While it is impossible to predict the future, the Indian Government is already on record saying that it does not want nuclear weapons parity with China, its largest enemy with which it is trying to better relations, but only a "credible minimum deterrent." Public domain data says that India has enough nuclear bombs or can produce enough to achieve this goal. Additionally, it is also supposed to hold enough fissile material to make scores more. Given this context, the enrichment limitation is not really a limitation that India wants to fight because it has already achieved its goals.

Additionally, India has also agreed to abide by the same standards of the acknowledged Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) in exchange to be treated as one outside the ambit of the NPT. Since New Delhi has also been vocal stating its intention to pursue a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), why should it not set an example to the rest of the world in yet another sphere by voluntarily stopping production of fissile material? This is essentially what the negotiators of the nuclear deal from India did.

At the same time, India does not want to be stuck as it did with the Tarapur deal where the US was not willing to take back the nuclear waste nor would it allow India to reprocess the fuel. The storage and supplementary costs will soon make nuclear energy generation unviable. Remarking on this aspect, U.S. Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns said that the issue of "spent nuclear fuel" was "ahead of us" in future negotiations meaning the nations need to work out a mechanism of dealing with it. At the same time, he confirmed that the US will not provide reprocessing or enrichment technologies to India.

• Introduction

• Concern 1: Certification Process

• Concern 3: Testing Curb

• Concern 4: Iran's Nuclear Program

• Concern 5: Access to Technology

• Concern 6: Bar on Side-Deal

• Concern 7: Uninterrupted Supply

• Conclusion