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Concern 1: Certification Process
A prime concern is language in the bill that requires a certification by the US President that New Delhi was cooperating with Washington to check Iran's nuclear ambitions. But the wording has been sufficiently weakened into a sort of nonbinding language, but there is still fear that this language may be twisted to suit US convenience, as has been done in the past, at a later time. In other words, India wants the independence to frame its foreign policy even if it turns out to be the opposite of US measures with or without the deal.
There is realization in the US that India cannot be pushed around and even if the countries were to ally closely down the road, the alliance will be along the lines of US-France relationship and not as close of US-Canada or US-UK relations. So much was testified by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice before a House and Senate panels and asked them not to design policies where variance in foreign policy is acceptable with some allies and frowned with others.
Moreover, this deal was similar to the 1985 US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) that the US forged with China but took 13 years to implement because of China's inability to meet the conditions. While constantly asking the US to implement the deal, China broke every promise by selling missile equipment and technology, dual-use chemicals and production equipment, and advanced conventional arms to recipients in regions of instability, primarily Iran and Pakistan. India does not have this problem as it has publicly, privately, politically, and socially announced of its policy not to proliferate. Unlike China, India is a democracy and such promises and commitments cannot be broken easily. Unlike Pakistan, India, as a democracy, cannot encourage sale of nuclear technology surreptitiously.
Therefore, as a law-abiding nation, India does not have anything to worry except a change in US political attitude that becomes inimical to India -there has been many instances of such changes by US governments in the past and India has faced it several times. Therefore, this is one area that India should cover in the 1-2-3 agreement to ensure that sudden political shifts are rare and with reason. At the same time, Indian strategists must realize the large change of political, diplomatic, and strategic landscape of the world and how the US views India. The broad-based bipartisan voting, large Indian American presence in the US, extensive business ties, democratic values, and growing strategic interaction are very different from the chilly Cold War days. Hence, while it is understandable that there is skepticism in India about the US based on past experiences, the context now is very different. For the most part, the US has overcome its Cold War and past experiences of technology transfer (such as US satellite launch integration cooperation with China boosted Beijing's ICBM capabilities), so can India.
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