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Iran's Nuclear Program |
The
United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have called for
a special meeting at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. The objective is to get
enough support to take Iran to the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) for punitive economic and possibly military
sanctions. The root of this disenfranchisement is a Western
suspicion of a nuclear program that the IAEA would not vouch
as entirely civilian. Western
nations accuse Iran of trying to develop a nuclear bomb,
violating international obligations, and hankering a bellicose
attitude to its neighbors. Firstly,
investigators of Libyan nuclear program found that disgraced
Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had sold nuclear weapons
technology to Libya, Iran, North Korea, and another West Asian
country believed to be either Saudi Arabia or Syria. Secondly,
as a signatory to the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 (Britain,
France, and Germany), Iran promised to place its nuclear
facility at Nantz in cold storage till a consensus is reached.
However, with a more hard-line party coming to power, Iran has
unilaterally abrogated this agreement and opened up the
facility for “research.†Thirdly, as a
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran
has right of access to civilian nuclear technology. However,
it is supposed to disclose any nuclear technology related
activity to the IAEA. While it has been diligent to disclose all its prior
activities, Iran did not disclose the purchase of centrifuges
from the A.Q. Khan nuclear weapons network. Fourthly,
Iran abruptly broke off conversations with the EU-3 without a
clear reason as to why it is terminating the conversation. Fifthly,
the Iranian President’s call for the destruction of Israel
and uncharitable comments against the Jewish people have
fueled and sustained suspicion over Iran’s long-term
objective for its nuclear program. |
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Iran
denies these charges. Firstly, it says that its
nuclear program is geared to developing self-sufficiency in
uranium enrichment to meet increased domestic demands for
electricity. Secondly, it denies that it is using the
centrifuges to produce high-grade fuel. Thirdly,
it says that since its intention is only civilian, as an NPT
signatory, it is entitled to produce its own nuclear fuel. Fourthly,
it argues that if India, as a new emergent nuclear weapons
state (NWS) and a non-signatory to the NPT, there should be no
restrictions on its operations. Fifthly, Iran
says its dialogue with EU-3 is unequal accusing those nations
of arm-twisting tactics and insensitivity. This
debate has curious and tangential implications for India. Firstly,
as one of the Governors of the IAEA, India has the
responsibility to vote on Iran’s nuclear program. In
September 2005, India voted against Iran’s nuclear program
but argued that the Iran-EU3 conversation continue to produce
a diplomatic solution. This caused much political fallout in
India where the minority Federal Government alienated
communist allies who are anti-American.
Secondly, India and the US signed a
civilian nuclear deal in summer 2005. This deal will
essentially recognize India as a NWS, grant it full access to
nuclear civilian technology, and excuse it for not signing the
NPT. The nuclear deal will also provide India much needed
technology that will enable it to generate electricity to
propel its growth and reduce its dependence on expensive oil.
Political extremists in commanding positions in the US
Congress have said that India needs to vote against Iran if
the nuclear deal is to get their support. Hence, if India does
not vote against Iran, it will lose all these benefits. Thirdly,
if India votes against Iran the consequence will be several
projects and Indo-Iranian commercial deals including a USD 20
billion Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) contract; a conceptual
Iran-Pakistan-India LNG pipeline; a strategic 219 kilometer
road through the mountains from Vearan to Zarani in Iran with
a link to the Garland Highway in Afghanistan-- this road will
not only give India access to Afghanistan from Iran but also
to the Central Asian republics; The Gujarat State Petroleum
Corporation (GSPC ) could be taking an equity state in
Iran’s South Pars oil field; and Iranian support to Indian
on Jammu & Kashmir in the Organization of Islamic
Countries (OIC), meetings often led by Pakistan. |
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The
issue becomes more complicated because India needs and values
the relationship of both countries but does not have the
economic, political, or military leverage that will allow it
to play on both sides. For example, China has a huge economic
relationship with both countries, is an acknowledged NWS, and
has military ties with Iran. India has an emerging economic
relationship with both countries but large enough to sustain
relationships; is not yet an acknowledged NWS or a
veto-wielding member of the UNSC; has military ties with the
US but no military ties with Iran. Therefore, the ideal
situation is it could find a way out of its predicament that
will enable it to secure the nuclear deal with the US and not
jeopardize its relationship with Iran. However,
none of the deals are really concluded. The US has been
raising many last minute issues with India regarding what
nuclear facilities it wants to classify as civilian. It is
trying to leverage even an unconcluded deal to stop India from
getting into economic partnerships with Syria. It is also
alienating large sections of Indian polity and decision makers
whose support are required for a strategic partnership with
the US just like the US Administration needs the support of
political extremists in the Congress. Moreover, there is fear
in India that the US would try curtailing Indian engagements
with other countries perceived inimical to their policy such
as Sudan, Venezuela, Bolivia, or Chile. The
relationship with Iran is also based on shaky grounds. While
Iran has supported India in the OIC, its support has been weak
and only as a leverage for political posturing against
Pakistan. Iran has consistently voted against Indian in
dealings on Kashmir and nuclear issues. Iran has never
committed to Indian economic overtures even reneging on ones
it has agreed to. For example, National Iranian Gas Export
Corporation (NIGEC) had entered a USD 20 billion deal with
major India oil companies to supply 2.5 million tons of
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) that would power northern states
saying that it needs ratification from the new Government.
India says this legal waffling makes Iran an unreliable
supplier, a country with no legal compulsions or values, and
makes the intentions of that country suspicious. |
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In order to navigate these harsh choices and hurdles, India has to base its policy to suit its own interests. Firstly, it needs to encourage the West to not follow the policy of punitive sanctions against Iran. The record of sanction regimes is littered by examples of Cuba, Iraq, and North Korea. Nowhere have sanctions worked to evolve a permanent solution. Secondly, it needs to encourage Iran to adopt the Russian proposals of joint-venture enrichment facility in Russia. Thirdly, it needs to assiduously advocate against Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations. Fourthly, it needs to counsel the US to apply proliferation policy equally. The US cannot accept proliferation from Pakistan and China but beat up Iran. Fifthly, it needs to encourage global nuclear disarmament efforts including Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and No First Use Treaty. Sixthly, it needs to insist on expanded economic ties with Iran irrespective of the nuclear issue and in areas beyond oil. Seventhly, it needs to invest heavily in research and development of alternative energy technologies that will free itself of oil and gas from Iran or nuclear energy technology from the US. |
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