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Musharraf Indian Response to his Proposals |
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The National Security Advisor and several army reports have frequently stated that while infiltration has dropped, the “mix†of terrorism has changed. Just as Pakistan outsourced its terrorism to the Taliban in Pakistan, it is now setting up offshore units in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand to train elements recruited in India to attack soft targets in mainland India and whip up communal antagonism.
Musharraf’s plan itself is ridiculously naive. Without a control
of terrorist elements and a concerted effort to
shutdown terror camps, how can there be any
demilitarization?
While India has a functioning democracy in Jammu &
Kashmir, there is no such “self-rule†in PoK or
NA. Pakistan has not even implemented the order of
PoK’s High Court demanding it to hand over
administrative control to PoK. With such imbalances in
fundamental freedom, how will the question of
self-rule even apply? When Pakistan will not work with
Indian forces even during the earthquake crisis to
provide relief for civilians, where is the question of
joint-management? Without the relevance of the other
three points, the question of making the border
irrelevant does not even arise.
India’s demand has consistently been to reducing terror levels
from Pakistan, closure of terror camps in that
country, achieving democratic parity in PoK and NA,
and opening up the border in a controlled fashion to
make the borders irrelevant. Responding to
Musharraf’s proposal will essentially drag India
into a conversation that will be controlled by
Pakistan.
Musharraf has a habit of saying one thing and doing quite the
opposite. The Washington Post had recently asked US
President George Bush not to trust Musharraf; this is
sound advice that India should carefully
consider.
India cannot value its interests at the same level as
individual political greed and desire for power. It
needs Pakistan to stick to the roadmap of confidence
building measures to develop trust before trying
“out of box solutions†or bring about major
“policy changes.†The General may be in hurry for
domestic military reasons or international
compulsions; India simply cannot go down with him. |
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