“Decisions in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group enabling nuclear trade with India
are made by consensus and consistent with its rules. Our aim is to guarantee
that this multilateral organization will continue to play a vital role in
global non-proliferation efforts.'' This could become a problem because there
are {hardliners
inside the NSG who oppose this deal on pure theoretical and
philosophical grounds.
It supports the timely consideration of nuclear export applications, but
prohibits the export of equipment, material or technology related to the
enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the
production of heavy water. This could be a setback to India which has already
mastered the full nuclear development cycle and needs the deal only to gain
access to uranium.
Creation of a system to ensure that “no items exported to India are diverted
to any uses that are not peaceful.”
Recognizing that the modifications would require renegotiations of the deal
with India, the US Administration had earlier asked
Congress to accept the deal as is. However, there has been intense
criticism in the Congress on the text and concerns regarding testing and
proliferation. The House version had an unreasonable demand for India to help
the US contain Iran.
A State Department spokesperson said “What we've seen is a strong and positive
reception to date. Both committees have worked hard on this legislation and we
certainly appreciate that and value the partnership and cooperation that we've
enjoyed with them so far.” He said that the legislation “has to go through some
more work but we are confident that (it) will be a cooperative and a good
process and it will end up with something that everybody can support and that
serves the interests if the United States and our strong partner India.”
Strong demands from Congressional representatives had caused the US
Administration to send out feelers to India about
modifications in its deal. It has also started
working on the nitty-gritty with India on the expectation of a
Congressional approval. The Bush Administration has also done some serious
heavy lifting in support of the deal with the Nuclear Supplier Group, allies,
and the Congress. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief El
Baradei had also communicated extensively in support of the deal.
Chairman of the SFRC Senator Richard Lugar said that the civilian nuclear
energy deal between India and the U.S. was the “most important strategic
initiative” undertaken by the Bush administration. Lugar also complimented the
Bush Administration saying that by concluding this pact and the far-reaching
set of cooperative agreements that accompanied it, US President George Bush
“embraced a long-term outlook” that sought to enhance the core strength of the
country's foreign policy in a way that would give it “new diplomatic options
and improve global stability.” However, he wanted to make sure that this treaty
does not “undercut” the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the hope
that the “agreement can be a lasting incentive for India to abstain from
further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United States
in stopping proliferation.”
Predictably, after a year of signing the deal, the communists have for all the
wrong things such as ratification of the bill in the Parliament, roll back of
the deal, a debate in the Parliament, etc. The main opposition party, the
Bharatiya
Janata Party, has also shown remarkable short-sightedness in demanding
wrong things and even threats that they may not accept the treaty if they come
to power. However, senior officials say the Government is determined not to
allow the deal to become an "albatross" around the neck of the country's
foreign policy. An unnamed Indian official said “There is a reference to
isolating Iran, joining the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Australia
group, Wassenaar agreement. None of this is in the operational part of the
Bill, but the language used for these add-ons is just not acceptable.” If not
for anything “it cannot be sustained domestically given the nature of our
political system.” Regardless of political differences, there is political
consensus in India that it cannot be pushed into accepting a deal that contains
references that could destroy age-old ties and permanently damage social,
cultural, and economic interests.
Despite the underlying suspicion on the amendments to the deal by both panels,
the overwhelming, and bipartisan nature of the support for the deal proves that
the changing perception of India extends beyond the White House. While Indian
strategists would frown on the test ban and also on the demeaning text seeking
a Presidential attestation that India is meeting its obligations, it was
refreshing to note that overall, there was willingness to respect India’s
sovereignty. Many amendments requiring India to offer more than it had already
committed were defeated handsomely. Another important perspective is the
de-linking of Pakistan, despite vocal and strong protests from Islamabad, from
India policy in Washington. The new legislation will also remove prohibition on
cooperating with India imposed after its 1998 nuclear tests.