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Issue 1, September 11, 2006
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India’s Continued Hibernation
As this serious escalation progressed,
National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan asserted that India will continue
with its ban on the LTTE and has no plans for “direct intervention” in the
resumed Civil War. He rejected TN Chief Minister M.K. Karunanidhi’s
statement that the ban on LTTE was “debatable” and said that it was a
“dangerous organization” but posed little danger to India as it would like
to get its support. Narayanan said that India will not “involve itself”
because of “past experience” but promised that it was “extending all
cooperation.” Not specifying what cooperation the nation was extending,
Narayan said that the “Lankan government is very sensitive in going ahead
with the devolution of power to the Tamils” as “they have problems in
dealing with the LTTE.”
Referring to his discussions with Sri
Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, Narayanan said that from India
’s perspective “the importance of safety and security of the Tamils,
devolution of powers, and distinction between LTTE and other Tamils” was
important. It is not clear if Sri Lanka agrees with the distinction between
the LTTE and the Tamils or whether it was a Lankan Government position that
has been adopted by India . In either case, this is a dangerous trend as it
means that the Lankan Government can now argue that it does not need to talk
to the LTTE since it does not talk for the Lankan Tamils. Even a cursory
conversation with any Lankan Tamil will show that they view the LTTE as
their primary negotiator although this position seems to be eroding among
Muslim Tamils, Indian-origin Tamils, and Tamils in the East.
In this new run up to violence, the
SLG had authorized the SLA to use any means necessary include brutal ones to
overrun the LTTE. For example, the SLG recently killed in custody 17 aid
workers of a French non-government organization and initially tried to hide
this crime and later did not even tender an apology. In another incident,
the air force bombed a school killing scores of children claiming that these
were child warriors and therefore legitimate targets. Both these incidents
have angered the population in TN causing the normally divided State
Assembly to pass a unanimous motion to condemn these attacks in the harshest
terms.
The TN population was also angered by
two insensitive policy decisions which had to be quickly backtracked. One
was the reported sale of 2 radars to SLA and another is the training of SL
policemen in counter-insurgency operations within TN. In both cases, the
strongest protest led to a quick apology and reversal of policy. These two
recent incidents show a lack of coordination and appreciation of the
consequences of wrong turns to India . Even earlier, the nation had created
policy that has been insensitive to TN such as the Indira-Srimavo Maritime
Agreement ceding Kachithivu to Sri Lanka , training of LTTE rebels in TN,
creation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, etc. All these decisions have failed
and need not have if the stakeholders in the South been consulted.
Emerging Patterns
Studying the developments of the last
few years, the following patterns emerge:
1.
Neither the SLG nor the LTTE appear to be serious
about making peace and look for the slightest excuse to break Agreements
2.
Years of this behavior has eroded trust levels to zero
3.
Any solution that may be proposed or implemented,
needs to be backed by guarantees that are strong and intractable
4.
Only a military and economic stalemate encourages
parties to want to negotiate peace
5.
Both the SLG and the LTTE have violent streaks that do
not hesitate to kill their own populations to root out dissension, eliminate
opposition, and coerce support
6.
Both sides are incapable of honoring agreements,
following norms, or accepting responsibility.
Indian Interests
in Resolving Crisis
Despite these very harsh realities,
India cannot afford to stay a silent spectator for the following reasons:
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As fighting escalates, the influx of
refugees to India will be high therefore affecting the economy, security,
and stability of TN which is an economic frontline state
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With both groups acquiring more
weapons, there will be 2 air forces, 2 navies, and 2 ground troops to deal
with
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As India refuses to engage militarily,
there are increasingly credible reports of Pakistani military and
counter-insurgency advisors in SL. Pakistan could also send its dreaded
{Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)} to SL and instigate the nascent Muslim
armed militias to target India
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A humanitarian crisis is evolving in
India ’s neighborhood. Caught in the vortex of violence, civilians are
blockaded and do not have access to food, medicine, and essential supplies.
With no human rights groups or aid agencies in the North and East, SLA
operates with impunity and commits violations at will. Similarly, the LTTE
also extends its own writ on the population. As the suffering of the people
escalates, TN will become increasingly vocal in more direct support from
India —a situation that the nation is unprepared to take.
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Violence in the South seriously
destabilizes trade routes to the South. For continued growth of the Indian
economy, it cannot afford to have such instabilities along important sea
lanes.
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India is projecting itself as a
strategic global player and has expressed desire to become a permanent
member of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It should assume leadership of a
complex problem it has good insight into and has the capability of
influencing positive results.
Recommendations
No matter the urgency for India to be
directly involved, India ’s options are limited by the attitude of the
warring groups. However, there are options that it can exercise to reduce
tensions.
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India needs to assume diplomatic
leadership to influence peace in Sri Lanka.
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Firstly, it needs to bring together
key nations such as the US , EU, Canada , and Japan into a contact group
that can focus on Sri Lanka .
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Secondly, it needs to draft a UNSC
resolution demanding a ceasefire from the SLG and withdrawal to positions
before the escalation.
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Thirdly, the UNSC should prohibit
the sale of weapons systems (especially heavy weapons such as artillery,
naval and airborne craft) to SLG and LTTE.
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Fourthly, it should ban military
advisors, counter-insurgency operation specialists, and other officer
deputation from third countries that could undermine peace.
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India should encourage the setting
up of a human rights body in Sri Lanka.
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Firstly, this group must be funded
by the National Human Rights Council (NHRC).
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Secondly, this body will be located
in Colombo and staffed by Indian, Japanese, Bhutanese, and Maldivian
observers with experience in judiciary, law, police, military, human
rights, and non-government activities.
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Thirdly, this group must expressly
demand that the SLG and LTTE desist from direct violations such as rape,
custodial torture, custodial death, indefinite detention without charge,
enforced disappearances, recruitment of child warriors, targeting
civilians and civilian structures, etc.
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Fourthly, it should create a contact
list of SL nationals outside the ambit of the SLG who will review, provide
input into, and assist this group to monitor, collect information, and
report human rights violations and humanitarian conditions in SL.
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Fifthly, this group must have strong
ties with the NHRC to get best practices and methodologies transferred to
it so it can operate efficiently without having to invent many of these
processes.
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Sixthly, India must review this
report with the contact group within the UN scope (as defined in (1)) and
to decide on future course of action.
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Seventhly, this group must also set
up a process for healing and reconciliation, along the lines of such
process in South Africa , where the grievances of population affected have
a body to hear their story and seek resolution.
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India should develop an unofficial
track of dialogue with LTTE.
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Firstly, this avenue of conversation
must be to seek assurance on norms of behavior that conforms to the Geneva
Convention.
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Secondly, it should demand that the
LTTE does not use children in war.
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Thirdly, it should receive human
rights violations data input from the LTTE.
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Fourthly, it should confront the
group with data showing its violations.
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Fifthly, discuss means by which the
LTTE can participate democratically. After all, other insurgent rebel
groups such as the Irish Republican Army in Ireland , Palestine Liberation
Organization through Fattah in Palestinian Territories , Basque
separatists in Spain , Hamas in Palestine Territories , Hezbollah in
Lebanon , and Maoists in Nepal have participated in democracy.
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India needs a contact group in
South India to guide its Sri Lanka policies.
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Firstly, India must not make Sri
Lanka policies in isolation and only from New Delhi .
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Secondly, it should include a group
of people from South India that would include politicians, academics,
think tanks, journalists, human rights groups, analysts, and researchers
to help it monitor, define, and refine its Sri Lankan policy.
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Thirdly, it needs to periodically
expand this contact group with similar individuals from Sri Lanka to
increase people-to-people contact and learning.
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India needs to sensitize the SLG on
the various facets in resolving the issue with the Tamils. Ceasefire,
Ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian issues, development, and Constitutional
reform are different elements that can be solved separately but in parallel.
It needs to impress on Sri Lanka to proceed on all these fronts in parallel
and use different means.
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Firstly, to address Ceasefire, the
SLG and LTTE have to be ready for this in the true spirit. This may come
with confidence building measures such as respecting the ceasefire line,
regular flag meetings between local commanders, local review of instances,
an arbitration process, etc.
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Secondly, to monitor Ceasefire, a
monitoring mission needs to be created and this could be drawn from
neutral African, South American, and Asian nations. These observers can
also be allowed oversight rights of territory and be local arbitrators.
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Thirdly, Humanitarian issues need to
be addressed immediately and can be as described in (2).
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Fourthly, a development framework
need to be worked out to ensure that rebuilding of the nation, however
modest, is re-started. However, this must not be done by providing large
amounts to the Government unless closely monitored since the SLG has the
proclivity to divert funds to beef up its military.
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Fifthly, a Constitutional reform
process has already been started in SL and exploring options in
Federalism, asymmetrical power structures, and such. While a long-term
reform is being worked out, India must demand that Sri Lanka adopt Clause
3 of Geneva Convention into its laws so human rights violations can be
prosecuted and the guilty punished. Currently, SL laws do not have this
provision. It should also demand that pending a final Constitution, SL
should introduce a modern Bill of Rights that will safeguard the lives and
fundamental rights of civilians. SL could also create a national
commission that overseas the interests of minorities and this could
provide a forum for addressing issues of minorities.
Home Page
Background and Policy Hibernation
Ceasefire, Human Rights Violations & Peace Talk
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