| |
Facing intense pressure from communists allies for ideological reasons and
Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)
for political reasons, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh eloquently defended the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal outlying ways it could help India. The Federal saw increased pressure after reports emerged that the US may be piling on conditions not originally stipulated in the 2005 deal that could affect India’s strategic initiatives such as Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) program, stockpiles of weapons grade uranium, and hamper further research.
While outlying the benefits of the deal, the Prime Minister asserted that India will not be subject to domestic laws of any nation, including the US. Addressing concerns of several retired scientists, he said that none of India’s strategic programs will be affected as they were not part of the original deal. He acknowledged that the deal will expire the minute India tests another nuclear device but reminded the Parliament that India has already declared a unilateral moratorium on testing. Singh suggested that the measures in the US Senate version of deal required the American President to certify compliance by India of non-proliferation measures and of fallback safeguards in addition to those agreed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are for the US Government to deal with and not for India to address. However, what is still not clear is whether an American non-certification will lead to an automatic withdrawal of support from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the IAEA. Further, it is not clearly specified what would be parameters on which the US President would certify Indian compliance. The danger of even going down this road will mean that India has tacitly accepted US laws and the danger of not addressing them leaves a huge stick by which India could be coerced into decisions.
But, as noted by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) Director Rajkumari Banerjee, the largest benefit India will gain from the deal is the unimpeded supply of uranium from other countries for its nuclear reactors to generate power. As an energy deficient nation requiring 600 kilo watt hours (kwh) per annum, India is far away from being self-sufficient and would have to look at multiple sources to meet this demand. While India has many reactors, it is short of uranium because of international embargos over its nuclear weapons program and non-compliance with the discriminatory Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Even countries such as France which has access to nuclear power had to buy uranium from third countries to meet their energy need. The other area that India needed help was with pressurized heavy water reactors. Technology embargos had limited India’s progress in this and fast breeder reactor areas. <
|
|
All decisions come at a cost and certainly the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal will also require one. By going out of its way to make an exception for India within the US laws, inside the NSG, and in the IAEA, the US has demonstrated extensive goodwill. Cold war mindsets and relevant historical betrayal of the US on core Indian issues continue to plague the bilateral relationship with deep questions on hidden agendas or costs that India may have to bear. Some say that the price for this deal is an alliance with the US against China while others say that this is ploy to get access to Indian resources. More virulent skeptics say that it is to enslave India into a dependence of the US pretty much along the lines of Japan and Germany.
While skepticism, questioning, and challenging assumptions are always good, there comes a point when a nation has to scale beyond its history and make a strategic leap forward in bilateral relations and direction. While making this decision to closely ally with the US, India should clearly address the core issues surrounding the US Senate requirement. The first one deals with a clear definition of parameters on which the US President will certify Indian’s compliance with nuclear non-proliferation. The second one deals with ensuring that an American non-certification does not automatically result in a disqualification for support from the NSG or IAEA .
|
|
![]()
|
