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With President George Bush, Republican leaders, and prominent Democrats voicing the importance, the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal may be taken up in a couple of days by the Senate even as supporters and opponents stepped up lobbying to suit their agenda. Senate Republican Majority Leader Bill Frist and Democratic Minority Leader Harry Reid (who will be the Majority Leader in January), agreed on Bush’s three legislative priorities—budget, Vietnam trade bill, and the Indian deal.
Frist said that the “very important nuclear agreement with the largest democracy in the world” should be “completed with the minimum amount of debate and amendments” after reports surfaced that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Leader Republican Senator Richard Lugar had hammered out a consensus on modalities with his Democrat peer (soon to be Majority Leader) Joe Biden. Media reports say that the two had agreed on a limited number of amendments (6 to 8) and a debate time of no more than a day and a half. US legislative process requires that once a bill cleared both houses, there be a conference to reconcile to different versions, after which the changes have to be ratified again by respective houses before going to the President for signing it into law. If the process is no complete by end the end of the year, the whole process will be have to be restarted. Thanksgiving Day, Christmas holidays aside, contentious issues such as Iraq , Iran , Israel , and North Korea are expected to hog attention in the two weeks left for the end of the year. It will be difficult for the pro-deal lobby to maintain focus on the deal. The pro-deal lobby is also trying hard to get the deal approved before Bush travels to Vietnam for the APEC summit and the pro-Vietnam lobby is working to get the trade deal going to make the visit meaningful.
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Trying to thwart this effort is the Arms Control Association (ACA), a lobby of nuclear Ayatollahs bent on scuttling the deal with fictitious concerns has written to Senators seeking amendments that would surely scuttle the deal in India . The letter signed by 18 people claiming to be non-proliferation advocates, warned the changes incorporated by the Foreign Relations Committee (FRC) are inadequate and that the deal will adversely affect US non-proliferation and security objectives. In addition to the changes already incorporated by the FRC, the ACA called for:
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1. A demand and confirmation that India has stopped the production of fissile materials for weapons or a support for a multi-lateral fissile cutoff treaty.
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2. An annual certification process to ensure that the US civil nuclear trade does not in any way assist or encourage India 's nuclear weapons program.
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3. Mechanisms to stop US’s continued direct or third party assistance should India break non-proliferation commitments outlined in the July 18, 2005 joint statement.
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4. A verification process which will ensure that the Government of India (GOI) or its affiliated entities do not trade or encourage weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or components.
Accepting that developing Indo-US relations must be “an important goal,” the group of 18 argues that these measures are necessary because India has neither joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty nor accepted safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. Further, they also claim that India 's non-proliferation policy is not fully consistent with the non-proliferation practices and responsibilities expected of the original nuclear-weapon states.
The arguments furthered by this group are neither accurate nor fair. The argument that India has not accepted the safeguards of all of its nuclear facilities is a sleight of hand because an important component of the deal is that India would negotiate such a deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Therefore, to say that India does not have one and therefore should not be granted the deal is akin to hanging someone before the trial. The argument that India ’s non-proliferation policy is not fully consistent with the non-proliferation practices and responsibilities of “original” nuclear weapons states is again disingenuous. While countries became part of the “original” group of 5 nuclear weapons states at various times, India has a stellar non-proliferation record that is at par with those of the US and much better than China, Russia, France, or the UK. Besides, India has already promised a unilateral moratorium on testing and a no-first use policy that none of the “original” nuclear powers have done.
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The most disingenuous of all arguments is one furthered by Former Assistant Secretary of State for non-proliferation Robert Einhorn, who is also a signatory to the letter. Talking to the Deccan Herald, Einhorn says that his concern is that “ Pakistan will react and react” and “get into real competition here.” As a senior adviser to the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, Einhorn says that he is “not worried about India ’s fissile materials posing a threat to the US ” and asserts that “it is not going to pose a threat to the US .” Instead, he says that the deal will make Pakistan “worst case everything” by seeing the “opportunities this deal gives India to increase its production of fissile material, and therefore, of nuclear weapons.” This argument is a fallacious excuse aimed to placate an energy-deficient India through verbal flattery but deny it peaceful nuclear technology to sustain its economic growth. It furthers skepticism within India about the sincerity of the US and does not provide any incentives for future generations to be non-proliferators. The message Einhorn and crowd is sending India is that it is more beneficial to be proliferator of nuclear and WMD technologies and materials than not.
The saving grace is that the Bush Administration is keen to honor its commitments and its objective of improving Indo-US relations in a multi-faceted manner. Visiting US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher asserted that “Whatever happens, we will make this [nuclear deal] come to fruition.” Backing up the Administration’s drive to bringing the deal to “fruition,” a delegation of US officials from Department of Energy, Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission arrived in New Delhi and held their 5th closed door meeting (in addition to numerous informal meetings) to discuss the “123 Agreement” that would dictate the operational portions of the deal and ensure its conformance to the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954
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