by Shri Akbar M Khaleeli

 Ambassador Khaleeli presented a broad historical survey of Iran and the Indo-Iranian interaction since ancient times to the present. Iran, China and India are the three enduring Asian cultures.  Iran was the nodal area of the Silk Route .  The speaker dwelt on the psychology of the Iranian peoples, the terrible sufferings they overcame during the period of Arab ascendancy followed by the more terrible Mongol invasions, their pride and sense of humour and love of independence.  He expounded the beliefs and values of the Shia faith, after pointing out that Iran was Sunni-dominant for four centuries until the Safavid era.  The Shias, he said, constituted in a sense the most continuous political party in the world. He cautioned against Indian diplomats taking a facile view that Sunni Islam as a majoritarian group is more Islamic than the Shias.

  He then spoke of Iran 's humiliation in the 19th Century as a hyper-colony and contrasted it with India 's condition under the British Raj.  Iran had to yield control of its minerals, oil and forestry to the European powers.  It was caught up in the rivalry among Russia , France , Britain and Germany .  The Iranians of the time were not anti-American and wanted a balance between the big powers mainly Britain and Russia  to avoid complete dominance by either.  An example of their joint power till the first decade of the 20th Century will suffice. When Iran obtained the services of an American expert, Morgan Schuster to advise on the administration and finances of the country, both powers made a demarche, forcing the fledgling Majlis to pass an act debarring Americans and others from employment under the Iranian Government. After Prime Minister Mossadeq nationalised the oil industry, the US , allied by the UK , authorised a CIA coup in 1953 to topple his government.  The US brought in the Shah from Rome to head a pro-Western government in Iran .  

The rise of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini after the Iranian revolution of 1979 was a partly- nationalistic backlash by a proud people chafing under out-dated restraints.  In the post-revolution phase, especially after the out-break of the Iran-Iraq war and the assassination of many Iranian revolutionary leaders, the moderating influence of the  provisional government appointed by Khomeini (and the party called the Liberation Movement of Iran, under Mehdi Bazargan and Ebrahim Yazdi), was overwhelmed by the clerical hardliners.  After this the latter became more powerful and emphasised the Islamic dimensions of the  Republic of Iran .  Thus a moderate course in Iranian foreign policy was hampered if not precluded from the start in the post-revolution period.

Shri Khaleeli gave a brief exposition of the centrality of Khomeini's personality and political vision in shaping the constitution of Iran . Whether or not anyone else can fully realise his vision is open to question especially the momentum and balance between revolution and national realism. In religio-juridical terms also, one cannot assert that the last word has been said. One can  sense that Khomeini while asserting political control over Iran, did not want vested interests to become too comfortable and hence in many ways  his influence in preventing  back-sliding is still felt. The decimation of the Iraqi religious leadership over the past two decades has also given Iran an edge in international Shia politics. Nevertheless, Shia-ism is too intellectually vigorous and naturally dissident to become monolithic with or without Iranian influence.

The anti-American backlash of the Shah Pahlavi era is still effective.  Iran 's policy towards Israel and the other states of Western Asia is inevitably coloured by this bias, which the Bush administration has done nothing to offset by conciliation or understanding.  The commitment of the Hizbollah in Lebanon and the  Islamisation of the Palestinian cause are seen as results of Iran's influence and have caused concern in many Arab regimes while at the same time accelerating American efforts towards Israeli-Palestinian ( read PLO) rapprochement, albeit in a road map filled with tragic accidents.

The present Iranian government, with President Ahmedinejad at the head, is defiantly unbudging in the face of American hostility to its nuclear programme.  His statements questioning the legitimacy of Israel as a state and the holocaust are an oblique response if not a challenge. 

US relations with Iran should not be reduced to the single dimension of terrorism.  Iran  has always been more sensitive about safeguarding its sovereign rights over nuclear energy, no less than its rights over oil and gas.  Mossadegh had shown  to other countries also the way  towards national control of oil resources in 1951. The two countries had friendly relations in the past.  In 1922, Reza Khan made an American, Millspaugh, Administrator-General in Iran .  The latter helped to stabilise the economy and initiate modernisation.  The present crisis in US-Iran relations must be seen in context.  Any government of a country with a population of 70 million or more would lessen dependence on oil and gas and seek other energy alternatives.  The first nuclear research reactor was supplied by the US , after an agreement in 1967, under the Atoms for Peace programme.  Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi had sent Iranian scientists to be trained abroad in nuclear power generation.  The Franco-German reactor planned for Bushehr conformed to these plans.  At that time there was no Western objection to the Shah's policy.  The current confrontation over Iran 's nuclear aspirations is an updated version of the old Western attitude of denying energy security and diversification to developing countries.  It is ironic that India , a victim of such suspicions and discrimination, should now strive to align itself with such an attitude in hopes of gaining nuclear materials and equipment.

This shift in foreign policy may marginalise India in its friendly relations with countries like Iran .  Its indifference to the American occupation of friendly Iraq and the conversion of Iraq into a breeding-ground for Islamic terrorism and networks, when none existed earlier, could have consequences in India . For India to get involved in Iraq on USA 's behalf as also its present indifference, can both harm our interests in Iran . If India has asserted its predominance as a regional power in the sub-continent and the Indian Ocean , it should not be surprised by Iran 's dominance in the Persian Gulf .  Outside powers including super-powers are not always destined to remain that way. One should keep our neighborhood relations in good repair.  

The US has followed different tacks in dealing with the nuclear threat from the policies of North Korea , Libya and Iran .  With the other two being more or less tackled, the US is bent on pressurising Iran via crises in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria and Central Asia .  Some Arab countries may be compelled to plan for an Arab bomb to counter a feared Persian nuclear capability by going nuclear themselves: a risk which would vastly complicate American policy in the region.      

Does India really wish for a wider role as a consequence of the US-Iran confrontation and as a beneficiary of access to sensitive US technology?  If the Indo-US deal comes to fruition, will it not make for long-term hostility in Indo-Iranian relations?  It is not easy to balance our relations when two partner countries are having sharply conflicting interests.  But it would be unfortunate if our government, while legitimately seeking to enlarge areas of strategic co-operation with USA, over-steps itself and gives the impression that by being in the good books of a super power it can carelessly undo the painstaking diplomatic goodwill and friendly relations we have built up especially since 1979 with Iran, which like China is bound to be around for a long time. 

Iran wants Pakistan to be stable and prosperous, but it is not in favour of changes in the status quo in Kashmir .  It understands that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are more antipathetic to Iran than even to the US .  Iran has absorbed Islamic values on its own, not from Arab clerics.  These factors make for Indo-Iranian rapport on the basis of shared interests and values.

Iran has diplomatic room, in that it can nimbly alter its equations with the US , Europe and Russia .  It was Iran that helped the US to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan .  The West may need Iran 's offices to bring about peace and order in Iraq where sectarian conflicts are raging under American auspices. 

by Vice Admiral (Retd) P J Jacob

India and Iran have a very complex relationship fraught with sub-equations.  The perspectives to be considered are historical, religious and regional, apart from the further complications of the US factor and terrorism.  Bilateral relations have traditionally been positive.  In January 2003 Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and the President of Iran, Mohammad Khatami signed the New Delhi Declaration announcing a “strategic partnership” between the two countries.  It addressed cooperation in economic matters, hydrocarbons, science and technology, education and training, apart from collaborative work on Afghanistan ’s reconstruction and on global issues. 

Indo-Iranian relations can be considered in the following stages.  1)  By the early 1970’s, both countries had emerged as important regional powers.  Iran was powerful in global oil politics and had a military presence in the Persian Gulf .  India was the strategically pre-eminent power in South Asia .  Though Iran ’s support for Pakistan during the 1971 war had again adversely affected the warming trend in bilateral relations, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh’s visit to Iran in July 1973 dispelled some mutual apprehensions. 

When Pakistan successfully cultivated the Arab Gulf states, Iran sought friendlier ties with India .  For India , it was a welcome balance, and a new period of mutual engagement began.  2) Between 1970 and 1990, India assessed that Iran was letting go of its contacts with the West.  Iran was espousing Islamic causes.  Both Iran and India had common concerns, such as security threats from US hegemony and the collapse of the Soviet Union .  The Soviet collapse threatened the stability of Central Asia and endangered energy supplies.  The rise of the Taliban and commercial interchanges were shared interests between India and Iran . Improved bilateral relations were also helped by convergence on the Afghan developments, with the Taliban, backed by Pakistan , becoming a source of anxiety for India as well as Iran .  Both countries backed the Northern Alliance for several years.  In this period Iran-Pakistan relations worsened, mainly because of their divergence on Afghanistan . Sectarian terrorism in Pakistan also contributed to this trend.  3)  1990-2001 (9/11).  In this decade India was a low-cost option for Iran in developing infrastructure and industry.  4) Since 9/11, both countries share concerns in containing terrorism and safeguarding energy supplies.  When the US consolidated its military presence in Afghanistan and accused Iran of being part of the ‘Axis of Evil’, Iran wished for closer bonds with India .  But Iran ’s nuclear programme and ambitions began to cause misgivings to the Indian government.  Meanwhile, the Indo-US nuclear deal for civil nuclear energy cooperation created a dilemma for India in its relations with Iran .

   There are various strategic perspectives to consider.  1) Energy security is the most important.  As stated in the New Delhi Declaration, there is a complementarity of interests in this sector which needs to be developed.  Iran has surplus energy resources, while India needs more energy for its rapid development.  Besides, India is seeking to diversify its sources of petroleum and its products.  Iran , with five percent of the world’s crude oil resources and 14 percent of its natural gas reserves, is keen on the Indian market.   Energy cooperation between the two is therefore highly desirable and logical.

   India and Iran have been involved in the stalled project of a gas pipeline via Pakistan for more than fifteen years.  India was initially averse to dependence on a pipeline through Paikistan territory, though Pakistan was ready to give assurances for its security.  The Indo-US nuclear deal has caused re-thinking in India .  The US probably insisted on India abandoning the pipeline project being suspicions of Iran .  It warned us of the sanctions it would be obliged to impose on our entities entering deals with Iran .  India is still keen on keeping its option open.  Iran is said that it is ready to sign the trilateral deal, but technical issues between India and Pakistan (now under a new elected government) are hampering the process.

In defence cooperation, there is an increasing trend.  The two sides have begun to institutionalise contacts between the armed forces.  A dialogue on mutual security issues and arms sales to Iran are on the cards.  The 2003 Declaration included exploring cooperation in defence, so that our strategic relations have gained a subtle but significant military dimension.

Iran has a fair amount of defence equipment of Soviet make.  India ’s known capacity to manufacture such arms under licence promises complementary interests.  This would boost India ’s military exports to West Asia , a region of geopolitical importance for us.  The Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2003 was another milestone.  It envisages Indian support for building a warship repair facility in the new Iranian port of Chahbahar , stationing Indian aeronautical engineers at Iranian military bases to help upgrade MiG 29 fighters, engineers to refit and maintain T 72 tanks.  The two countries had held joint naval exercises.  Iran has sought India ’s assistance to service its naval and air force equipment and to develop batteries for its Kilo class submarines, these being more suitable in Gulf waters than those supplied by Russia . 

As regards terrorism, India and Iran have mainly cooperated to secure their interests in Afghanistan .  Iran feared Sunni extremism by the Taliban regime.  India saw the situation as a manifestation of the Islamic extremism that it was contending with in Kashmir .  Both countries supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, in contrast to Pakistan .  Both also supported the US military action to oust the Taliban regime and both seek to prevent a return to a revived Taliban regime.  Both have given economic aid to Hamid Karzai’s government.  Other than this, Iran ’s anti-terrorism credentials are suspect.  The assassination of Hezbollah’s external operative, Imad Mughniyeh, is a sign that Iran continues to be a key player in global terrorism.  It has close links with Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Iran may still have a hand in aiding Al Qaeda agents.  Iran has been called the world’s ‘central banker of terrorism’.  The US 9/11 Commission found that Iran helped Al Qaeda agents to transit its territory into Afghanistan, though there was no evidence of Iran’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks.  This warrants great circumspection on India ’s part in joining hands with Iran in anti-terrorist actions.

   Iran-Pakistan relations are of importance to India .  They have not always been smooth.  Iran supported Pakistan in crisis situations, giving the latter moral, political, diplomatic and even financial support.  But after 9/11, when the US tightened its alliance with Pakistan , things have changed.  Iran is in effect caught between two wars, in Iraq and in Afghanistan .  The rise of the Taliban has made for acrimony between Iran and Pakistan .  But still their relations remain close.  Pakistan ’s nuclear cooperation with Iran indicates a certain strategic congruence.  Pakistan would like normal relations with Iran , since it would otherwise have problematic neighbours on both sides.  Pakistan ’s future course will affect its relations with Iran .  If Pakistan experiences Shia-Sunni clashes, Iran would be impacted.  

For India , better relations with Iran would be an advantage vis-à-vis Pakistan .  If, for instance, military cooperation moves to an Indian presence in Iran , it would add strength to our watch on Pakistani affairs.  But Iran could use greater access to India to urge both India and Pakistan to moderate their policies towards each other.  Iran was the first country to try for a détente and dialogue between India and Pakistan when tensions ran high in 2001.

Iran ’s nuclear policy poses a serious dilemma for India .  India has to go along with the world community in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power, since such a development would have adverse security implications for us.  But to do this without impairing good relations with Iran is difficult.  We would be liable to answer charges from Islamic countries that India , which previously opposed the double standards of the West, was now adopting them.  But it is doubtless correct that India cannot accept a new nuclear power in the region and that it must side with the world community to ensure that Iran’s programme strictly conforms  to the IAEA provisions on non-proliferation.  The government faces the internal problem of keeping the Opposition parties and the Left from spreading the perception that India has become the ‘junior partner’ of the US .  These parties have also opposed any dilution of Indo-Iranian relations.

In 2005, contrary to some speculation, India voted at the IAEA for the resolution finding Iran in breach of its international obligations.  This was a notable shift.  It was criticised as submission to US pressure.  In January 2006, the US ambassador to India linked the progress on the nuclear deal with this issue, hinting that if India did not vote with the US , the US Congress would thwart the nuclear deal.  This was attacked by India ’s opposition parties as an affront to our sovereignty.  Yet on February 4, India again voted with the majority at the IAEA in referring Iran to the UN Security Council, while also stating that it would not detract from India ’s close relations with Iran .  However, it is in India ’s interest to see that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons.  Though Iran was disappointed by India ’s vote, our relations do not seem to have suffered too much.  Pragmatism and mutual needs should govern our relations with Iran .

Another issue which can affect smooth relations with Iran is the closeness of Indo-Israeli ties.  Iran being one of the staunchest opponents of Israel , the increasing exchanges between India and Israel , including our purchases of Israeli arms, could well cause misgivings and friction.  Iran seems to have maintained a tolerant view of it so far.  But Israel is apprehensive of close ties between India and Iran , particularly of Israeli defence technology reaching Iran through India .  Israel ’s Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, on a visit to India in 2003, asked for guarantees from India that it would not transfer any acquired technology to third countries, especially Iran .  On the other hand, Iran was unhappy that an Indian rocket launched an Israeli spy satellite into space in 2008.  Managing these counter currents would determine the future of Indo-Iran relations.

The strategic imperatives before India may be listed as follows: 

India must keep up its energy cooperation with Iran , including the tri-nation gas pipeline project, regardless of the Indo-US nuclear deal. 

India must actively pursue defence cooperation with Iran and extend it to training Iranian personnel.  Naval cooperation and joint exercise to provide inter-operability will be desirable.

Cooperate on anti-terrorism to the extent possible, keeping in mind our reservations on Iran ’s policies.

Cooperate with international efforts to make Iran follow non-proliferation norms and to ensure that Iran does not go in for nuclear weapon capability.  India could impress on Iran the wisdom of complying with the IAEA requirements on inspection and safeguards to avoid sanctions and other dangers.

The enhanced engagement with Iran since the mid-1990’s have deepened bilateral relations.  However, India ’s improved relations with the US and Israel , which Iran views with suspicion, could test the leadership of both India and Iran .  India has to weigh its strategic options if Iran begins to edge away from us on account of our relations with the US and Israel .  India is in quite a sound position economically and militarily to balance its national interests and should be able to pursue its strategic imperatives without greatly ruffling one party or the other.