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Hormis Tharakan
Ambassador S K Lambah, IFS (Retd)
Indo-China
CHina's Defense Modernisation: Implications for India
"Upgradation
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"Missile
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by
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by Air
Chief Marshal Fali Major (Retd)
"Economic
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"The
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C.V. Ranganathan
Indo-Iran
Complexities
of the situation of Iran: India's strategic interests and options
"A Historical Perceptive" by
Amb.
Akbar Mirza Khaleeli
"A
Strategic perspective" by
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perspective" by Shri
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Indo-Myanmar
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security relations: Measures to improve trade and economic ties
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"A
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"The
Current Scenario"
by
Shri
K V Rajan, IFS (Retd)
"Implications
for India"
by Maj.
Gen (Retd. Ashok K. Mehta
|
Seminar Summary Report CHANGING CONTOURS OF INDO-US RELATIONS: CHALLENGES RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES |
|
As compiled by Shri A Madhavan, former ambassador of India and a current member of Asia Centre; 3 June 2006; IAS officer’s Association, # 1, Infantry Road, Bangalore -1 |
|
Asia Centre has been conducting a series of seminars and discussions to review India’s Security environment in the Sub-continent. As a final leg of this of Series, a seminar was held on 03 June 2006 from 10 A M to 1 P M on the topic “Changing Contours of Indo- US Relations: Challenges Risks And Opportunities” at the I A S Officers’ Institution, # 1 Infantry Road, Bangalore. The seminar was presided by Shri A P Venkateswaran, former Foreign Secretary and chairman of Asia Centre.The
presentations were followed by a lively discussion session. Nearly
45 Asia Centre members and invitees drawn from retired officers of
Indian Administrative Service, Foreign Service & Defense
Services, academics and scientists attended the seminar. The following distinguished speakers addressed the seminar: -
Shri
Brahma Chellaney, Professor
of Strategic Studies, Center
for Policy Research,
Amb.
N. Krishnan, Former Ambassador and India's Permanent
representative at UN Head quarters, New York.
This report summarises the essence of the presentations and the discussions that followed. INTRODUCTION. Lt.
Gen. (Retd.) Ravi Eipe, Director of
Asia Centre, welcomed the speakers and
audience and explained the context and purpose of the
seminar. US and Shri
A.P. Venkateswaran, Chairman of Asia
Centre, introduced the seminar as the last in the series held by the
Centre on |
|
Dr. Brahma
Chellaney, Centre for Policy Research,
There has been a
shift in A closer Indo-US
engagement is on, with the Is there any
perceptible shift towards The The nuclear deal
has become a complicating factor in the bilateral relationship.
The import of American nuclear reactors is not in The Rivalry between |
A historic perspective
Ambassador N.
Krishnan:
The US and India have a
love-hate relationship. Independent
India found goodwill among Americans, but relations between the countries were
beset with disappointment and frustration on our side, matched by annoyance
and neglect on theirs. Personal
differences among the leaders also led to the two drifting apart.
Now, after fifty years, the same pattern may be repeated.
The US now seems to have rediscovered India as a rising power.
Indians have reacted with delight at one level and suspicion and
apprehension at another level. The new relationship is described as a
‘strategic partnership’, which is seductive, suggesting that both
countries are on the same side, though it is not an alliance against any other
country. It opens beguiling
perspectives over many areas of cooperation, including high tech in defence,
nuclear power, and space. It also
suggests closeness in dealing with global issues.
The speaker explained how the
initial goodwill soured on both sides. India
being governed as a constitutional, multicultural democracy with guaranteed
rights for citizens under the rule of law was a common bond.
But divergences emerged in foreign and economic policy.
India would not be aligned with the US in the cold war period.
Americans perceived India as pro-Soviet, and hence chilled in their
attitude to us. India’s adoption
of a planned economy with a strong public sector and its approach to the NPT,
followed by the Pokhran test of 1974 alienated the US against us.
Pakistan became a lynchpin of American policy from the time of CENTO.
In relation to US interests in South Asia, India and Pakistan were
hyphenated. US leaned towards
Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and supplied weapons to that country, overruling
our protests. In the Bangladesh
crisis of 1971, the despatch of the US warship ‘Enterprise’ to the Bay of
Bengal angered Indian opinion and strengthened the view that the US could look
at India only through the prism of Pakistan.
The US denial of uranium fuel for the Tarapur reactor, in violation of
the bilateral agreement, was a breach that Indians minded.
Since the cold war ended about
1989, global equations changed dramatically, affecting Indo-US relations also.
Paradoxically, the Pokhran nuclear test in 1998, although it upset the
NPT, brought about a change in American thinking on India and its regional and
global position. In the George
Bush administration, the neo-conservatives have been designing a new vision of
the world in which India is accorded a prominent role.
This has considerably boosted bilateral relations.
In this framework, India is
not billed as a counterweight to China, but as a promising partner for the US,
on account of India’s constancy as a democracy which is on track in
liberalising its economy; this offers prospects for American business and
investment in the knowledge and IT sectors as well as industry and trade.
India’s large reserve of skilled professionals is a further
attraction.
In a talk by Nicholas Burns,
Under Secretary of State in October 2005, he observes, “Successive
administrations in Washington and Delhi approached each other alternately with
episodic engagement on the one hand, but with wariness on the other.”
He notes that past estrangement is turning into engagement. He quotes
President Bush to support the idea of “India’s arrival as a force in the
world” in economic, political and strategic capacities, a country set to
become a major centre of global power. Bush
further observes that the economic and political focus of the global system
will shift eastwards to Asia, and that the US-India relationship will be
developed in this context.
India should naturally welcome
this trend, which gives it the advantage of emerging opportunities.
Both countries can benefit from cooperation in areas of mutual
interest.
Several agreements have been
signed since 2004, when the NSSP was launched to build up mutual trust in
sensitive areas like defence, space, nuclear energy, high-tech, dialogues of
business executives and people to people interaction.
More Indian students have chosen the US rather than other countries for
higher education. In the US there
are nearly two million people of Indian origin, many of them highly regarded
professionals.
Indians have reacted
with more emotion than Americans on the shift in relations.
Opponents have raised anti-US slogans and the other side has reacted,
zealously proclaiming greater merit in American actions and statements than is
warranted. The nuclear deal in
particular has provoked a heated debate.
Doubts about the deal were
voiced soon after it was signed. Official
reticence combined with partisan self-congratulation deepened the doubts.
When details of the Indian plan for separating civilian and other
nuclear facilities leaked out, the sceptics claimed to be vindicated.
There is a division in the ranks of both the scientists and the
strategic community. While all
agree that India should retain its autonomy in making decisions, there is a
difference concerning the effect of the deal on this autonomy.
In the media, some partisans have unfairly disparaged our scientists.
The nuclear deal could boost
India’s output of electricity and ease the restrictions on cooperation in
high-tech, if India is not asked to pay too high a price.
What we can accept is a reciprocity of moves forward by the two sides,
the separation plan being left to India to decide and India being treated on
par with the nuclear weapon powers: but the expectations raised on these
points have been belied.
It was only after the Chairman
of Atomic Energy spoke out about the Americans changing the goal posts that
the danger of losing our autonomy sank in.
It now seems that the Fast Breeder Reactor (Kalpakkam) will be excluded
from the civilian list (subject to IAEA inspections) for the next ten or
fifteen years. The haste to tie up
the loose ends of the deal was probably because it was linked to the success
of the Bush visit to India in March 2006.
What we require is a careful cost-benefit analysis and a cool
assessment of American motives.
American critics have stressed
that bending the non-proliferation rules to accommodate India would jeopardise
the NPT regime. The US
administration urges that the deal would secure India in the very same
framework. The US is using civil
nuclear cooperation as a sweetener to bind India in the non-proliferation
system. This is evident from the
discussion over the separation plan and the two lists.
The US gave up its earlier aim to “cap, roll back and eventually
eliminate” India’s nuclear weapon plans after 1998. Now the aim to is
contain or limit our nuclear weapon capability.
The present deal, along with the projected treaty on cutting off
fissile materials (FMCT), will do it. We
note that while the nuclear weapon powers have undertaken some obligations
voluntarily, in India’s case, special obligations are prescribed, to be
overseen by the US Congress too, and subject to future scrutiny and
prescription.
It is generally conceded that
India has been a responsible and scrupulous nuclear power, though it never
joined the NPT. The contrast in
the conduct of some NPT signatory countries is marked, though India still does
not accept the NPT. Indian
sincerity has been demonstrated in the export controls we have put in place
and the WMD Act. Yet the
separation plan, which should have been left to India to determine, has been
criticised. As our Prime Minister said, “An effective non-proliferation
framework that addresses our security interests while simultaneously
encouraging peaceful uses of nuclear energy is in our vital national
interest.” India can take part
in programmes like the PSI, which are consistent with its policy of
non-proliferation, but the virtual acceptance of the discriminatory and
unequal NPT by the deal of July 18, 2005 is not in our interest.
Many Indians were appalled by
the two Indian votes against Iran at the IAEA.
This was interpreted as a submission to obvious American pressure,
though the PM claimed that it was the government’s own decision.
Iran’s nuclear programme may be suspect, but the solution should be
sought through negotiations, not threats of UNSC sanctions and attack.
Issuing ultimatums is not
justified. Our PM has said that
India does not want a new nuclear weapon power in the neighbourhood, but this
applies to all regions, always. It was relevant too when India and Pakistan
went nuclear in 1998. Can we
prevent a new nuclear power by riding on the backs of the Americans?
Before 1998 India would never have invoked NPT obligations to justify a
position India took in a world forum. India
seems eager to accept the flawed NPT now.
A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani
scientist, has become notorious for his nuclear trading.
But the US is unwilling to press for his prosecution.
In contrast, India suffered under a technology denial regime.
It obliged us to stand on our feet and also to climb higher.
Now we may welcome the prospect of obtaining technology denied so far,
but not at the cost of accepting conditionalities that will cramp our policy
and autonomy.
While Indians should not be
stuck in a cold war mind-set and should adapt our policies to the new
realities, there is no need to swallow tempting offers without subjecting them
to a rigorous calculus of pros and cons. We
should not set aside our past experience in dealing with the US, nor accuse
the cautious of living in a time warp.
A book edited by Michael
Ignatieff on American Exceptionalism highlights the contrast between US
insistence on human rights and the support of US support for dictatorial
regimes violating those rights. The US exclusion of the International Criminal
Court, its pre-emptive military actions, its rejection of some international
agreements like the Kyoto protocol are of a pattern of self-exemption, which
paradoxically flourishes along with preaching human values and democracy to
others. It raises the basic
question, to what extent does the US accept constraints on its sovereignty
through international rules and conventions it has helped to shape?
US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice flatters us by counting India as a potential great power.
She argues for a global order based on six powers: the US, Japan,
Russia, the EU, China and India, all upholding freedom.
Does it fit in with India’s worldview?
Do we accept a balance structured on a consortium of six, excluding
Africa and Latin America?
We may not go along with
American priorities and methods. For us, the preservation of human cultural
diversity is more important than it is for Americans. The term “strategic
partnership” is deceptive, given the asymmetry of power between the US and
India. The two cannot build a
partnership on strategic matters. It
is good if the US helps India build up its strength and standing, but the
goals of the two are asymmetrical.
India has no long-term
strategy as such, but only short-term goals.
We should not rush into the strategic framework envisaged by the
present US administration. Let us
not be seduced by offers of future great power status.
The two countries should certainly go ahead with multi-faceted
cooperation rather than strategic partnership in a reciprocal effort.
The Americans are known to be
hard-headed in pursuing their interests. We
should emulate them. They would
respect it. Then our relations
will be stronger and endure longer. We
should consider the US in a proper perspective without superlatives.
India's options in the global senario
II.
Lt. Gen (Retd.)
S.S. Mehta:
friendship.
On the whole, we need a transition strategy till friendship is proven.
His presentation was
accompanied by a set of schematic diagrams with keywords in boxes arranged
around a centre, for each of several aspects discussed, such as
‘Internal pressures on the main countries affected by Indo-US
relations’: China, Pakistan, India’s core interests, US self-interests
and global interests. He
contended that a small ally could sometimes be of help to a powerful ally
and cited some examples from Indian history, such as the Mauryas.
Since the cold war, the
American attitude of preaching to India (about Kashmir, Punjab, etc.) has
changed. The internet has
helped. But the 1998 n-test by
India prompted the US to revert to the preaching mode.
Its effort to ‘cap’ India’s n-capability was a theme running
through the Talbott-Jaswant Singh series of talks.
The US has accepted the
‘de-hyphenation’ of India and Pakistan in its South Asia policy.
India pointed out that missile technology from China had
proliferated to Pakistan and elsewhere too.
Pakistan’s Kargil incursion in 1999 spurred the US under
President Clinton to pressurise that country to withdraw and avert a
dangerous war. Clinton was for
the Indo-Pakistan peace process to move forward and for friendly relations
with India.
Under President Bush, the US
was motivated to invade Iraq, claiming that Iraq was acquiring WMD’s to
use against American targets and Israel.
Now he targets Iran for the same reason.
Why the inconsistency of soft-pedalling Pakistan’s proliferation?
The US interests can be
analysed under the heads: economic dominance, military hegemony, energy
access to continue high consumption of petro-fuels, investment protection,
trade, IPR and business expansion.
The July 2005 nuclear deal
between India and the US has opened new possibilities for India.
Air India’s big order for Boeing aircraft is a positive
indication. There is a sharp
upturn in the number of start-ups in India, with fresh American high-tech
coming in. The draconian US
visa system is being simplified (except for some scientists).
India’s entry into the restricted ITER project (plasma research)
and the offer of cooperation for improved technology in the coal industry
are other positives. In
defence, India may obtain access to US transport planes like the CI/30 J.
The ISRO-NASA agreement on India’s moon probe (with two US made
instruments) is a significant step. Prospects
of cross patenting open the way for Indian firms to take out US patents
for their products/processes.
The US has to an extent helped
Indian security interests, for example, by its ban on certain jihadi
groups in the subcontinent. US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has strongly defended India in Senate
hearings on the nuclear deal. She
contrasts India and Iran in regard to their record of non-proliferation.
India’s core interests in
defence and security, economic development, education and research,
S&T can be furthered by US cooperation.
With two of our neighbours being unfriendly, we will need the
technology of missile shields, radar, smart bombs and border surveillance,
apart from futuristic weapons against sophisticated terrorists.
Intelligence sharing is an area where the two countries can
strengthen mutual confidence. The
US can be a leash on Pakistan’s possible adventurism against India.
The two navies can work together in securing trade routes in the
Indian Ocean. In peacekeeping,
Indian experience will be of value to the US and the world.
Though both countries may
differ in their perception of China, that country’s force levels and its
presence in the Bay of Bengal and at Gwadar port in Pakistan enhance the
danger zone for India.
In the quest for energy
sources, the US is trying to undercut Russia by its pipeline diplomacy in
Central Asia. Russia and China
have countered the US strategic moves by the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO).
It would be ideal if the US
were really sincere in bringing about greater security and stability in
the world through its policy of promoting ‘democracy’ and
‘freedom’, instead of using these code words for the cynical change of
regimes. But doubts remain.
In trade matters and policy,
India and the US are at variance on issues like the WTO.
On Intellectual Property Rights, it is good that India has won its
case regarding the attempted appropriation of tamarind, turmeric and the
like as patents by corporate interests.
Both countries can work to create a common data base for the joint
evaluation of particular cases. In
investment protection, India’s legal frame is still somewhat weak in the
eyes of potential Western investors. In
academic research, the scope for collaborative work is immense, especially
in areas of interest to us like agriculture.
To conclude, the Indo-US
dialogue can forge ahead constructively in the present era, if India
approaches it with self-confidence. The
process itself is more important than the short-term results or lack of
them.
Discussion
To the question, ‘Who is the
main adviser to the prime minister on the nuclear deal?’ the panel had
no specific answer. A question
on energy security drew the comment that India has no firm energy policy,
and no ministry devoted to energy issues as a whole, since they are dealt
with in several ministries. With
our oil and gas imports coming by sea, the tanker ships are vulnerable to
interdiction. China, finding
itself in a similar position, is going in for overland pipelines.
India’s electric power supply is fuelled by coal (60%), hydro
(20%) and nuclear (3%). We
should develop the hydel potential of the northeast and the Himalayas.
In coal, investment for cleaner technology is needed.
India’s internal problem of
Naxalite and tribal insurgencies are indeed pressing.
So is unemployment among millions of young people.
These are serious deficits.
A question came up on Pakistan
suffering no penalties for its clandestine support of terrorism (to the
Taliban in Afghanistan and to jihadi groups in Kashmir). The main reason
lies in Pakistan’s strategic value to the US in its despairing efforts
to establish stability in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is also seen as a check on Iran.
Dr. Chellaney explained the US
relationship with Japan and Germany, two countries that seem to have
flourished in the post-war era. The
US imposed a constitution on Japan which curbed any attempt at
nationalistic expansionism by limiting its defence forces.
Japan is dependent on the US for its security and any investment in
that direction is constrained by its need to obtain American clearance.
India, with one-sixth of the
human race, cannot depend on the US for security.
Sri Sitaraman considered that an axis of the US, Japan and
Australia is in the making to check possible Chinese expansionism or
threats to other countries. Lt.
Gen. Mehta said that we should evolve a transitional strategy to test the
waters with the US. India
cannot rely on either Russia or China.
India should not, of course, act as a lackey of any major power.
Dr. Chellaney said that in
this century India could move out from non-alignment to multi-alignment
based on specific interests.
The biggest advantage of the
nuclear deal (Sri Sitaraman said) is access to uranium fuel, though the
high cost is a deterrent to the import of US reactors.
The importance of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) and the conversion
of thorium were stressed. Lt.
Gen. Mehta considered that access to US dual-use technology would benefit
India in its transitional stage.
Dr. Chellaney commented on the
availability of uranium in India. The
crunch in supply was first signalled by the government only in 2005,
perhaps to build up public support for the intended nuclear deal with the
US. In his belief, there is no
urgency and no apprehension of our uranium reserves running out soon.
The FBR plan is crucial to India’s nuclear policy and cannot be
compromised. He concluded with
a warning that India should not give room for the perception by others
that it has moved much closer to the US and Israel in its foreign policy.
There is no need for it.
The chairman, Shri Venkateswaran,
summed up the seminar with the observation that India should safeguard its
sovereignty in negotiations like the nuclear deal and that there is no
call for India to take lessons in democracy from others.
If we have the will and the vision, we can use our large numbers
and resources to advantage. He
recalled Swami Vivekananda’s quip that we should spend less time just
thinking and more on action.
1) Overall view:
The seminar brought out the many facets of contemporary Indo-US
relations in their constructive potential as well as inherent divergence.
The general view was that India should confidently welcome the
improved climate of bilateralism in a transition period when our security
and economic needs can be partly met by a friendly major power like the
US. At the same time, the
warning was sounded that the asymmetry between the two countries should
not be allowed to derail our basic national interests and autonomy in
foreign and economic policies as framed by India’s democratically
constituted government.
2) Limits:
Though there is a consensus in Indian public opinion that India
should cultivate good relations with the US as well as other major powers,
informed observers are sharply divided on the extent to which India should
modify its basic foreign policy norms (such as safeguarding our
sovereignty in key issues) to accommodate the interests of major powers.
India would be misguided to give up or weaken its support for a
stable, multi-polar global order. Nor
should India acquiesce in the permanent ascendancy of the US as the only
superpower. It follows that
the post-cold war world, while it offers opportunities for India to alter
its worldview in the transformed international situation since 1990 and
the worldwide shock of 9/11, still does not oblige us to become an ally
and global partner of the US to the extent of accepting American
perceptions of countries and regimes important in our scheme of things.
In this regard, Iran is a test case in Asia.
(It is ominous that the draft US bill on nuclear cooperation with
India, which is to be sent to the US Congress for approval, has a section
on foreign policy coordination where the US is seeking to steer India on
its attitude to Iran’s nuclear programme).
3) The nuclear deal:
Among the promising lines on which Indo-US cooperation can proceed,
now that Americans no longer view India through the cold war prism, it is
the nuclear deal chalked out by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh on July 18, 2005 that has drawn maximum attention and commentary.
It is questionable whether the projected civilian nuclear
cooperation should be the litmus test of the newly warming relationship
between the two countries. It
has inevitably become the centrepiece, because it breaks new ground and
because, in the context of world energy shortage, it can make a useful
though limited difference to India’s development plans.
But an exaggerated concern over the fate of this deal and fear of
diplomatic disaster for India if it fails (by the US Congress putting
spokes in it rather than from Indian second thoughts), are not justified.
It will be a setback to bilateral relations, no doubt, but both
countries can resume cooperation in other areas to their mutual benefit,
although in a cooler atmosphere of mutual disenchantment.
On June 27, 2006 the
International Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives voted
37-5 in favour of considering the enabling draft Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act of 2006. Two
days later the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the same
proposal with a vote of 16-2. It
will, if passed by the US Congress after discussion in the Senate and
voting in both houses, permit the US to make an exception in favour of
India to the highly restrictive Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
It will be contingent on India observing specific conditions in
conformity with the non-proliferation regime which the US and the nuclear
powers, with the backing of American allies like Japan and Australia, have
established. One important
condition is that India should renounce nuclear testing, not just by a
provisional moratorium, but forever. Another
is that India will forswear any augmentation of its store of fissile
material (for weapons) and work with the US on the FMCT.
The first major hurdle has been cleared, but there are more ahead.
The deal has to pass through the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG),
a cartel wherein Australia, an exporter of uranium, is ready to sell to
China but not to India because it is a non-signatory of the NPT.
The deal has also to run the gauntlet of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and the Missile Technology Control regime, which could
entail unpalatable legislative enactments and executive obligations by
India. Further, the deal hinges on an agreement about inspections between
India and the IAEA, under negotiation.
While the US legislature retains its privilege of overseeing
India’s nuclear record in a kind of annual security audit, there is no
parallel right for the Indian parliament to examine the US record.
The nuclear deal was sprung on
us last year without sufficient preparation of Indian public opinion.
It is a complex agreement with several technical, scientific,
economic, political and strategic implications about which there was
little background data available to Indian observers.
The global aspects of the deal were also obscured by the initial
euphoric proclamations of a new era of Indo-American amity.
Few people, Indian or American, are equipped to understand the
science and technology of nuclear power.
For instance, the details of the Indian plan for the separation of
civilian and defence-related nuclear facilities, a crucial piece in the
architecture of the agreement, came out in sparse instalments only later,
when the Americans were debating its alleged deficiencies.
The significance of retaining our autonomy in operating the FBR’s
in Kalpakkam was not explained. India’s
thorium reserves are to be used as fuel eventually, but this technology
will take some years to come into effective operation in our country.
This information is not in the public domain.
Indian nuclear scientists were obliged by our political leadership
to restrain airing their doubts on the deal, so that the public was denied
adequate exposure to the pros and cons as they saw it, whether as
individuals or as a working group. The
impression remains that the Indian Atomic Energy Commission had only a
secondary (if not seconding) role in the negotiations.
There was more focussed
discussion about the technical and political aspects of the deal in the US
think tanks like the Council for Foreign Relations and in American media
than on our side. For instance, some American experts aver that the Indian
government is keen on the deal because the Indian nuclear establishment
has a pressing need for natural uranium, which is said to be difficult for
us to mine and refine for use in our Heavy Water nuclear power reactors
and even more so, in a highly enriched form, for the nuclear warheads.
This aspect was not openly explained in India, presumably because
of its sensitive nature. But
when the American side can discuss it in detail, it behoves our side to
brief parliament, the media and the public authoritatively.
Some Indian critics took an
adverse view of the deal consistent with their unchanging scepticism about
American strategy and motivation. The
prize held up to India was indeed tempting, namely, that the deal would
enable it to break free from decades of nuclear isolation, years during
which the US and its close allies had denied our nuclear industry both
technology and fuel. But the
counter-view that during this isolation India was able to develop a
credible and respectable nuclear capability, both civil and military, is a
fact not to be overlooked. If
the cost of compliance with the prescriptive regime is deemed too high, if
the opening of our facilities to possibly intrusive inspections by a
biased team under the IAEA could cramp our minimum programme of storing
fissile material and operating our nuclear facilities according to our own
lights, and if the separation of nuclear facilities is expected to entail
very costly duplication, India must firmly ask for equal treatment with
other nuclear powers which are not subjected to such stringent
restrictions, even at the risk of the deal falling through.
The NPT factor:
The nuclear deal hinges on the fundamental difference between
India and the US in regard to the NPT.
Each country has a radically different motive for going ahead with
the deal, though the common factor is that it raises domestic opposition
in both. The Indian
expectation is a wish to be recognised as a nuclear power, apart from but
on par with, the five avowed nuclear weapon powers.
The US motive is to corral and shackle India’s nuclear potential
into a confined space of dependency where American firms will have a
guaranteed advantage.
We have always opposed the NPT
for its essentially discriminatory foundation and its unequal obligations
as between the nuclear weapon powers and the non-nuclear weapon powers.
Yet Americans almost unanimously swear by the NPT and believe in
its efficacy as an international regime which has prevented the spread of
nuclear weapon capability to new powers: (other than India, Pakistan and
Israel, the chief non-signatories, and other than what the US derogatorily
calls ‘rogue states’, the aspirant nuclear powers, Iran and North
Korea, which gained technology from the machinations of the Pakistani, A.
Q. Khan). They do not see that
the US has exempted itself from all obligations under the treaty.
They see the NPT solely as an instrument which the world has
sanctioned to be used by the US and its allies to prevent proliferation
outside the circle that includes the anointed five powers, plus the sneak
entrants, India and Pakistan, plus Israel, the US surrogate in West Asia.
India under the UPA coalition has become a late convert to the
discrimination implicit in the NPT, without quite signing up.
The nuclear deal will not allow India into the superior class of
the nuclear haves, despite its hard-won acquisition of nuclear weapon
capability. Our government has
not protested the freezing and perpetuation of this nuclear distinction,
which is bound to work against India’s long-term interests.
India will be obliged to curb if not ‘cap’ its fissile stock
and forswear n-tests in perpetuity, while the US permits itself the
freedom to test more pointedly powerful nuclear weapons for tactical
warfare and ‘bunker bursting’: mini-nukes with maxi-blast, we may call
them.
The chief concern of American
sceptics and critics is that India should not be ‘rewarded’ by the
offer of technology, fuel and reactors when the NPT is under threat from
‘rogue states’ and from the possible diversion of weapons to
terrorists. They believe that
it will encourage other aspirants to defy or wreck the NPT.
This disregards or minimises India’s record as a responsible and
scrupulous non-proliferator, but the US acts in the righteous conviction
that it is divinely empowered to impose global rules when its security may
be threatened by others possessing WMD’s.
The global context:
The Indo-US relationship has to be set in the global context.
India has to manage a longish period of transition from the status
of an emerging power to the rank of a developed country with high Human
Development ratings like Japan. We
badly need technology and investment.
The US can surely be an excellent partner.
Even China, which is seen as a potential rival to the US, has
gained vastly from American and Western partnership in the last three
decades. But there are limits
that India cannot forget. For
one thing, Pakistan’s endemic antagonism to our nation and its
interference in Kashmir through sponsored extremists who distort Islam
cannot be resolved with American help or brokerage.
The US considers it to be our problem. The American anti-terrorist
agenda does not square with India’s.
India’s need to cultivate good relations with Russia, China, the
EU the Arab and African countries and Latin America should not be subsumed
under the imperatives of a putative strategic partnership with the US.
Some of the differences between India and the US (apart from
foreign policy) will not go away: one is on trade and subsidies, another
is on investment incentives for US corporations to compete in the Indian
market, yet another is the persistent American denial of high-tech in key
sectors. Indians have a high
regard for Americans and their achievements, but not for the US as an
overweening global power with a global reach.
This distinction is likely to colour the partnership between the
two countries, even in the era of warmer relations.
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