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As Democrats routed the Republicans in the US mid-polls and seized both houses of the Congress after 12 years, there is a lot of fear in India that Indo-US relations, specifically the nuclear deal, assiduously built by the Bush Administration may be a casualty. Passed by the previous House of Representatives but pending in the Senate, many fear that the waning power of President George Bush may inspire nuclear Ayatollahs to ambush the deal in the Senate.
Bush Administration officials and representatives are quick to argue that the deal has bi-partisan support in both houses and partisan politics and differences over Iraq , North Korea , and Iran does not span to India policy. Indian Government officials are tip-lipped on the impact of the election outcome but take heart in continued assurances. After all, the Bush Administration has done more for Indo-US relations in the past 4 years than all Governments of the past. While a lame duck President Bill Clinton, appreciating India ’s restraint during the Kargil War, tried to over-compensate for all the damage his Governments and Secretaries had done in the 90s, George Bush had initiated several bold overtures to take bilateral relationship to a new level.
Indian diplomats had worked overtime to get the bill to complete before the polls, to remove the uncertainties and avoid delays, but partisan bickering and procedural issues had stalled the vote in the Senate. Now, with the change of control and plenty of politicking in store, notwithstanding political overtures to cooperate, there is near consensus expecting the nuclear deal not to show up any time soon in the lame-duck session till January. While US Ambassador David Mulford assured India of his Administration’s continued interest in the issue and hopeful of an early introduction (echoing Bush’s statement that he wants to get this done), Indian officials doubt that White House would be too keen to push through an issue at this stage. Fuelling this skepticism are practical US domestic issues such as fiscal concerns, controversial tax cuts, minimum wage, healthcare and pharmaceutical industry issues, etc. Crucial foreign policy issues includes Iraq where increasing body bags carrying American soldiers is dividing the nation apart, North Korean nuclear program, trade deficit with China, and concerns over terrorism. Nowhere in this sphere of immediate concerns do Indo-US relations or the nuclear issue feature.
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At the same time, there is no consensus even within the Democratic Party on many issues. While many Democrats disagree with Bush’s policies, they are divided among themselves on what alternatives need to be adopted. Easy targets such as Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfield and UN Permanent Representative John Bolton have already been targeted and almost accomplished. However, there is no clarity or workable solutions on any of the other issues. Democratic leaders in the Senate such as Tom Lantos, Harry Reid, and Joe Biden have already said that they will support the deal in a post-election scenario so Mulford says that “the prognosis is very good” that the deal may be completed in the lame-duck session.
This is good news and bad news for India . Good news because it takes the bilateral relationship out of partisan contention and politicking and bad news because it keeps the deal in limbo and empowers critiques of stronger relations with the US in India . The main challenge for India is going to be more at getting attention for its issues such as the nuclear deal, economic cooperation expansion, furthering defense ties, and science and technology cooperation. But the opportunity is that there is no major anti-Indian feeling or opposition in the Congress anymore and instead has broad-based support. The biggest question is whether this goodwill is strong or deep enough to warrant bi-partisan support and attention.
Even if it should get the required attention, there is genuine fear that the deal may be modified, at the behest of nuclear Ayatollahs, insisting on conditions such as fissile material cut-off, cap of nuclear weapons, annual certification of good conduct, etc., will be unacceptable to Indian political and scientific communities already critical of the deal. A coalition Federal Government requiring the support of these parties will be unable to accept such modifications will undoubtedly reject the deal. Fortunately, India would be able to get a first hand and insider assessment from US Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher for South and Central Asia in the State Department as he visits New Delhi for consultations with new Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee. In the meanwhile, Mulford confirmed that the 123 Agreement on the nuclear deal that defines the nuances is now in cold storage pending Senate clearance.
The biggest problem plaguing Indo-US relations has always been lack of attention, consistency, engagement, and continuity. It is in India ’s interest to initiate processes with US bodies to create a foundation on which to build relations. The nuclear deal is a remarkable show of good faith and interest by Bush with high stakes. A success of the deal would have catapulted relations to historic heights. At the same time, a failure would push bilateral relations to Cold War levels of skepticism and distrust. What both nations desperately need is an architecture for continued engagement that can be run irrespective of political changes or international developments
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