lahore, Orientalia, 1870; The Mohomedan Commentary on the Holy Bible, Ghazeeporo, the author, 1882; On the Present State of Indian Politics, Consisting of Speeches, and Letters Reprinted from the “Pioneer”. Allahabad, the Pioneer Press, 1888; Report of the Members of the Select Committee for the Better Diffusion and Advancement of Learning among Muhammedans of India, Benares, Medical Hall Press, 1872; Review on Dr. Hunter’s Indian Musalmans” Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen? Benares, Medical Hall Press, 1872.

[14] The origin of the idea of a separate Muslim state is controversial among the writers of this movement. Sir Muhammad Iqbal’s presidential address at the Allahabad session of the All-India Muslim League in late-1930 is often considered as the starting point. (For instance: Muhammad Munawwar, Dimensions of Pakistan Movement, Rawalpindi, Services Book Club, 1989, p. 120) However, Iqbal probably envisaged only the union of the Muslim-dominated north-western territories of the Sub-continent within a large federation of all India and not an independent Muslim state (Shamloo, ed., Speeches and Statements of Iabal, Lahore, 1948, pp. 10-35). Recent research indicates that this idea was presented from time to time even in the 19th century. The first group was made up of British administrators and writers, who were interested in dividing and ruling India on communal lines. (Wilfred Scaven Blunt, Ripon-a Private Diary, London, 1909, pp.107-108) The second group was made up of some extremist Hindus who organized militant revivalist movements, such as the suddhi(purification) designed to convert Muslims into Hinduism and the sangathan (consolidation) aiming at greater unity among the Hindus. (For the views of Lala Hardayal, the chief spokesman of Hindu extremism, in the 1920s, see: The Times of India, New Delhi, 25 July 1925: The Comrade, 22 May and 5 June 1925. For similar views: Indra Prakash, A review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha, New Delhi, 1938.) The third group was the Muslim protagonists of the same idea, who could neither reconcile themselves to the loss of power in India and were also influenced by the Pan-Islamic movement of the time. (Ishtiaq Husai Quershi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 610-1947: A Brief historical Analysis, The Hague, 1962.) For more detail: M. Rafique Afzal, ed., The Case for Pakistan, Islamabad, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1979, pp. xi-xxxiv. Also: Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Evolution of Pakistan, Lahore, 1963.

[15] Harendrechandra Paul, Jalalu’d-Din Rumi and His Tasawwuf, Calcutta, Sobharani Paul, 1985. Also: Nazir Qaiser, Rumi’s Impact on Iqbal’s Religious Thought, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1989.

[16] Ulrick Enemark Petersen, “Breathing Nietzsche’s Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau’s Concepts of Power and Human Nature”, Alternatives, 24/1 (January-March 1999), pp. 83-118; Alex J. Bellamy, “Introducing Nietzche to the Study of Nations”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, London, 5/1 (Spring 1999), pp. 118-143.

[17] Arthur Berriedale keith. A Constitutional History of India: 1600-1935, Delhi, Low Price Publications, 1930; 1990, pp. 226-273. For the operation of the reforms and the report of the Simon Commission: ibid., pp. 274-318.

[18] A biography of the Karachi-born Muslim League leader and creator Pakistan: Stanley A. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, 1984. A reassessment of Jinnah’s aims: Ayasha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah: the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985. The author suggests, a position strongly criticized by Pakistan, that Jinnah’s demand for an independent state for the Indian Muslims was not really the goal he wanted, and that he favoured instead a loose union between the two entities joined in defence and foreign policy.

[19] A Comprehensive study on a remarkable intellectual, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, whose life was dominated by three passions: Hindu-Muslim unity, freedom of India, and love of learning: Tributes, appraisals and selected writings on the occasion of his Centenary: Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, ed., India’s Maulana: Abul Kalam Azad, 2 vols., New Delhi, Indian Council for cultural Relations, 1990.

[20] Gandhi lent his strong support to the Khilafat cause. All-India Khilafat Committee was formed with Seth Chhotani of Bombay as president and Maulana Shaukat Ali as Secretary. Parshotam Mehra, A Dictionary of Modern Indian History; 1707-1947, Delhi, Oxford university Press, 1985, p. 377; M. Naeem Qureshi, “The Indian Khilafat Movement (1918-24)”, Journal People’s Fight for National Liberation: Non-Cooperation, Khilafat and Revivalist Movements, New Delhi, Srijanee Prakashar, 1972, pp. 213-386. English translation of a leading Turkish source on the Khilafat Movement: M. Kemal Oke, The South Asian Muslims’ Freedom Movement and the Turkish National Struggle, Ankara, Ministry of Culture, 1986.

[21][21] Mushirul Hasan, ed., Muslims and the Congress: Select Correspondence of Dr. M.A. Ansari, 1912-1935, Delhi, Manohar, 1979, p.20.

[22] Humayun Kabir, Muslim Politics: 1906-47 and other Essays, Calcutta, K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1969, p.51.

[23] Fourteen studies by the Congress Party during the century long (1885-1985) history: Ram Joshi and

R. K. Hebsur, eds., Congress in Indian Politics: a Centenary Perspective, Riverdale, Maryland, The Riverdale Co., New Delhi and London, Sangham Books, 1988. Another centenary collection: Paul R. Brass  and Francis Robinson, eds., Indian National Congress and Indian Society: 1885-1985, Idelogy, Social Structure, and Political Dominance, New Delhi,Chanakya, 1987.

[24] The Islamic Republic of Pakistan now officially celebrates the anniversaries of this particular date as the Republic Day.

[25] For full proceedings of the session: Syed Shaarifuddin Pirzada, Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session, Karachi, Pakistan Publications, 1968. It was originally referred to as the Lahore Resolution, but came to be known in popular parlance as the Pakistan Resolution, so dubbed by the Hindu press.

[26] Chaudri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Lahore, Services Book Club, 1988, p.38; Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim Leagye Documents, 1906-1947, Vol.II, Dacca, 1969, p.341.

[27] Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, ed., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 5th ed., Vol. I, Lahore, Muhammad Ashraf, 1952, pp. 172-178.

[28] Richard Symond, The Making of Pakistan, London, Faber and Faber, 1949, p.59.

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